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ABSTRACT
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA:
CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS’S ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
ORIENTATIONS TOWARD DEMOCRACY
Chunlong Lu 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Jie Chen
Does the middle class in China think and act democratically and hence serve as 
the harbinger o f democratic development in that country? Little empirical work has been 
done to systematically address this crucial question. The primary goals of this 
dissertation are to explore the level of attitudinal support for democracy among Chinese 
middle class individuals, examine their behavioral orientations toward politics, and 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the role of the Chinese middle class in the 
evolution of the Chinese political system. This dissertation argues that the middle class 
in China consists of the following four occupational groups: self-employed laborers, 
managers, professionals, and civil servants. Following this conceptualization, it discusses 
the relations between the Chinese party-state and the newly rising middle class, and 
makes distinctions between the subgroup of middle class individuals employed in the 
public sector and the subgroup employed in the private sector, and posits three 
hypotheses: (1) The private-sector middle class has strong democratic attitudes; on the 
other hand, the public-sector middle class has significantly weaker democratic attitudes; 
(2) The private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic orientation may lead to their 
negative evaluation of the current forms of mass political participation; in turn, this 
negative evaluation may cause the private-sector middle class individuals to engage in 
non-participatory action as a form of protest against the current system; and (3) The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
public-sector middle class individuals’ undemocratic belief may lead to their positive 
evaluation of the current forms of mass political participation; in turn, this positive 
evaluation may cause the public-sector middle class individuals to engage in participatory 
action to express their support of the current system. The hypothesized causal 
relationships are tested via three representative public opinion surveys.
The three hypotheses are strongly supported by the empirical evidence. This 
dissertation concludes that the private-sector middle class people are more likely to hold 
democratic values and act in ways that promote democracy in China, while the public- 
sector middle class people tend to hold negative attitudes toward democracy and act in an 
undemocratic fashion. Such findings are of theoretical and practical significance.
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Since the advent of the post-Mao reform, the People’s Republic of China has 
undergone a series o f profound socio-political changes, one of which was the emergence 
and growth of the middle class in the country’s urban areas. This development raises an 
important question: Does the middle class in a non-democratic, transitional society such 
as China think and act democratically and hence serve as the harbinger of democratic 
change in that country? Although there have been some anecdotal observations, China 
studies have not yet developed a theoretically complete and in-depth explanation of the 
role of the middle class in that country’s democratic transition. Moreover, previous 
theoretical approaches to the study of the Chinese middle class, despite their 
sophistication, failed to provide a conceptual framework to explain and predict the 
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the new middle class toward democracy.
This dissertation, therefore, explores a new approach to the study o f the role o f the 
middle class in China’s political transition. Unlike traditional approaches, which tend to 
neglect the individual-level analysis o f the attitudinal and behavioral orientations o f the 
middle class, this new approach focuses on a set of socio-political characteristics of 
middle class individuals, among which their socioeconomic ties with the Chinese state is 
the most important. The underlying idea for this new approach is that this set of socio­
political characteristics determines middle class individuals’ attitudes toward democracy 
and their political actions. The purpose of this study is to explore, through the use of
This dissertation follows the format requirements o f A Manual fo r  Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses and 
Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
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three public opinion surveys conducted in China, this alternative approach. This chapter 
presents the theoretical foundations for the approach and the hypotheses for the data 
analysis.
STRUCTURAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS: THE “MODERNIZATION” APPROACH AND 
THE “CONTEXTUAL” APPROACH
Before I review the previous studies of the Chinese middle class, which tend to be 
structural-oriented, I will briefly describe the structural- and individual-level approaches 
to the analysis of class politics, emphasizing the differences between the two.
The structural-level and individual-level analyses intend to answer different 
questions. The structural-level analysis, which is meant to describe a crucial property of 
whole societies, emphasizes the impact of the size of different social classes as well as 
the relationships among these classes on the change and stability of a political regime.
On the other hand, the individual-level analysis, which defines “a set of ‘locations’ filled 
by individuals subjected to a set of mechanisms that impinge directly on their lives as 
they make choices and act in the world”1, focuses on the links between social class status 
and individual attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward political affairs. Moreover, 
the findings from the analysis on one level can not be used to validate (or invalidate) the 
findings from the analysis on the other level.
The previous studies of the political role of the Chinese middle class tend to 
be structural-oriented. One group of these scholars argues that democratic change in 
China is inevitable, because economic development will create a large middle class
1 Erik Olin Wright, “Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept of Class Structure,” in Reworking Class, ed. 
John R. Hall (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 44.
2 Ibid.
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in the next two decades. According to this argument, the newly emerged Chinese 
middle class has quietly become the class carrying the values of responsive 
government and democracy. I will call this argument the “modernization” approach.
For adherents of this approach, continued economic growth creates an independent 
middle class; moreover, the emergence of a large and growing middle class “bodes 
well for the emergence o f democracy,” because the middle class forms “a solid base
-3
for legal democratic politics.”
Another group of these structural-oriented scholars argues that the middle
class will remain a small minority within Chinese society, and therefore are not
likely to become a democratic force. Moreover, this view suggests that the Chinese
middle class is anti-democratic or undemocratic by nature.4 I will call this argument
the “contextual” approach.
The modernization approach originates in the work of Aristotle, who was the first
to observe the structural relations between a democratic regime and the strength of a
middle class in a society:
“Aristotle observed that where the rich were the most powerful class, they 
established exclusionary oligarchies as the form of government, wherein only 
those with large property holdings could vote or hold political offices. Where the 
poor were very numerous and well organized, they established what Aristotle 
called ‘extreme democracy’— extreme because the poor, badly educated, and 
tending toward ‘mobrule,’ as Polybius dubbed it, often overrode law in their 
assemblies, and more often followed blindly the lead of a charismatic demagogue.
3 Ronald M. Glassman, China in Transition: Communism, Capitalism, and Democracy (New York: 
Praeger, 1991), 62.
4 For example, see David G. Goodman, “The New Middle Class,” in The Paradox o f  China’s Post-Mao 
Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick Mac MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999), 259-61; Margaret M. Pearson, China’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequences o f  
Economic Reform  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jane Duckett, “Bureaucrats in 
Business, Chinese Style,” World Development 29 (2001): 23-37; David Zweig, “Undemocratic Capitalism: 
China and the Limits o f Economism,” The National Interest 56 (Summer 1999): 63-72; He Li, “Middle 
Class: Friends or Foes to Beijing’s New Leadership,” Journal o f  Chinese Political Science 8, nos. 1&2 
(2003): 87-100.
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Aristotle observed, however, that where the middle class was prosperous and 
numerous, they tended to establish a stable form of government based on the rule 
of law and founded on the inclusion of the entire population in the participatory 
process of the assembly.”5
The recent empirical studies have echoed Aristotle’s observation that a strong and
unified middle class is a favorable condition for the rise of democracy and the
stability o f such a political system.
Following Aristotle’s argument, Robert Dahl suggests that a middle class-
dominant society tends to be less unequal in terms of the distribution of
socioeconomic resources, which is favorable to the rise and maintenance of a
democratic system.6 On the other hand, the inequalities in the distribution of
socioeconomic resources in a society without a strong middle class may approximate
the inequalities in the distribution of political resources, which is not favorable to
competitive politics and polyarchy.7
In addition, Francis Fukuyama suggests that in a middle class-dominant
society, the most important socioeconomic inequalities will be based not on inherited
social position but on education, occupation, and individual achievement. Hence, a
middle class-dominant society will have a high level of social mobility, which
creates “better environments for fostering liberal democracy than those riven by
o
longstanding class barriers.”
5 Glassman, China in Transition, 3-4.
6 Edward N. Muller, “Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality,” American Sociological 
Review 53 (1988): 50-68; and idem, “Economic Determinants of Democracy,” American Sociological 
Review 60 (1995): 805-21; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971).
7 Dahl, Polyarchy.
8 Francis Fukuyama, “Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link,” in Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy Revisited, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 101-102.
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For example, American democracy occurred in a society “wherein the rich 
were relatively weak, the poor [were] easily absorbed into the middle class, and the 
middle class [were] burning with desire for democratic and lawful government;” 
whereas “in England, where the gentry were all-powerful, and in France, where the 
poor swelled to vast proportions and could not gain upward mobility, and where the 
feudal classes still held some power, the political ideas of the ... middle classes 
could not become institutionalized.”9
The modernization theorists further suggest that with economic development 
in a society, the middle class will emerge and gain in size, and, in turn, work as a 
causal agent for the establishment of democracy.10 For the modernization theorists, 
economic development changes a country’s social structure from the pyramid-shaped 
type to the diamond-shaped type, with the majority of the population being middle 
class. This structural change tempers the intensity of a country’s social conflict both 
by reducing the proportion of the lower class that is susceptible to anti-democratic 
and extremist ideologies and forces and by increasing the proportion of the middle 
class that supports pro-democratic ideologies and forces, which, in turn will facilitate 
the rise and stability o f democracy.11 Moreover, modernization theorists assume that 
this developmental path—economic development creates an affluent middle class in
9 Ronald M. Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 158.
10 For more on this point, please see Seymour M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o f Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 
69-105; and idem, Political Man: the Social Bases o f  Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1981).
11 Muller, “Economic Determinants o f Democracy;” Lipset, Political Man.
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a society, which, in turn, leads to a democratic system— is linear and can be
12generalized to all countries and regions.
Based on the this modernization theory, Ronald Glassman and Henry Rowen 
are optimistic about the future of democracy in China, because they believe that 
economic development will create a large Chinese middle class in the next two
1 2decades, which, in turn, will act as a causal agent for democracy in that country.
Also, Pei Minxin has predicted, “when the proportion of the middle class [in Chinese 
society] is over 60 percent, political openness will be inevitable, and the pressure on 
the government will be dramatic.”14
The contextual approach has a very pessimistic view of the role of the 
Chinese middle class in promoting democracy in that country.15 They do not agree 
with the linear model of modernization theory and they assert that the unique 
historical experiences of each country, their distinctive cultures, and their particular 
political systems are of critical importance in understanding the causal relations 
among social phenomena.16
12 See Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy;” and idem, Political Man', Samuel P. Huntington,
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 
1991); Ronald M. Glassman, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press; London: Macmillan Press, 1997); and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio- 
Historical Perspective.
13 Henry S. Rowen, “The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,” The National Interest 45 (1996): 68- 
69; Glassman, China in Transition.
14 Jiang He, “Analysis: The Significance o f the Growing Middle Class in China,” (2004). Available 
[Online]:< http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/4-4-27/21061.html> [17 July 2006].
15 For example, see Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, China’s New Business Elite', Duckett, 
“Bureaucrats in Business, Chinese Style;” Zweig, “Undemocratic Capitalism;” Li, “Middle Class.”
16 For a detailed discussion of the contextual effects o f historical origin and cultural circumstances on the 
causal relevance among social phenomenon, please see Charles Ragin and David Zaret, “Theory and 
Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies,” Social Forces 61, no. 3 (1983): 731-54; Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); Theda Skocpol, “A Critical Review o f Barrington M oore’s 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” Politics and Society 4, no. 1 (1973): 1-34; and idem, States 
and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f  France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). For a detailed discussion of the role of the middle class in the democratic changes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Adherents of the contextual approach are concerned with the overall Chinese 
social structure and the size of the Chinese middle class. Because of the fact that over 40 
percent of China’s population still lives in rural areas and is poorly educated, there is 
little possibility for the middle classes to grow to the same proportion in China as in the
17developed countries. Therefore, the middle class will remain a small minority in China, 
and the Chinese social structure will remain pyramid-shaped, with peasants constituting 
the largest social class. Moreover, Chinese society is currently one of the most unequal 
societies in the world.18 The widespread social grievances, particularly among desperate 
peasants and unemployed workers, has intensified the interest conflicts between the rich 
and poor. Thus, given this socioeconomic polarization and potential class antagonism, 
the small middle class may choose to align with the bourgeoisie and Party-state, since 
“they share the need for repressive state power that if free from the influence or control of 
the populace would protect their wealth and ‘noble’ status in the societal hierarchy.”19 
In the studies cited above on the role of the Chinese middle class in promoting 
democracy in that country, no attention is given to the individual-level analysis of the 
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the middle class.
In the view of the modernization approach analysts, the middle class appears to be 
a consistent agent for democracy within a society; therefore, democratic change is 
inevitable. However, this belief leaves these scholars in a weak position, because, the
in the less developed countries, please see Dale L. Johnson, “Class and Social Development: Toward a 
Comparative and Historical Social Science,” in Middle Classes in Dependent Countries, ed. Dale L.
Johnson (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985), 13-19; Ulf Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle 
Classes: Reflections on Political Development,” Australian Journal o f  Politics and History 37 (1991): 100- 
17.
17 An Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” Political 
Science Quarterly 117, no. 3 (2002): 401-22.
18 Alvin Y. So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” Journal o f  Contemporary 
Asia  33, no. 3 (2003): 367.
19 Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 416-17.
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middle class is in fact not a consistent democratic force in the non-democratic,
transitional society. For example, in Singapore, the majority of the middle class accepts
the undemocratic government as long as the authoritarian regime continues to satisfy 
20their material needs. In Malaysia, the burgeoning middle class, especially ethnic
Malays, has either actively supported an increasingly authoritarian state or remained 
21politically apathetic. In Indonesia, the new middle class has stood firmly on the side of 
the status quo.22
The contextual approach scholars treat the middle class as an “arbitrary” or 
“dependent” variable, which can be predicted by the overall social context. According to 
them, the size of the middle class within a society has a dominant impact on its attitudinal 
and behavioral orientations. Therefore, the Chinese social context (i.e., a society where 
more than half of the Chinese population are still peasants and the middle class will 
remain a small minority) is the decisive factor in determining the nature o f the middle 
class and that, given the current social context, that nature will be undemocratic.
Moreover, both approaches (i.e., the modernization and contextual approaches) 
are based primarily on theoretical speculation and lack empirical evidence to support 
their arguments. Very few representative-sample studies have systematically addressed 
the individual-level question: does the middle class in China think and act democratically 
and hence serve as the harbinger of democratic change in that country? To fill this gap,
20 Peng Er Lam, “Singapore: Rich State, Illiberal Regime,” in Driven by Growth: Political Change in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, ed. James W. Morley (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Garry Rodan, “The Growth of 
Singapore’s Middle Class and its Political Significance,” in Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political 
and Economic Directions in the 1990s, ed. Garry Rodan (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993).
21 Daniel A. Bell, “After the Tsunami: Will Economic Crisis Bring Democracy to Asia,” The New Republic 
218 (March 9, 1998): 22-25; David Martin Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle 
Class Culture in Pacific Asia,” Comparative Politics 30 (1998): 147-69.
22 Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia;” Bell, “After 
the Tsunami.”
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this dissertation focuses on the individual-level analysis and attempts, by using three 
public opinion surveys, to explain the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the 
Chinese middle class.
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
ROLE OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS IN DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
As Erik Olin Wright has suggested, the framework deployed in the structural- 
level analysis has tended to be unsuitable for the concrete, individual-level analysis.23 
The basic strategy that I have adopted in this dissertation is to conceptualize middle class 
status as a set o f distinctive socioeconomic attributes— owning small properties, 
supervising others, and possessing professional expertise—which qualitatively 
distinguish the middle class from other social classes. This dissertation identifies these 
socioeconomic attributes as the initial and dynamic factors in influencing the middle 
class’ political attitudes and behaviors. This study also adds a new attribute—-the 
socioeconomic ties with the state— reflecting the uniqueness o f the Chinese middle class, 
which divides the Chinese middle class into two sub-groups: private-sector and public- 
sector.
In its presentation of an individual-level theoretical framework that explains how 
these socioeconomic attributes affect the middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors, 
this dissertation uses the theoretical insights of the studies of the middle class in the West. 
The predominant view, in the individual-level studies of the middle class in the West, 
suggests that middle class individuals have strongly supportive attitudes toward 
democracy because they realize that democracy is the best system to protect their 
23 Wright, “Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept of Clasp Structure.”
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individual rights and property. Unlike members of the upper classes who not only own 
much larger properties but usually enjoy formal or informal clientelist ties with the state 
power that could be used to protect their properties and other interests, members of the 
middle class generally lack close connections with powerful political patrons.24 Without 
these political connections, middle class citizens have to rely on such democratic 
institutions as the popular election o f leaders and constitutional limitations on state power 
to protect their rights and property from the actions of powerful intruders (e.g., the 
government and its officials).25 The Western literature also contends that middle class 
individuals are most likely to act on their democratic beliefs, because they have a high
level of political efficacy: that is, they are more confident about their role in public affairs
26  •and are more competent to participate in politics than members of the lower class. This 
political confidence and competence comes mainly from the experience and intellectual 
expertise gained in their occupations and professions. The experience o f running a 
business, supervising others, and/or possessing intellectual expertise makes middle class
24 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and idem, The New Middle 
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
25 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; Lipset, Political Man.
26 Heinz Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective,” Journal o f  Politics 18 (1956): 232-53; 
and idem, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (1956): 
515-29; Lipset, Political Man', Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get 
Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977); Norman H. Nie, G. 
Bingham Powell, Jr. and Kenneth Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental 
Relationships, Part I,” American Political Science Review  63 (1969): 361-78; and idem, “Social Structure 
and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part II,” American Political Science Review  63 
(1969): 808-32; Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, 
The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, 
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1972).
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people feel competent to participate in all types of actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise
27and/or maintenance of a democratic system.
This Western individual-level theoretical framework may be applied to the 
assessment of the political attitudes and behavior of middle class individuals in urban 
China. According to the conceptualization employed in Chapter II, the middle class in 
urban China includes four major occupational groups: self-employed laborers (i.e., 
private entrepreneur of small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context), 
managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers 
in the Chinese context). Like their counterparts in Western societies, the members of the 
middle class in urban China possesses the following socioeconomic attributes— owning 
small properties, supervising others, and possessing professional expertise. For example, 
all members of the Chinese middle class own property, which, while it may not be 
extensive, is substantial: all self-employed laborers own their businesses, while most
28managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants own at least their apartments. In 
Chapters IV and V, I will use this Western individual-level theory to assess the political 
attitudes and behavior of middle class individuals in urban China.
On the other hand, this dissertation also recognizes that the Chinese middle class 
is different from its Western counterparts: the rise of the middle class in China is a 
relatively new phenomenon (about 20 years old), and more importantly, a direct 
consequence of the rapid state-led economic development of the past two decades.
27 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and idem, The New Middle 
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in 
Politics (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959).
28 See, Benjamin L. Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner 
Self-Organization in Urban China,” The China Journal 49 (2004): 31-59.
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Therefore, this study adds a new objective factor—the socioeconomic ties with the 
state—to modify the application of these general theories.
A. The Relations between the State and the Middle Class
Many empirical studies of the developing countries suggest that throughout the
developing world the activities of the state have been a primary source of the formation
of the middle class. As Dale Johnson has observed:
“In less developed societies the state tends to grow to the limits of resources that 
can be taxed or otherwise appropriated by government.. ..In part, this 
overdevelopment compensates for the presence of weak classes of local 
capitalists, or even their virtual nonexistence: States assume entrepreneurial 
functions, giving birth to technocratic, managerial, and technical groupings.”29
As a result, the members of the middle class were the main beneficiaries of state
economic paternalism in the developing world; they were also dependent upon the state
for the advancement of their careers.
Moreover, many empirical studies tend to suggest that since the state often played
a very active role in creating and shaping the formation of the middle class in the
developing world, the emergence of a unified and distinctive middle class identity was
nearly impossible. These studies further suggest that the political orientations of the
middle classes in the developing world are not unified but fragmented.30
As has been the case in other developing countries, the development of China’s
middle class was influenced by national politics and government policies. In the past
29 Johnson, “Class and Social Development,” 15.
30 Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle Classes;” Hagen Koo, “The Middle Class in the East Asian 
Newly Industrialized Societies: Issues, Preliminary Findings and Further Questions,” in East Asian Middle 
Classes in Comparative Perspective, ed. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, 
Academia Sinica, 1999), 83-100; Eui Hang Shin, “Social Change, Political Elections, and the Middle Class 
in Korea,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1999): 28-60; Johnson, “Class and Social 
Development.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
fifty years, government policies and the changes in the state institutions determined
[0]the patterns of social stratification in Chinese society. Before the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, a small middle class including managerial personnel, 
professionals, small businessmen, and civil servants constituted approximately 7% of the 
Chinese population.31 In the period beginning in 1949 and ending in 1978, China was a 
statist society ruled by a strong Leninist Party; the private economy was gradually 
eliminated, and private entrepreneurs, small and medium-size businessmen, as well as 
independent professionals, disappeared in Chinese society.32 During this period, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent
I T
middle class into a subservient stratum.
Since 1978, the CCP has gradually legitimized the existence of the private 
economy in Chinese society and has taken genuine measures to encourage its 
development.34 The CCP has abandoned their monopolization of occupational mobility, 
allowing ordinary Chinese citizens to have greater freedom to choose their occupations, 
35and the CCP has also de-emphasized the importance of political loyalty and activism in
31 Xueyi Lu, ed., Dangdai zhongguo shehui liudong (Social Mobility in Contemporary China) (Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004).
32 Yanjie Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” Annual Review o f  Sociology 28 (2002): 
91-116; Deborah S. Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China: Training, Hiring, and Promoting 
Urban Professionals and Managers after 1949,” Modern China 26, no. 3 (2000): 251-75; Xueyi Lu, ed., 
Dangdai zhongguo shehuijiecengyanjiu baogao (Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social 
Classes) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002); Zeqi Qiu, Dangdai zhongguo shehui fenceng  
zhuangkuang de bianqian (The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China) (Hebei, China: 
Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2004).
33 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary 
China’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China; Qiu, The Changes o f  Social 
Stratification in Contemporary China', Martin King Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” The 
China Quarterly 64 (1975): 684-711.
34 Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private 
Enterprises: Prospects fo r  the New Century (Washington D.C.: International Finance Corporation, 2000).
35 Xueguang Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China.
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educational attainment and occupational advancement.36 The post-Mao reform has 
changed the social structure of China and consequently paved the road for the emergence 
of a middle class. Since the late 1980s, a middle class by Western standards has emerged 
in Chinese society.
However, due to the continued importance of the state institutions in influencing 
ordinary Chinese citizens’ life opportunities during the reform era, the formation of the
77middle class in contemporary China follows two separate paths. The first is through the 
state institutions, where middle class positions in government and party agencies, state- 
owned enterprises and public organizations are considered to be “closed” positions, and 
access to these positions is subject to screening for political loyalty and party 
membership. This sub-group, the middle class employed in the public sector, which 
includes managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public 
organizations, and staff members in the government and party agencies and public
7 Qorganizations, is, in varying degrees, still affected by state power. The second path is 
through the market institutions, where middle class positions in the private sector are 
considered to be “open” positions, and the access to these positions is determined by the 
workings o f the market institutions. This sub-group, the middle class employed in the
36 Yang Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations: A Comparative Study of Promotion Determination in 
Reforming China,” Social Forces 80, no. 2 (2001): 683-712; Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and Donald J. 
Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into the Urban Chinese 
Elite, 1949 to 1996,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 2 (2000): 191-209.
37 Chunling Li, “Zhongguo dangdai zhongchan jieceng de gouchengji bili” (The Composition and Size of 
China’s Contemporary Middle Class), Zhongguo renkou kexue (Chinese Population Science) 2003, no. 6: 
25-32; Qiang Li, “Zhongguo zhongdeng shouru jieceng de goucheng” (The Composition o f China’s 
Middle-Income Stratum), Hunan shifan daxue shehui kexue xuebao (Journal of Hunan Normal University 
Social Science) 2003, no. 4: 7-9; Wei Zhang, Chongtuyu bianshu: zhongguo shehui zhongjian jieceng  
zhengzhi fenxi (Conflict and Uncertainty: Political Analysis o f  Middle Stratum in Chinese Society)
(Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005); Hangsheng Zheng and Lulu Li, Dangdai zhongguo 
chengshi shehui jiegou (Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin 
daxue chubanshe, 2004); Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
38 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in 
Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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private sector, which includes managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, 
professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur of 
small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context), and white-collar office workers 
in the private entities, is much more independent than the first sub-group in terms of its 
relationship to state power.39
This unique relationship between the state and the newly-rising middle class in 
China makes this class quite different from its counterpart in Western societies.
Therefore, studies analyzing the political attitudes and behaviors o f the middle class in 
China must be designed to reflect this difference.
B. The Working Hypotheses fo r  the Data Analysis
Rather than treating the newly emerged Chinese middle class as a monolithic 
class, I divide this class into two sub-groups: the public-sector sub-group and the private- 
sector sub-group. It is my expectation that these two sub-groups of the Chinese middle 
class will have different attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward democracy.
With regard to the political attitudes and behaviors of the sub-group of middle 
class individuals employed in the public sector, I hypothesize that the middle class 
individuals employed in the public sector will not support democracy and thus will act in 
an undemocratic way. Because the middle class individuals in the public sector have 
close relations with the Communist Party and government, and enjoy many privileges 
sanctioned by the Party and government, they have a vested interest in maintaining the
39 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Qiu, The Changes o f  Social 
Stratification in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China; 
Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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status quo.40 For example, as David Goodman points out, the managers in the state- 
owned and collective enterprises, and the professionals in the public sector, in general, 
“far from being alienated from the [P]arty-state or seek[ing] their own political voice, 
[appear] to be operating in close proximity and through close cooperation” with the 
Party-state.41 As a result, they may not demand a transparent, democratic political 
system; instead they are concerned that a dramatic change of the current political system 
may endanger their interests since they may lose those privileges that they are currently 
enjoying by virtue of their close relationship with the Party-state.
With regard to the political attitudes and behaviors of the sub-group of middle 
class individuals employed in the private sector, I hypothesize that the middle class 
individuals employed in the private sector have strongly supportive attitudes toward 
democracy and thus will act in a democratic way. The middle class individuals in the 
private sector are much more independent from the Communist Party and government.42 
Like their Western counterparts, the middle class individuals in the private sector 
perceive democracy as the best form of governance to protect their property 43 Moreover, 
they strongly demand the legal-institutional constraints upon the power of the Communist
40 As Luigi Tomba observed, members of the Chinese middle classes whose social status is dependent upon 
the Party-state (e.g., professionals in the public sector) “are generally supportive of the present national 
leadership and feel that their social status today is largely dependent on the reform policies and the present 
program to manage the economy.” See his article, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in 
Beijing,” The China Journal 51 (2004): 24.
41 Goodman, “The New Middle Class,” 260-61.
42 The successes o f the middle class individuals in the non-public sector were dependent upon their market 
power rather than upon patron-client relations with the Party-state. Please see Zheng and Li, Social 
Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
43 In the last five years, incidents related to property rights protection have increased in large and medium­
sized cities. Owners of commercial apartments, most of which are members of middle class in the private 
sector, have engaged in many activities to protect their properties such as collecting signatures through 
Internet online forum, organizing home-owners’ associations, and calling for more democratic decision­
making process o f community affairs. For example, see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Yongshun Cai, 
“China’s Moderate Middle Class: The Case o f Homeowners’ Resistance,” Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005): 
777-99.
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Party to guarantee the proper functioning of the market, to contain the widespread 
corruption, and to secure their property and their bourgeois lifestyle.44 Like their 
Western counterparts, the middle class individuals in the private sector have acquired 
modern values such as those of equality and negotiation, as well as of self-independence 
as a result of their experiences in their daily lives and work. Such modern ideas are 
closely related to democratic values and can be easily translated into democratic attitudes.
The data used in this dissertation include: 1) Beijing Survey on “Election and 
Urban Local Self-Governance” in 2000 (see Appendix A), 2) Beijing Survey on 
“Construction of Urban Residential Communities” in 2004 (see Appendix B), and 3) the 
national survey of public opinion in China, the World Values Survey (WVS) 2001 (see 
Appendix C). This dissertation will mainly rely on these three public opinion surveys to 
identify the Chinese middle class and to describe their attitudinal orientations and 
behavioral orientations toward democracy. In addition to these three public opinion 
surveys, an interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” (see 
Appendix D), which was conducted in Beijing in cooperation with Renmin University of 
China, will be used to support the arguments presented by this dissertation.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY
On at least three grounds, this study promises to make a significant contribution to 
the study of the role of the middle class in the evolution of the Chinese political change.
44 For example, An Chen observed that, the top priority of small entrepreneurs and businessmen (i.e., one 
main component of the middle class in the non-public sector) is to “strive for institutionalization of and 
ideological (or constitutional) justification for capitalism in order to make their businesses and capitalist 
way of life politically safe.... [And this priority] has an obvious pro-democratic element as it exerts pressure 
on the communist regime for some fundamental economic-political changes.” See his article, “Capitalist 
Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 415-16.
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First, it is hoped that this study will act as a bridge between the extremes of the 
modernization approach, which views the middle class as being unvarying supporters of 
democracy, and the contextual approach, which views the middle class as being 
inevitably undemocratic due to the Chinese social structure, by developing, through the 
use of three public opinion surveys, a new approach to the individual-level analysis of the 
middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors. This study makes distinctions between 
structural-level and individual-level analysis in the study of the role of the middle class in 
democracy and democratization. It focuses on the individual-level question of why 
middle class individuals think and act democratically and makes an original contribution 
to the literature that expands the understanding of this question.
Second, it yields important findings about the Chinese middle class’ political 
attitudes and behaviors. It identifies a set of socio-political characteristics of middle class 
individuals to explain their attitudes toward democracy, and shows that the 
socioeconomic ties with the Chinese state divides the middle class into two sub-groups 
and shapes their attitudes toward democracy. Furthermore, based on my theoretical 
model and understanding of the Chinese middle class’ political attitudes and behaviors, 
this study will make some reasonable forecasts about the role of the middle class in 
China’s democratic transition.
Third, the findings from this study will also have implications for American 
policy toward China. American policy makers have expressed the hope that the 
formation of a prosperous and strong middle class will lead to political change and 
ultimately democratization. This hope is based on the assumption that the newly rising 
middle class would prefer a more democratic political system than the one in which they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have prospered. So, a better understanding of the goals and preferences o f the Chinese 
middle class is necessary in order to evaluate the prospects for democratic political 
change in that country.
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
Chapter II is designed to answer a critical question: who are the people who 
constitute the Chinese middle class? This chapter begins with a general discussion of an 
important methodological issue that guides the measurement of the Chinese middle class: 
assuring comparability of the measurement. It summarizes the existing literature on the 
identification o f China’s middle class and discusses its strengths and weaknesses. In this 
dissertation, I operationalize the Chinese middle class by combining four occupational 
groups: self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur of small or medium-sized 
business in the Chinese context), managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants 
(i.e., white-collar office workers in the Chinese context). Furthermore, I categorize the 
Chinese middle class people into two subgroups: public sector and private sector, 
depending on the nature of their employers.
Chapter III examines the evolution of the Chinese middle class since 1949. This 
dissertation makes distinctions between the totalitarian society (1950— 1978) and the 
transitional society (1978-present), and compares their different state-society relations in 
order to provide a background for the proper understanding of social differentiation and 
the emergence of a middle class in China. The comparative analysis between the 
evolution of China’s middle class and its Western counterparts in this chapter lays the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ground for formulating a theoretical hypothesis regarding the political attitudes and 
behaviors of China’s middle class.
Chapter IV measures the attitudinal orientations toward democracy among 
China’s general population and its middle class in particular in the following three sub­
dimensions: support for competitive election, support for equal protection and rights for 
all people, and support for sovereignty of the people’s will. This chapter also determines 
that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic within Chinese society in 
terms of the above-referenced dimensions; on the other hand, the public-sector middle 
class shares, though to a lesser degree, negative attitudes toward democracy with the 
upper class.
Chapter V attempts to answer the research question: does China’s middle class act 
in ways that promote democracy? In particular, this chapter focuses on the following two 
questions: Do the members of the private-sector middle class, who have democratic 
values, act in ways that promote democracy? Do the members of the public-sector 
middle class, who hold negative attitudes toward democracy, act in ways that will impede 
the transition to democracy? In particular, I explore these two questions by examining
(1) how the two sub-groups of the middle class act in the civic organizations, and (2) how 
the two sub-groups of the middle class act in the urban self-government system. This 
chapter finds that the private-sector middle class does act in democratic ways, whereas 
the public-sector middle class act in undemocratic ways.
Chapter VI summarizes the empirical findings from this dissertation and then 
elucidates the key political and theoretical implications of these findings. Overall, the 
findings from this dissertation provide a mixed picture about the role of the Chinese
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middle class in promoting democracy in that country. On the one hand, the current Party- 
state can still draw substantial political legitimacy from the public-sector middle class; on 
the other hand, the Party-state has to face the rising demands for democracy from the 
private-sector middle class.
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CHAPTER II
WHO ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CONSTITUTE THE MIDDLE CLASS IN TODAY’S
CHINA?
This chapter answers the critical question, who are the people who constitute the 
middle class in today’s China? I begin with a general discussion of an important 
methodological issue that guides the measurement of the Chinese middle class: assuring 
comparability of the measurement. In particular, I emphasize that the identification of 
the middle class in China shall be in agreement with the original concept of the “middle 
class” in the Western literature. I believe that my efforts to assure comparability in the 
identification o f the Chinese middle class are of critical importance to this study.
The comparative political studies face a basic methodological issue: how does a 
study ensure the comparability of the measurement of variables? As Stefan Nowak has 
asked, in regard to comparative studies: “how do we know we are studying ‘the same 
phenomena’ in different contexts; how do we know that our observations and conclusions 
do not actually refer to ‘quite different things’, which we unjustifiably include into the 
same conceptual categories?”1 These questions point to the importance of achieving 
comparability of concepts and indices in the comparative political studies.
In this chapter, I will discuss the concept of the middle class in the Western 
context because it is in the study of the Western societies that the concept of the middle 
class was born, and more importantly, it is in the West where the middle class by modern 
standards first emerged. In order to ensure comparability, it is necessary that my
1 Stefan Nowak, “Comparative Studies and Social Theory,” in Cross-National Research in Sociology, ed. 
Melvin L. Kohn (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 35.
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definition of the Chinese middle class carry the same socio-political attributes as the 
definition o f the Western middle class. Only when this objective is achieved can I 
explore the question of whether the Chinese middle class thinks and acts democratically, 
and examine whether the mechanisms associated with these socio-political attributes (as 
stipulated in Chapter I) can be applied to the Chinese middle class.
MEASUREMENT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN THE WESTERN LITERATURE
In the debate over the conceptualization of the middle class, Western literature 
identifies two dichotomous approaches: the objectivist and the subjectivist. The 
subjective approach suggests that, because a “social class is a psychological attachment 
that is part of an individual’s overall self-concept,” the middle class is identified based 
on an individual’s belief or perception that he or she belongs to the middle stratum of a 
certain society.
The origin of the subjective approach can be attributed to Aristotle. Aristotle 
“thought of classes as subjective rather than objective entities. Membership in a class, 
according to his way of thinking, is not determined by physical characteristics of any 
kind, such as wealth or income, or at least not definitely determined by such 
characteristics. Members of the middle class gain their position therein by thinking of
2 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960); Richard Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1949); Seymour M. Lipset, “Stratification: Social Class,” in International 
Encyclopedia o f  the Social Science 15 (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1968), 296-316; Sheldon 
Kamieniecki and Robert O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Political Behavior 6, no.
1 (1984): 41-59; C. Wright Mills, White Collar: the American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953); Joseph Alan Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Rinehart, 1957); 
Milbrath, Political Participation; John J. Ray, “The Questionnaire Measurement of Social Class,” 
Australian and New Zealand Journal o f  Sociology 1 (April 1971): 58-64; Katherine Cramer Walsh, M. 
Kent Jennings, and Laura Stoker, “The Effects of Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations 
towards Government,” British Journal o f  Political Science 34 (2004): 469-95.
3 Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations 
towards Government,” 470.
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themselves as above the lower class and below the upper class.”4 The modern forerunner 
of subjective class measurement—Richard Centers—emphasizes class as “psychological 
groupings, something that is essentially subjective in character, dependent upon class 
consciousness (i.e., a feeling of group membership), and class lines of cleavage [which] 
may or may not conform to what seem to social scientists to be logical lines o f cleavage 
in the objective or stratification sense.”5
According to subjectivists, the middle class is a socially constructed attribute, thus 
identification with the middle class depends on an individual’s awareness of class 
divisions and the salience of these divisions and also his/her belonging to the middle 
class.6 In accordance with this reasoning, Western scholarship often identified 
respondents’ class positions based on their answers to questions such as, “There is a lot of 
discussion about class these days. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a class?” 
and “Do you usually think of yourself as being part o f the upper class, the upper-middle 
class, the middle class, the lower-middle class, or the lower class?”7 Modern researchers 
however, prefer to ask their respondents , “Do you usually think of yourself as being part 
of the upper class, the upper-middle class, the middle class, the working class, or the 
lower class?” or “Do you usually think of yourself as being part of the middle class or the
o
working class?”
4 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective,” 236-237.
5 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes, 27.
6 Bernadette C. Hayes, “The Impact of Class on Political Attitudes: A Comparative Study of Great Britain, 
West Germany, Australia, and the United State,” European Journal o f Political Research 27 (1995): 69-91; 
Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations 
towards Government.”
7 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
8 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes', Robert W. Hodge and Donald J. Treiman, “Class 
Identification in the United States,” American Journal o f  Sociology 73, no. 5 (1968): 535-47; Hayes, “The 
Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social Class 
Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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The rationale o f using the “working class” term proposed by the second group of 
scholars is that the term “lower class” in a class identification question has a stigma 
attached to it that may drive respondents away from this category and thus may squeeze 
more respondents into the category of middle class.9 As suggested by Lester Milbrath, 
“almost no one had the lack of pride to call himself lower class.”10
Using this subjective approach, empirical studies have found that in Western 
societies, more than a half of their population registered identification with the middle 
class, about 30 per cent with the working class, and less than 10 per cent with the upper 
class.11
The objectivists argue for the importance of such objective socioeconomic 
indicators as income, education, and occupation in the conceptualization of class 
structure.12 Within the objective approach, there are two conceptual branches. One
. . . .  13branch emphasizes the quantitative, cumulative property of the objective indicators.
This branch, the “quantitative” branch, suggests that the best way to capture an 
individual’s class identification is to form a quantitative index of income, education, and
9 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes', Herman M. Case, “Marxian Implications o f Centers’ Interest- 
Group Theory: A Critical Appraisal,” Social Forces 33, no. 3 (1955): 254-58.
10 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
11 For example, see Hodge and Treiman, “Class Identification in the United States;” Hayes, “The Impact of 
Class on Political Attitudes.”
12 Robert R. Alford, “A Suggested Index of the Association of Social Class and Voting,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 26 (1962): 417-25; Val Burris, “The Discovery of the New Middle Class,” Theory and Society 
15, no. 3 (1986): 317-49; Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', 
Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social 
Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Darren Sherkat and T. Jean Blocker, “The 
Political Development of Sixties’ Activities: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and Socialization 
on Protest Participation,” Social Forces 72, no. 3 (1994): 821-42; Verba and Nie, Participation in America', 
Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State (New York: Shocken Books, 1978); and idem, Classes 
(London: Verso, 1985); and idem, Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); John F. Zipp, “Social Class and Social Liberalism,” Sociological 
Forum 1, no. 2 (1986): 301-29.
13 Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures Interchangeable?” Milbrath, Political 
Participation', Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” 
Sherkat and Blocker, “The Political Development o f Sixties’ Activities;” Verba and Nie, Participation in 
America.
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occupation, and then to identify the person with a social class according to the person’s 
position in the overall scale of the index. As a result, the middle class usually consists of 
those who are in the middle range of the scale. For example, Milbrath has suggested that, 
“persons who scored high on all three factors would be placed in the upper class; those 
who scored high on two factors but medium or low on one factor would be in the next 
rank. Those who scored high on only one factor would be in the next rank, and so 
forth.”14
In a comparative study of five nations (the United States, Britain, West Germany, 
Italy, and Mexico), Norman Nie and his associates formed a weighted, quantitative index 
of such objective indicators as education, income, and occupation, and determined the 
middle class to be those who were in the middle third of the index.15 They found that, in 
the United States, about a half of its population belongs to the middle class; while, in the 
less developed Mexico, only 16 per cent of the population belongs to the middle class.
The other branch, the “qualitative” branch, of the objective approach stresses the 
qualitative property of the various objective indicators of social class.16 This branch 
argues that the middle class is composed of those who possess a set of certain socio­
political attributes, which qualitatively distinguish them from the other social classes. As 
Martin Oppenheimer says, “class is not a quantitative measurement along some 
mathematical continuum, but a qualitative measurement representing groupings that are
17distinct and separate from one another.”
14 Milbrath, Political Participation, 91.
15 Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II.”
16 Burris, “The Discovery o f the New Middle Class;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in 
Socio-Historical Perspective', Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State', and idem, Classes; and idem, Class 
Counts; Zipp, “Social Class and Social Liberalism.”
17 Martin Oppenheimer, White Collar Politics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985), 7.
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Within the qualitative branch of the objective approach, the neo-Marxist 
measurement is the one most often used. The neo-Marxist measurement developed by 
Erik Olin Wright employs three sub-dimensions to form class categories: means of 
production, position in authority structure (based on managerial and supervisory 
responsibilities), and possession of skills and expertise.18 In the first sub-dimension, 
those having means of production are classified as owners; owners can be further divided 
into two categories: bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, depending on the size of the 
means of production. In the second sub-dimension, those who supervise other workers 
are classified as managers. In the third sub-dimension, those possessing skills and 
expertise are classified as professional. The remaining society will be classified into 
working class, peasants, and unemployed depending on whether they are employed or 
unemployed, or whether they are employed in industry, service, or agriculture. The 
middle class is defined as the petite bourgeoisie, managers and professionals. More 
specifically, the petite bourgeoisie is referred to as the “old middle class”, while 
managers and professionals are referred to as the “new middle class” .19
Based on this qualitative measurement, Wright found that, after lumping together 
the three occupational groups consisting of the petite bourgeoisie (including small
employers), managers and professionals (including skilled workers), over half of the
20American population (about 57 per cent) belongs to the middle class.
18 Wright, Class, Crisis, and the State', and idem, Classes', and idem, Class Counts.
19 Burris, “The Discovery of the New Middle Class;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in 
Socio-Historical Perspective', Mills, White Collar, Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism 
(London: New Left Books, 1975).
20 Wright, Class Counts.
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THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE THREE MEASUREMENTS
Which measurement is the most valid for the identification of the middle class? 
There is no consensus on this question in the Western literature. Furthermore, empirical 
studies have reported that these three measurements can be used interchangeably, because 
these measurements are intercorrelated with one another internally.21
In this section, I will discuss the relationship among these measurements, 
especially the relationship between the objective and subjective measurements. First, it is 
clearly understood why the two branches (quantitative and qualitative) of the objective 
approach are highly correlated. In Western societies, the upper and middle class 
individuals qualitatively defined by occupation are more likely to have high-level or 
middle-level incomes and attain a higher level of educational achievement than the 
members of the lower class or working class.22 Thus, there will be a large overlap 
between the middle class qualitatively defined by occupation and the middle class 
quantitatively identified by the index of income, education, and occupation.
Second, there is also a correlation between the objective and subjective 
approaches. In reality, the subjective identification can not be separated from the 
objective characteristics; indeed, the subjective identification has its roots in the objective 
characteristics. Moreover, empirical studies have found a strong positive association
21 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes; Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures 
Interchangeable?”
22 For example, Erik Olin Wright found that mean income increase monotonically from the working class 
to the managers and the petty bourgeoisie to the capitalist class, see his article “What is Middle about the 
Middle Class?” in Analytical Marxism, ed. John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
114-40. Richard Centers found that the mean educational attainment of the middle class, especially the 
managers and professionals, is higher than the working class or the lower class, see his book The 
Psychology o f  Social Classes. For more on this point, please also see Erik Olin Wright and Luca Perrone, 
“Marxist Class Categories and Income Inequality,” American Sociological Review 42, no. 1 (1977): 32-55; 
Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman, “An Interpretation of the Relation between Objective and 
Subjective Social Status,” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 569-82; Eulau, “Identification 
with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior.”
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between objective class status and subjective class identity.23 For example, Centers 
found that “nearly three-quarters of all business, professional and white collar workers 
identify themselves with the middle or upper classes,” and “an even larger proportion of 
all manual workers, 79 per cent, identify, on the other hand, with the working and lower 
classes.”24
According to Mary Jackman and Robert Jackman, objective socioeconomic status 
is the primary determinant of subjective class identification, with other variables (i.e., 
social contacts) playing a mediating role.25 They believe that objective class status is the 
salient factor in dictating “the pattern of individuals’ social lives,” and they suggest that, 
“people mix primarily with others of the same socioeconomic status.” Thus, they 
conclude that “such patterns of social contact in turn lead to psychological identification 
with the relevant (socioeconomic) group.”
According to their argument, the individuals’ subjective perception of their own 
position in the class structure should meet a number of requirements: first, the individuals 
must identify themselves with the class to which they belong according to the objective 
definition; second, they must feel united with others in the same objective position; third, 
they must feel separated from, or must disidentify with, people in different objective class 
positions.27
23 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes', David Coburn and Virginia L. Edwards, “Job Control and 
Child-Rearing Values,” Canadian Review o f  Sociology and Anthropology 13 (1976): 337-44; Hayes, “The 
Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Kamieniecki and O ’Brien, “Are Social Class Measures 
Interchangeable?” Milbrath, Political Participation.
24 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes, 85.
25 Jackman and Jackman, “An Interpretation of the Relation between Objective and Subjective Social 
Status.”
26 Ibid., 570-571.
27 Please also see, Morris Rosenberg, “Perceptual Obstacles to Class Consciousness,” Social Forces 32, no. 
1 (1953): 22-27.
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Thus, Jackman and Jackman hypothesize that objective class status works through 
social contacts to exert impacts on subjective class identification. The empirical studies 
of American respondents supported this hypothesis and found that, first, the status of 
one’s social contacts increased substantially with one’s own objective social class 
position and, second, the effects of one’s objective class status on subjective class 
identification was channeled through the status of one’s social contacts.28
On the one hand, subjectivists like Heinz Eulau and Bernadette Hayes admit the 
fact that subjective identification is highly correlated with objective class status; on the 
other hand, they insist that the subjective identification can not be equated with the
29objective class characteristics. As Hayes has said, “subjective class identities can not
be simply reduced to objective class positions.”30 Moreover, they suggest that we should
treat the subjective identification as the intervening variable between objective class
status and political orientations and action.
“It can be successfully argued that meaningful explanation of the relationship 
between people’s objective position in the social structure and their political 
behavior requires the introduction of an ‘intervening variable’ in the form of their
• • • • T 1self-identification with a particular social class.”
In other words, the objective conditions of socioeconomic status are 
necessarily filtered by the process of self-identification. Via this subjective process, 
objective conditions, like raw materials, are transformed into perceived conditions, 
which, in turn, are the basis of the formation of class identification. This finding has 
important theoretical implications for the identification of the middle class in Chinese
28 Jackman and Jackman, “An Interpretation of the Relation between Objective and Subjective Social 
Status.”
29 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and 
Political Role Behavior;” Hayes, “The Impact of Class on Political Attitudes.”
30 Hayes, “The Impact of Class on Political Attitudes,” 77.
31 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” 516.
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society. As the following discussion of the Chinese people’s class consciousness 
shows, the social differentiation and division since the beginning of the post-Mao 
reform offer the necessary raw material for the formation of class consciousness and 
class identification; furthermore, this formation is influenced by the Chinese people’s 
perception of this social division.
THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
The objective social conditions offer the raw materials for the formation of 
class consciousness and class identification in a society. Thus, in order to provide a fuller 
understanding of the class consciousness of the Chinese people, I will briefly examine the 
evolution of the Chinese social structure during the period in which the CCP has 
controlled China.
After the establishment o f the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP 
embarked on a set of sociopolitical programs to eliminate the economic bases of the 
private economy and also the independence of the urban middle class. In the rural areas 
the CCP adopted a land reform program to eradicate the economic basis of the landlord 
class and a collectivization program to eradicate the economic basis o f the rich peasant 
class.32 In the urban areas the CCP adopted a nationalization program to eradicate the 
economic basis of the capitalist class and a collectivization program to eradicate the 
economic basis of the small businessmen, self-employed laborers and independent 
intellectuals.33 The CCP also adopted the system of unified job assignment (tongyi fenpei) 
and controlled occupational advancement, turning urban managers and professionals into
32 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;” Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in 
Contemporary China.
33 Ibid.
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“a stratum of salaried civil servants who needed to be obedient to CCP superiors.”34 
Finally, the CCP initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Cultural Revolution to 
increase its control over the urban professionals, intellectuals, and managers
35ideologically.
As the direct result of such CCP policies, the private economy was gradually 
eliminated, and private entrepreneurs, small businessmen, and self-employed laborers 
disappeared in Chinese society as legitimate economic actors.36 Meanwhile, the 
professionals, intellectuals, and managers “became fundamentally dependent on the 
party-state in every sphere of life” and were “reduced to a politically subordinate stratum 
of the salaried civil servants”, whereas before 1949, “there had been more physical and 
social space where such professionals and managers could escape state control and 
supervision.”37 In conclusion, in the period 1949-1978, the Chinese party-state 
successfully transformed China from a strong class-divided society to a statist one in 
which “the objective economic bases of antagonistic classes were eroded.”38
During this period, there was no significant objective class difference among 
different social segments, and Chinese society was, to some extent, a highly egalitarian 
society in socioeconomic terms. The Maoist regime proclaimed that the Chinese 
government is led by the workers and peasants and that the government intends to realize
34 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 270.
35 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Richard C. Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese 
Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Nan Lin and Wen Xie, “Occupational Prestige in 
Urban China,” American Journal o f  Sociology 93 (1988): 793-832; Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in 
China;” Andrew G. Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” Annual Review o f  Sociology 15 
(1989): 405-24.
36 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;” 
Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China; Lu, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China.
37 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 272.
38 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 365.
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a classless and egalitarian society.39 Paradoxically, even though the economic bases of 
social classes were eroded during this period, the Maoist regime still “used the terms 
‘classes’ and ‘class struggles’ all the time in their political campaigns.”40 The Chinese 
people were categorized into several classes “based on the occupation or political 
affiliations of one’s father or grandfather in 1949,” and “former exploiting classes, and 
members of Nationalist party organizations, and relatives of political detainees suffered 
systematic discrimination.”41 Overall, the working class was favored by the Maoist 
regime and was granted socio-political privileges.
Since 1978 Chinese society has become differentiated and divided. First, the CCP 
gradually legitimized the existence of the private economy in Chinese society and took 
measures to encourage its development. The development of the private economy in 
China has experienced three major stages. The first stage (1978-1983) is marked by the 
official revival of private business. However, in this stage the CCP only officially 
recognized the individual businesses (getihu).42 For example, Article 11 of the 1982 
Chinese Constitution states that “the individual economy of urban and rural working 
people, operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist 
public economy.”43 The second stage (1984-1992) is characterized by the rise of private 
enterprises isiying qiye),44 as distinguished from individual businesses. In April 1988, 
the National People’s congress revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and allowed 
private businesses to hire more than the previously permitted eight non-family employees,
39 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
40 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 364.
41 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” 417-18.
42 The individual businesses are only permitted to employ less than eight non-family employees.
43 Changfu Wang, Gaige kaifang hou de zhongguo siyingjingji (Chinese Private Economy since Reform 
and Openness) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1997).
44 The private enterprises are those which employ more than eight non-family employees.
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thus officially recognizing the existence of private enterprises.45 The third stage (1993 to 
the present) starts from Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour in September 1992. In 
September 1997, private enterprise was recognized by the CCP as an important 
component of the socialist economy and in March 1999, the National People’s congress 
revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and incorporated the right of private ownership.46 
As a consequence of these policies, private entrepreneurs and self-employed individual 
businesses reemerged within Chinese society, and became the great beneficiary o f the 
Dengist reform.47
Secondly, the CCP de-emphasized the importance of political loyalty and 
activism in educational opportunity and occupational advancement, and gradually 
abandoned the system of unified job assignment and the monopolization of occupational 
advancement. As a consequence of such policy changes, managerial and professional 
strata began attaining more and more autonomy and independence from the Chinese state
48and came to be the central players in the rising market economies of urban China. As I 
will discuss in Chapter III, four factors contributed to the dramatic growth of these two 
groups: the expansion of the opportunity for college education, the development of the 
private economy, the inflow of foreign direct investment, and the reform of state-owned 
firms.
45 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises', Wang, Chinese Private 
Economy since Reform and Openness.
46 Association o f Chinese Private Economy, e<±, Chinese Private Economy Yearbook 2000-2001 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 2003).
47 Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: the Party, Private 
Entrepreneurs, and Prospects fo r  Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
48 For more on this point, please see Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., 
Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China', 
Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
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Thirdly, the working class, as a whole, is losing the privileges that were 
guaranteed them under the Maoist regime and is becoming proletarianized.49 As 
summarized by Yanjie Bian, in the Maoist regime, the working class was officially and 
politically recognized as a ‘leading class’. However, the post-Mao reforms eroded this 
status recognition and differentiated the working class as wage labor in the private sector, 
unprotected labor in the state sector, layoff labor in search of a job, and deprived migrant 
peasant-labor.50
Based on this discussion, it is evident that Chinese society was transformed from 
a statist society (1949-1978) to an unequal society (after 1978). As I will discuss in 
Chapter III, the Dengist regime (after 1978) regards social inequalities as necessary and 
has abandoned the Maoist goal of establishing an egalitarian socialist China. For 
example, Deng Xiaoping has emphasized that in order to build a socialist nation with 
Chinese characteristics, “some people in rural areas and cities should be allowed to get 
rich before others,” and “to let some people and some regions become prosperous first is 
a new policy that is supported by everyone.”51
From this brief examination of the history of the CCP class policy and the 
evolution of the Chinese social structure, it seems evident that objective class division has 
come into being in Chinese society. However, the subjective perception of class division
49 Martin King Whyte, “The Changing Role of Workers,” in The Paradox o f  C hina’s Post-Mao Reforms, 
ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 173-96; 
Timothy Weston, “China’s Labor Woes: Will the Workers Crash the Party?” in China: Beyond the 
Headlines, ed. Timothy Weston and Lionel M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 
245-71; Ching Kwan Lee, “Pathways of Labor Insurgency,” in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and 
Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (London: Routledge, 2000), 41-61.
50 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” 96.
51 Xiaoping Deng, Selected Works o f  Deng Xiaoping Volume III (1982-1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1994), 33.
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is different from the objective measurement of class division. Do the Chinese people 
perceive China as an unequal, class-divided society or as a classless society?
It is my belief that since 1978, the Chinese people have gradually come to 
perceive China as an unequal society. The recent empirical study conducted by Xin Liu 
confirms this belief. In surveying Wuhan residents’ class consciousness, Xin Liu found 
that about three quarters of the people surveyed are aware that they live in an unequal 
society.52 Chunling Li found in his 2000 study that most Chinese people perceived the 
existence of socioeconomic differences and inequalities.53 In fact, Chinese society has in 
the last two decades become one of the most unequal societies in the world. As Alvin So 
has said, “in the early 1980s, China was among the world’s most egalitarian societies. By 
the mid-1990s, the inequalities of income distribution in China not only already exceeded 
the inequality found in the transition economies in Eastern Europe and the high-income 
countries of Western Europe and North America, but also those in China’s Asian 
neighbors such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.”54 For example, in 2000, the Gini 
index55 of Chinese society was 44.7, which is beyond the international poverty alarm 
point of 40.
However, the consciousness of social inequalities is not the same thing as class 
consciousness. Class consciousness is a quite different concept. According to Centers,
52 Xin Liu, “Zhuanxingqi zhongguo chengshi jumin de jieceng yishi” (The Stratum Consciousness of 
Chinese Citizens during the Transitional Period), in Zhongguo shehui fenceng (Social Stratification in 
China’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 
207-24.
53 Chunling Li, “Dangqian zhongguoren de shehui fenceng yishi” (The Social Stratum Consciousness of 
Contemporary Chinese People), Hunan shehui kexue (Hunan Social Science) 2003, no.5: 76-79.
54 So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 367.
55 Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals 
within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents perfect equality and a 
value o f 100 represents perfect inequality. Please see United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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class consciousness “implies that a person’s status and role with respect to the economic 
processes o f society imposes upon him certain attitudes, values and interests relating to 
his role and status in the political and economic sphere. It holds, further, that the status 
and role of the individual in relation to the means of production and exchange of goods 
and services gives rise in him to a consciousness of membership in some social class 
which shares those attitudes, values and interests.”56 In other words, class consciousness 
depends on “the extent to which members of the group are aware of the reality of the 
group and o f their own membership in it.”57
Do the Chinese people realize that they are members of a social class and, if  so, 
do they cognitively identify with their class? Chunling Li suggests that many Chinese 
people still do not acknowledge the appropriateness of the concept of class in Chinese 
society and only a few of them have grasped the meaning of social class and the criteria
C o
by which to identify different social classes. For example, when asked to name some 
different social classes in Chinese society, those in the less-educated occupational groups 
could only identify three groups: “rich people”, “powerful people”, and “ordinary 
people”; those in the well-educated occupational groups could identify some groups in 
more specific terms, such as “government or party cadres”, “private entrepreneurs”, and 
“professionals”. However, few of the respondents identified the different social segments 
in terms of “upper class”, “middle class”, and “lower class”.
Several factors contribute to the Chinese people’s lack of class consciousness in 
the period after 1978. First, since the beginning of the Dengist reform, the CCP banned 
the discussion of the concept of class. Paradoxically, even though the economic bases of
56 Centers, The Psychology o f  Social Classes, 28-29.
57 Ibid., 75.
58 Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness of Contemporary Chinese People.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
social classes were eroded during the Maoist period, the Maoist regime still used the
terms ‘classes’ and ‘class struggles’ in the political campaigns and insisted that the class
struggle was the central task of the CCP.59 After 1978 Deng Xiaoping shifted the focus
o f the CCP’s work from class struggle to economic development and formulated the goal
of a “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui) and the strategy of allowing certain people to
get rich before others. As a result of this policy change, the Dengist reform has
reconstructed the economic bases of social classes. On the other hand, the CCP has given
little attention to the re-emergence of class differentiation in Chinese society.
For example, it was not until July 1, 2001 that President Jiang Zemin officially
acknowledged the emergence of multiple social strata in Chinese society:
“Since China adopted the policy of reform and opening-up, the composition of 
China’s social strata has changed to some extent. There are, among others, 
entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by scientific and technical 
enterprises of the non-public sector, managerial and technical staff employed by 
foreign-funded enterprises, the self-employed, private entrepreneurs, employees 
in intermediaries and freelance professionals. Moreover, many people frequently 
move from one ownership, sector or place to another, changing their jobs or 
capacity from time to time. This trend of developments will continue.”60
It was in this July 1 speech that the CCP fully recognized the change in social structure
that had occurred since the beginning of the Dengist reform and officially acknowledged
that social strata other than the working class and peasants had emerged.
Second, the older people rejected the application of the concept of social classes
to Chinese society because of the tragic memory of the Cultural Revolution. Before 1978,
especially during the Cultural Revolution, the use of the concept of social classes was
highly politicized. The Maoist regime used the term “class struggle” to launch a
59 Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Lu, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China', So, “The Changing Pattern o f Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
60 Please see “Full Text o f Jiang’s Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering,” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 
2 July 2001.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
nationwide campaign of discrimination against those people who were labeled as the 
“exploiting class” or the “anti-revolutionary class”.61 The tragic memory of the Cultural 
Revolution, especially for those who were discriminated against, made the older 
generation sensitive to the use of the concept of social classes. For example, when 
answering the question “do you agree that class is a valid concept to identify different 
social segments?” the reaction of older people was very cautious and not a few of them 
denied the validity of the concept of class in Chinese society.62
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS: WHICH APPROACH 
IS THE MOST VALID?
A. Subjective Measurement
Based on the discussion above, it is evident that objective class differentiation 
exists in Chinese society; on the other hand, the individuals’ subjective perception of 
belonging to a class has not yet emerged. Such a conclusion leads to the proposition that 
the subjective approach is not a valid type of measurement for the identification of the 
middle class in Chinese society.
To test this proposition, I examined several survey results of the subjective 
measurement of social classes conducted by Chinese scholars.63 These scholars
61 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China;” Qiu, 
The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China; So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and 
Class Conflict in China.”
62 Some interviewees even asked interviewers, “Why do you ask the question of the validity o f the class 
term in Chinese society?” or “Is the CCP going to change its policy?” They were quite cautious and even 
refused to answer this question. Please see Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness of Contemporary 
Chinese People.”
63 Li, “The Social Stratum Consciousness o f Contemporary Chinese People;” Liping Chou, “Zhiye diwei: 
shehui fenceng de zhishiqi” (Occupational Status: The Designation o f Social Stratification), in Zhongguo
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employed the following question to identify the social class of the Chinese respondents: 
“There is a lot of discussion about class these days. Do you think of yourself as being 
part of the upper class, the upper-middle class, the lower-middle class, or the lower 
class?” The use of the term “lower class” rather than “working class” in the survey 
question can be problematic, but there are two theoretical justifications for the use of this 
term. First, there is no stigma in China associated with the concept of the lower class. 
Instead, according to the CCP’s ideology, the lower class is the “leading class” in China. 
Second, the concept of the working class is quite vague in the Chinese context. In the 
Maoist era, it was the position of the CCP that only those people who worked in the state- 
owned enterprises or collective-owned enterprises belonged to the category of “working 
class”. However, during the same period most urban residents who had no objective 
working class status also tended to subjectively identify with the working class to avoid 
political discrimination. After the commencement of the reform, the CCP officially did 
not make a clear statement on the change in China’s social structure and the composition 
o f the working class. As a result, the concept of working class is quite vague and most 
urban residents still claim publicly that they belong to the working class in order to avoid 
political problems.
Two important findings from these studies support my argument. First, there is a 
very high percentage of “Do not know (DK)” answers among Chinese respondents. For 
example, in the early 1990s, surveying the subjective class identifications of Shanghai 
respondents, Hanlong Lu and Yanjie Bian found that about 16 per cent of Shanghai 
residents could not identify their class status, while there were only 0.5 % of respondents
shehui fenceng (Social Stratification in China’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 178-206; Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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who could not identify themselves with a class group in American society.64 Such 
findings support my conclusion that the Chinese people’s class consciousness has not yet 
emerged. In a nationwide survey conducted almost 10 years later (2001), Chunling Li 
found that about 9.2% of China’s respondents still could not register their class status 
subjectively, despite the fact that, by 2000, the Chinese people had become much more 
conscious about social differentiation and inequalities.65
Second, many studies reported that almost 40% of Chinese respondents 
subjectively identified themselves with the middle class. For example, in the early 1990s, 
surveying the subjective class identifications of Shanghai respondents, Hanlong Lu and 
Yanjie Bian found that around 42 % of Shanghai residents identified themselves as 
middle class.66 Based on a nationwide survey conducted in 2001, Chunling Li found that 
about 40 % of Chinese respondents subjectively identified themselves as middle class.67
The WVS 2001 China survey used the same question as previous China 
scholarship has employed to probe the subjective identification of Chinese respondents. 
The result is presented in Table 1. There are two major findings: first, about 7 % of 
Chinese respondents could not identify their social class position; second, 51 % of 
Chinese respondents subjectively expressed agreement with the category o f middle class. 
Such findings are consistent with the previous China scholarship.
64 Hanlong Lu and Yanjie Bian, “Cong shimin diwei guankan gaige yu shehui jingji bupingdeng” (Reform 
and Socioeconomic Inequality from the Perspective of Town-dweller Status), in Zhongguo shehui fenceng  
(SocialStratification in China’s Today), ed. Peilin Li, Qiang Li, and Liping Sun (Beijing: Shehui kexue 
wenxian chubanshe, 2004), 160-77.
65 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
66 Lu and Bian, “Reform and Socioeconomic Inequality from the Perspective of Town-dweller Status.”
67 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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Table 1. Distribution of Chinese Respondents’ Self-Identified Social Classes (WVS
2001 China Survey)
Subjective Class Identity Frequency Percent
Upper Class 4 .4
Upper-middle Class 27 2.7
Middle Class 510 51.0
Lower-middle Class 220 22.0
Lower Class 174 17.4
Missing 65 6.5
Total 1000 100.0
As I have previously indicated, in the Western settings, the subjective 
identification can not be separated from the objective characteristics; furthermore, the 
subjective identification has its roots in the objective characteristics. Accordingly, the 
subjective identification with middle class depends on an individual’s awareness of 
objective class divisions and the salience of these divisions and also his/her belonging to 
middle class.68 However, in Chinese society, the individuals’ subjective perception of 
class membership has not yet emerged, even though the objective bases o f class 
differences have formed in the period since the beginning of the post-Mao reform. Based 
on this argument, my hypothesis was that there would be no correlation between the 
objective and subjective measurements. Upon testing the bivariate correlation between 
subjective and objective indicators (i.e., the qualitative measurement of the middle class) 
from the WVS 2001 China survey, I found that the result supports my expectation: there
68 Hayes, “The Impact o f Class on Political Attitudes;” Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker, “The Effects o f Social 
Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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is a very weak positive correlation (Tau-b= 0.072) between these two indicators.69 This 
finding is different from the one in the Western settings.
The Crosstab between the subjective and objective measurements from the WVS 
2001 China survey presented in Table 2 indicates that those Chinese respondents having 
an objective middle class status are more likely to identify themselves as middle class, 
while those respondents not having an objective middle class status also tend to identify 
themselves as middle class.
Table 2. Crosstab between Subjective and Objective Measurements of Middle Class 
in Chinese Settings (WVS 2001 China Survey)
Subjective Measurement
Non-Middle Class Middle Class
Objective
Non-Middle Class 50.4% 49.6%
Measurement Middle Class 39.7% 60.3%
Note: Kendall’s Tau-b^ 0.072, Sig. = 0.022.
Why do half of Chinese respondents having no objective middle class status still 
identify themselves as middle class? There are at least two possible explanations. First, 
the self-perception of middle class status may be influenced by other subjective 
orientations. For example, when explaining the perceptual obstacles to class 
consciousness, Morris Rosenberg argues that false class consciousness may emerge when 
“the individual identifies with his future self, e.g., an ambitious young worker who hopes
69 Lu Xueyi and his associates also find the same pattern: there is weak correlation between objective 
indicator and subjective evaluation of social class. Please see Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary 
C hina’s Social Classes, 33.
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by diligence and initiative to elevate himself to supervisory capacity or eventually own 
his business.”70 Thus, it may be the case that most people in a developing country such 
as China are longing to become members of the middle class and therefore may 
subjectively (or wishfully) identify themselves with the middle class, even they do not 
have objective middle class characteristics. As Table 2 indicates, over 50% of Chinese 
respondents subjectively identified themselves with the middle class, while only 13% of 
them were objectively qualified to be included in the middle class category.
Second, cultural contexts may also become an obstacle to the formation of class 
consciousness in different societies. In the Chinese setting, Confucian culture may exert 
a negative influence on the Chinese people’s subjective class identification.71 Influenced 
by the traditional Confucian culture, Chinese people tend to be “face-saving” (aimianzi) 
and believe in the doctrine of the mean (zhongyong), and thus Chinese people are more 
likely to identify with the “middle class” subjectively. Those who belong to the lower 
class objectively may identify with “middle class” subjectively to save face; on the other 
hand, those belong to the upper class objectively may identify with the “middle class” 
since they believe in the doctrine of the mean and do not want to be boastful.72
B. Quantitative Branch o f  the Objective Approach
Along with the subjective measurement, objective measurements have been 
widely used by China scholars to define the middle class of the Chinese population.
70 Rosenberg, “Perceptual Obstacles to Class Consciousness,” 27.
71 Hui Shen, “Zhongchan jieceng de rentong ji qi jiangou” (Middle Class Identity and Structure), in 
Zhongguo zhongchan jieceng diaocha (Survey o f  the Chinese Middle Classes), ed. Xiaohong Zhou (Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 29-61; Chou, “Occupational Status;” Lu, ed., Research Report on 
Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
12 Shen, “Middle Class Identity and Structure;” Chou, “Occupational Status.”
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Among these objective measurements, income is the one most often used. For example, 
David Goodman asserts that, as of 1997, in the more developed, coastal parts of South 
and East China, a person with a monthly income of above 5,000 to 6,000 RMB is 
regarded as being a member of the middle class; whereas, in the less developed parts of 
West China, a person with a monthly income of above 3,500 to 4,500 RMB is regarded 
as a being a member of the middle class.73 Alastair Iain Johnston uses monthly 
household income to determine middle class status. He says that “the middle class is 
constituted by respondents whose monthly household income is 3,000 RMB or more.”74 
Hangsheng Zheng and Lulu Li assert that, as of 2000, an urban citizen living outside 
Beijing with a monthly income of 1,000 to 10,000 RMB is a member of the middle class; 
while for Beijing residents, a person with a monthly income of 2,000 to 20,000 RMB is a 
member o f the middle class.75
However, this income-based, quantitative measurement of middle class status has 
serious drawbacks in both practice and theory. In practice, it is very hard to achieve any 
consensus on the criterion of income when defining middle class, since first, actual 
personal income is hard to determine. There tends to be a huge gap between reported (or 
nominal) and actual incomes in many occupational groups in China, and the latter is often 
kept secret for various reasons, such as tax evasion (which is highly prevalent in China).76 
Beyond that, in Chinese society income does not necessarily represent a person’s real 
socioeconomic status. To quote Jie Chen: “most private entrepreneurs have much higher
73 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
74 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent 
Liberalization?” The China Quarterly 179 (2004): 603-28.
75 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
76 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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incomes than government bureaucrats. [However,].. .members of both groups may enjoy 
very similar living standards (in many cases, bureaucrats may enjoy even higher living 
standards than average private entrepreneurs).. . .While the entrepreneurs usually use their 
monetary resources to maintain such living standards, the bureaucrats in general achieve 
these standards through their administrative power and government perks.”77
Secondly, income varies dramatically among geographical areas in a fast 
changing society such as China.78 For example, the average monthly income of residents 
in developed areas is 2.5 times higher than the average of those in underdeveloped areas. 
And the average monthly income of urban residents in China is 2.5 times higher than the 
average of those in rural China. Moreover, the average monthly income o f urban 
residents in developed areas is 5.4 times higher than the average of rural residents in 
underdeveloped areas.79 Table 3 documents the income difference among different areas 
in contemporary China.
Table 3. The Distribution of Monthly Income in Different Regions
Regions Mean Standard Deviation
Developed Urban Area 1250.02 1285.99
Less Developed Urban Area 631.79 702.15
Underdeveloped Urban Area 741.02 1466.10
Developed Rural Area 638.28 828.54
Less Developed Rural Area 350.47 1074.02
Underdeveloped Rural Area 233.45 612.45
Note: Developed regions include Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jinagsu; less 
developed regions include Shangdong, HeiTongjiang, and Hebei; underdeveloped regions 
include Guizhou, Sichuang, He’nan, Jiang’xi, andN ei’menggu.
77 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China, 90.
78 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Zheng and Li, Social Structure 
o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
79 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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In theory, as I have discussed, the middle class is not a quantitatively defined 
middle layer in a society, but a qualitative category comprising a set o f social-political 
characteristics that make the middle class distinctive, that is, owning small properties, 
supervising others, possessing professional expertise. The income-based definition of the 
middle class offered by China scholars is lacking any theoretical basis upon which to 
explain whether such measurement of the Chinese middle class also includes those 
social-political characteristics.
Within the quantitative branch of objective measurement, education has also been 
used by China scholars to define the middle class in China. Zheng and Li assert that an 
urban citizen with some university-level education or graduate-level education is a 
member of the middle class.80 The education-based class scheme offered by Zheng and 
Li is presented in Table 4. In this table, we can see that in 10 Chinese cities, the middle 
class constitutes about 26 % of the Chinese population.




Highest Education Received 10 Chinese Cities (%)
Elementary School and Below 13.7
Low Class Middle School 24.7
High School and Equivalent 
Education
35.6
Middle Class Higher Education1 25.7
Note: l. Higher education includes middle-level and high-level vocational education, 
college-level education, and graduate-level education.
80 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
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However, this education-based measurement excludes most self-employed 
individuals, who do not necessarily possess a higher education. As I will discuss in 
Chapter III, most Chinese self-employed individuals are not well-educated, especially 
those who started their businesses in the 1980s. However, self-employed individuals 
have been regarded as a backbone of the middle class in Western society. The European 
self-employed small business person has, since the seventeenth century, presented 
himself as the most steadfast supporter of democracy, has greatly resented the monarchial 
intrusions on his properties and has thus engaged in and political struggles to defend his 
economic interest, which eventually contributed to the emergence and rise of lawful
o  1
democracy.
C. Qualitative Branch o f  the Objective Approach
On the other hand, in the qualitative branch of the objective approach, Lu Xueyi 
and his associates present a comprehensive picture of social stratification in China mainly 
by drawing upon the neo-Marxist measurement. In addition to Erik Olin Wright’s three 
sub-dimensions (means of production, position in authority structure, and possession of 
skills and expertise), Lu and his associates include the sub-dimension, within or outside 
the political system (tizhinei or tizhiwai). They argue that, unlike Western societies, 
political institutions have exerted a tremendous impact on the pattern of social
87stratification in Chinese society. In the Chinese context, those positioned in the core of
81 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical 
Perspective', and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
82 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China.
83 For example, from 1949 to 1978, the Chinese party-state successfully transformed Chinese society from 
a strong class-divided one which characterized before-1949 Chinese society to a statist one in which the
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the political system usually enjoy much more socio-political privileges than those 
positioned outside the political system. As I have discussed, government bureaucrats 
may not earn more income than private entrepreneurs, but they may nonetheless have 
higher living standards by virtue of their administrative power. Lu and his associates 
have distinguished three positions in the political system in China today: the core o f the 
political system, the periphery of the political system, and outside the system.84 The core 
of the political system includes most government agencies (zhungfu bumen) within the 
party and state apparatus, and some advantaged public organizations (shiye danwei), 
which are nonprofit organizations in the public domain. The core of the political system 
monopolizes the power of redistributive benefits and enjoys a large portion of 
redistributive benefits. The periphery of the political system includes disadvantaged 
public organizations and enterprises owned by the central government or local 
governments (guoyou qiye). The periphery of the political system has little redistributive 
power, enjoys only a small portion of redistributive benefits, and has had to extract 
resources from their market activities. Most collective enterprises (jiti qiye), private 
enterprises, foreign-related enterprises, self-employed businesses, and peasants are 
positioned outside of the political system and thus enjoy little redistributive benefits.
Lu and his associates identified 10 social classes based on occupational 
differences in contemporary Chinese society: (a) administrative personnel o f state affairs 
and social affairs, (b) managerial personnel, (c) private entrepreneurs, (d) professionals, 
(e) civil servants, (f) self-employed individuals, (g) service workers, (h) industry workers, 
(i) peasants, and (j) unemployed and semi-unemployed. Table 5 documents the positions
objective economic bases o f social classes were eroded. I will discuss more in detail how political 
institutions influence the pattern of social stratification within Chinese society in Chapter III.
84 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
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of each occupational group in the Chinese social structure in terms of the means of 
production, position in authority structure, possession of skills and expertise, and position 
in the political system.85
According to Lu and his associates, administrative personnel of state affairs and 
social affairs are bureaucrats in government agencies.86 They are positioned in the core 
of the political system, monopolize the political resources, and enjoy most of the
• • 87redistributive benefits. Private entrepreneurs are those owners of enterprises that 
employ more than eight non-family employees and that were legitimized as a part of the 
Chinese economy only after 1988. Private entrepreneurs own the large means of 
production, and even though they were positioned outside the political system, they were 
gradually co-opted by the party-state.88
Managerial personnel include all mangers in state-owned enterprises, private 
enterprises, and joint-venture enterprises. They do not own the means of production; 
rather, they have the responsibility of managing the means of production. Most o f them 
are well-educated and possess some cultural capital.
Professionals are those occupations that involve specialized training and skills 
such as engineers, accountants, lawyers, doctors, university professors, researchers, and 
so on. Since the professional occupations require specialized training, most professionals 
possess cultural capital.
85 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China’s Social Classes; and idem, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China.
86 Ibid.
87 In the Chinese bureaucratic system there are four bureaucratic ranks: bu (ministry), ju  (bureau), chu 
(division), and ke (section). In specific, administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs include 
those bureaucrats having bureaucratic ranks higher than chu in the central government or provincial 
governments, and those having bureaucratic ranks higher than ke in the local governments.
88 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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Table 5. A Formal Model on Social Class in China offered by Lu Xueyi and His
Associates
Position in Position in Means of Inside/Outside the Major
Labor Authority Production Political System Resources
Division Structure (tizhinei/tizhiwai)
Administrative High and High and Agents (Do The core of the Political
personnel of Middle-level Middle-level not possess political system
state affairs professional management means of
and social and technical production,
affairs rank but control or 
dispose)
Managerial High and High and Employee The periphery of Cultural or
personnel Middle-level Middle-level (Do not the political political
professional management possess means system or outside
and technical o f production, the system
rank but control or 
dispose)
Private High-level Employer Outside the Economic




Professionals High and Self-managed Employee or Inside the political Cultural
Middle-level or be managed self-employed system or outside
professional (Independent (Not possess the system
and technical to some means of
rank extent) production)
Civil servants Middle and Being Employee Inside the political Some cultural
low-level managed or (Do not system or outside and political
professional middle and possess means the system
and technical low-level of production)
rank management
Self-employed Management Self- Outside the Some








Commercial Skilled, semi­ Being Employee or Inside the political Some cultural









Industry Skilled, semi­ Being Employee or Inside the political Some cultural
workers skilled and managed or self-employed system or outside or political
unskilled low-level (Do not the system
labors management possess means 
of production)
Peasants Skilled, semi­ Self-managed Employee or Inside the political Some
skilled and self-employed system or outside economic or
unskilled (possess some the system cultural
labors means of 
production)
Unemployed — — — — None
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Civil servants include staff members in the government and party agencies, and 
office workers in all types of enterprises and organizations. They hold white-collar jobs 
and most o f them have at least a university-level education.
The self-employed individuals are those owners of businesses that employ less 
than eight non-family employees. They own some means of production and manage their 
businesses by themselves. Unlike the private entrepreneurs who own a large amount of 
economic capital, most self-employed individuals own only a small amount of economic 
capital. In the Chinese context, most self-employed individuals are not well-educated, 
especially those who started their businesses in the 1980s.
Service workers are those who work in the wholesale or retail trade, or other 
service-related occupations. Industry workers include all types of workers in all types of 
production-related enterprises. In most instances, China scholars will combine service 
workers and industry workers into one category as “workers”.89 Peasants are agricultural 
workers who live in rural China.90 Generally, peasants possess no means of production 
and are not in a position to access government distributive benefits. Unemployed and 
semi-unemployed refer to those who do not have a job at all or who do not have a stable 
occupation.
89 Most workers are not well educated and have a lower economic status than other social segments such as 
administrative personnel o f state affairs and social affairs, managerial personnel, private entrepreneurs, 
professionals, civil servants, and self-employed individuals and they are becoming increasingly 
proletarianized. Please, see Whyte, “The Changing Role of Workers;” Weston, “China’s Labor Woes;” 
Lee, “Pathways of Labor Insurgency.”
90 Since the 1950s, the Chinese party-state designed a household registration {hukou) system to divide 
China into two parts: rural and urban. The household registration {hukou) system was established by the 
Chinese party-state in 1955 as “one of its procedures for solidifying administrative control” and it 
distinguished rural from urban and restricted the migration from rural to urban. Moreover, urban residents 
enjoyed certain privileges such as access to education, housing, health care, all but the most menial jobs 
and so on. There was little chance for a rural peasant to become an urban resident. Please see Xiaogang 
Wu and Donald J. Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China: 1955- 
1996,” Demography 41, no. 2 (2004): 363-84.
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This dissertation mainly draws upon the qualitative branch o f the objective 
approach to identify the Chinese middle class. This branch of the objective approach 
does not suffer from a significant drawback of the quantitative branch. This is mainly 
because, in contemporary China, occupations are much easier to determine and are more 
consistent across regions than personal income, and they tend to present “groupings that 
are distinct and separate from one another.”91 Therefore, the occupation-based, 
qualitative measurement (of the objective approach) should be a more reliable and useful 
indicator of the middle class in the Chinese setting. In addition, such a measurement 
seems to be more suitable for cross-nation comparison, since the modern occupations 
used in this measurement (i.e., white-collar professional, private entrepreneur, managerial 
personnel, and white-collar office workers) arise largely from the general trends of 
modernization and industrialization at the global level, and hence have commonalities
92across countries.
Furthermore, in the Western literature, the middle class is meant to refer to a 
group of persons who carry a set of distinctive social-political characteristics (i.e., 
owning small properties, supervising others, and possessing professional expertise).
Thus when I define the middle class in China, it is crucial that my definition of the 
middle class include those same characteristics. Consequently, based on the qualitative 
branch of the objective approach, I operationalize the middle class in China by combining 
four occupational groups typically used in the Western settings: self-employed laborers 
(i.e., private entrepreneur of small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context),
91 Oppenheimer, White Collar Politics, 7.
92 Alan Marsh and Max Kaase, “Background o f Political Action,” in Political Action: Mass Participation in 
Five Western Democracies, ed. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al. (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), 97- 
136.
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managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers 
in the Chinese context).
Based on this qualitative branch, I group the 10 occupational categories presented 
by Lu Xueyi and his associates into three social classes: upper class, middle class, and 
lower class.
Table 6. Class Scheme Used in Analyzing the Chinese Middle Class
The Original Scheme as used Revised Chinese Class Scheme by
by Lu Xueyi and his associate this Dissertation
I Administrative Personnel of State 




IV Professionals III+IV+ Middle Class
V Self-Employed Laborers (Getihu) V+VI
VI Civil Servants
VII Service Workers VII+
VIII Industry Workers VIII+ Lower Class
IX Peasants IX+X
X Unemployed and Semi-Unemployed
I classify four occupational groups as belonging to the category of the middle 
class: self-employed laborers, managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants. 
There are several reasons to include civil servants in the category of “middle class”. First, 
in China today, the group of white-collar office workers is composed mainly of civil 
servants that include staff members in the government and party agencies, public 
organizations, and office workers in all types of enterprises. Secondly, in the Western 
settings, civil servants are often recognized as an integral component of the middle
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93 •class. Lastly, in the Chinese context, as I have just discussed, most civil servants hold 
white-collar jobs and possess some cultural, economic, and political capital.
This dissertation draws upon the 2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban 
Local Self-Governance” to identify the Chinese middle class objectively according to the 
qualitative branch of objective measurement. The 2000 Beijing survey reports that in 
2000 approximately 15% of Beijing respondents belonged to the objective middle class 
category according to the qualitative branch.
Table 7. Distribution of Social Classes among Beijing Residents in Objective Term
Qualitative Class Identity Frequency Percent
Upper Class 47 5
Middle Class 138 14.6
Lower Class 761 80.4
Total 946 100.0
Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following chapter, due to the continued 
importance of the state institutions in influencing ordinary Chinese citizens’ life 
opportunities during the reform era, the formation of the middle class in contemporary 
China follows two distinct paths.94 The first is through the state institutions, where 
middle class positions in government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises and 
public organizations are considered to be “closed” positions, and the access to these 
positions is subject to screening for political loyalty and party membership. This sub­
group of the middle class includes the managers in the state-owned enterprises,
93 Kahl, The American Class Structure', Mills, White Collar, Wright, Class Counts.
94 Li, “The Composition and Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class;” Li, “The Composition of 
China’s Middle-Income Stratum;” Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the 
Cities in Contemporary China', Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
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professionals in the public organizations, and staff members in the government and party 
agencies and public organizations. The second path is through the market institutions, 
where middle class positions in the private sector are considered to be “open” positions, 
and the access to these positions is determined by the workings of the market institutions. 
This sub-group of the middle class includes the managers in the private and foreign- 
related enterprises, professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers, and white- 
collar office workers in the private entities.
Table 8. The Occupational Distribution of the Chinese Middle Class by Sector
Occupations Sector
Managers in the state-owned enterprises
Professionals in the public organizations Public Sector
Staff members in the government and party agencies and
public organizations
Managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises
Professionals in the private sector
Self-employed laborers Private Sector
White-collar office workers in the private entities
Based upon the 2000 Beijing Survey, I calculate the percentage of these two 
subgroups in the Chinese middle class as follows: about 55% of the Chinese middle class 
belongs to the first subgroup, which is employed in the public sector, whereas about 45% 
of the Chinese middle class belongs to the second subgroup, which is employed in the 
private sector.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter answers the critical question: Who are the people who constitute the 
middle class in today’s China? Based on the qualitative branch of the objective 
approach, I operationalize the middle class in China by combining four occupational 
groups typically used in Western settings: self-employed laborers (i.e., private 
entrepreneur of small or medium-sized business in the Chinese context), managerial 
personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white-collar office workers in the 
Chinese context). Moreover, the Chinese middle class can be divided into two subgroups: 
public sector and private sector. I find that, as of 2000, approximately 15% of Chinese 
urban residents belonged to the objective middle class category, with half of them being 
employed in the public sector and the other half being employed in the private sector. I 
will now summarize the major points made in this chapter.
First, in Western settings, there are two dichotomous approaches to the 
conceptualization of the middle class: objectivist and subjectivist. Furthermore, within 
the objective approach, two branches are recognized: quantitative and qualitative. All 
three measurements are valid approaches to the identification of the middle class in 
Western settings; furthermore, these three measurements are interchangeable in studying 
the effects of social class status on political attitudes and behaviors.
Second, with the commencement of the Dengist reform in 1978, the objective 
socio-economic bases of social class differences have formed in Chinese society, whereas 
the individuals’ subjective perception of class membership is still far from coming into 
being. Two major factors contribute to the underdevelopment of the Chinese people’s 
lack of class consciousness. First, since the beginning of the Dengist reform the CCP
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banned the discussion of the concept of social class, which tended to blur the Chinese 
citizen’s perception of himself/herself as a member of a social class; second, the tragic 
memory o f class struggle in the Cultural Revolution made Chinese citizens abhor the 
concept of social class. The existence of the Chinese citizen’s lack of class 
consciousness validates my suggestion that objective measurement is the most valid 
approach for the identification of the middle class in the Chinese context.
Third, within the objective approach, the income-based quantitative branch has 
been found to have severe drawbacks in the identification of middle class positions. First, 
it is very hard to achieve a consensus on the criterion of income when defining middle 
class since actual personal income is hard to determine and varies dramatically among 
geographical areas in a fast changing society such as China. Second, this income-based 
measurement tends to find only a quantitatively-determined middle layer in Chinese 
society rather than a true middle class. The education-based quantitative branch also has 
been found to have severe drawbacks, as it excludes those self-employed individuals who 
do not have higher education.
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CHAPTER III
THE BACKGROUND OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS
This chapter discusses the emergence of the Chinese middle class in the context 
of the evolution of Chinese social stratification since 1949 and provides a general 
framework to explain the relations between the Chinese party-state and the newly rising 
middle class. This is important because the unique socio-political background of the 
emergence of the Chinese middle class has played an important role in shaping the 
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of this class.
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the pyramid-shaped social 
structure before 1949 in which a small number of big bourgeoisie and landlords occupied 
the apex, and then turns to a detailed discussion of how the years immediately after 1949 
changed the patterns of social stratification and the social structure that had existed 
before 1949. Beginning in 1949, the CCP embarked on a set of socio-political programs 
to eliminate the economic bases o f the private economy and also the independence of the 
urban middle class. Between 1949 and 1978, the CCP successfully transformed China 
into a statist society in which the party-state reached into every aspect of ordinary 
citizens’ lives.
The post-Mao reform era that beginning in 1978 represented a rupture in the 
political system that had defined the Maoist period (1949-1978), and it changed the 
patterns of social stratification in Chinese society dramatically. During the era of post- 
Mao reform, the emerging market forces have challenged and gradually diminished the 
importance o f state influence in the patterns of social stratification through the
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introduction of new mechanisms of resource allocation and the alteration of the 
opportunity structure that was monopolized by the Party-state.1 According to market 
transition theory, state and market represent two fundamentally different systems of 
resource allocation. Market transition theory suggests the rise of market institutions in 
the era o f post-Mao reform creates alternative sources of rewards not controlled by the 
state institutions, and such a shift reduces dependence on the state.2 Moreover, this 
theory suggests that as power— control over resources— shifts progressively from state 
institutions to market institutions, there will be a change in the distribution of rewards 
favoring those who hold market rather than state power.3 Based on this theory, one 
would expect that the Chinese middle class, the majority of whom hold market power, 
will grow more independent and will gain an increasingly larger share of the distribution 
o f rewards.
By contrast, the state-centric model illustrates the continued influence o f state 
institutions on ordinary citizens’ lives during the reform era.4 The premise of the state- 
centric model is based on an insight from new institutionalism theories that the state plays
1 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China; William L. Parish and Ethan Michelson, “Politics and 
Markets: Dual Transformations,” American Journal o f  Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 1042-59; Victor Nee, 
“A Theory o f Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,” American 
Sociological Review  54 (1989): 663-81; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis Moen, 
“Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism: the Case of Urban China, 1949-1993,” Social Forces 74 
no. 3 (1996): 759-96.
2 Victor Nee, “Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in 
China,” American Sociological Review  56 (1991): 267-82; and idem, “The Emergence o f a Market Society: 
Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China,” American Journal o f  Sociology 101, no. 4 (1996): 908- 
49; and idem, “A Theory of Market Transition;” Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews, “Market Transition 
and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism,” Annual Review o f  Sociology 22 (1996): 401- 
35.
3 Nee, “The Emergence of a Market Society;” and idem, “A Theory of Market Transition.”
4 Yanjie Bian and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence o f Power: The Changing 
Stratification System in Urban China,” American Sociological Review 61, no. 5 (1996): 739-58; Nee and 
Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Akos Rona- 
Tas, “The First Shall Be Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism,” 
American Journal o f  Sociology 100, no. 1 (1994): 40-69; Xueguang Zhou, “Economic Transformation and
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a crucial role in setting up institutional contexts within which social forces interact.5 
Based on this insight, the state-centric model suggests that, “given the historical role of 
the state in China, and the prevalence of vested interests associated with existing 
institutions, there is no reason to doubt that the remaking of institutional rules in China’s 
economic transformations will be heavily influenced by the vested interests and the 
state’s own interests.”6
The state-centric model helps us understand why, despite the societal 
transformations wrought by market forces in the post-Mao China, state institutions have 
continued to play an important role in determining the patterns of social stratification, and 
it identifies and conceptualizes the unique forms of China’s market economy, in which all 
kinds of economic agents cultivate relations with political institutions and are involved in 
a wide variety of rent-seeking behaviors.7 The state-centric model refines the logic of 
China’s economic transformations and suggests that the newly emerging social strata 
such as the private entrepreneurs and middle class are still dependent on the state 
institutions. In fact, the Chinese party-state has evolved in response to the challenges 
posed by market institutions, creating a set of new institutions—the so-called corporatist 
institutions—to regulate the unleashed social forces.8 As Margaret Pearson points out, 
China’s new corporatist institutions reflect “the evolution of socialist systems away from 
a highly penetrated, Party-dominated Leninist system to one in which a degree of
Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data,” American Journal o f  Sociology 105, no. 4 
(2000): 1135-74; Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism.”
5 Peter B., Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Back In  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 
Capitalist Development and Democracy, Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
6 Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China,” 1141.
7 Parish and Michelson, “Politics and Markets.”
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autonomy for economic interests outside the Party-state structure is deemed by the state 
to be necessary for industrialization, at the same time that the state finds it desirable to 
prevent the independent organization of the societal groups that might undermine the 
state.”9
THE PRE-1949 CHINESE SOCIETY
The pre-1949 Chinese society may be divided into urban and rural sectors. The 
rural social structure was characterized by the dominance of a small number of gentry 
and landowners over the large number of peasants. On the other hand, the urban social 
structure was characterized by the dominance of a small number of big bourgeoisie and 
comprador capitalists over a large number of the proletariat.
In his “Analysis of the Various Strata of Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes 
toward Revolution,” Mao Zedong identified eight categories of persons in rural China: 
big landlords, small landlords, owner peasants, semi-owner peasants, semi-hired peasants, 
poor peasants, hired peasants and rural handicraft workers, and vagabonds.10 These eight 
categories of persons can be grouped into three classes: landlords and rich peasants, 
middle peasants, and poor peasants. Big and small landlords belonged to the upper class 
of landlords and rich peasants and they occupied the apex of the pyramid-shaped social 
structure in rural China.11 The landlords and rich peasants, who prior to 1949 owned 
more than 70 percent of the arable land despite constituting less than 10% of the rural
8 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China; Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, China's New Business 
Elite.
9 Pearson, China's New Business Elite, 40.
10 Zedong Mao, “Analysis o f the Various Strata of Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes toward 
Revolution,” in Collected Works o f  Mao Tse-Tung (1917-1949), Volumes 1-2 (Arlington, VA: Joint 
Publications Research Service), 85-90.
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population (Table 9), relied on the exploitation (e.g., high rents) of poor peasants for their
living. Owner peasants belonged to the class of middle peasants and most of them owned
enough land to be self-sufficient. Semi-owner peasants, semi-hired peasants, poor
peasants, hired peasants and rural handicraft workers, and vagabonds all belonged to the
category of poor class and they owned little land or no land at all. According to Mao
Zedong, semi-owner peasants were better off than other components o f poor peasants
12who owned no land at all. Overall, the semi-hired peasants, poor peasants and hired 
peasants were vulnerable to exploitation by the class of landlords and rich peasants for 
whom they worked. The vagabonds referred to those who did not work. Before 1949, 
the class o f middle and poor peasants owned less than 30 percent of arable land despite 
constituting more than 90 percent o f the rural population (Table 9).
In the urban areas, there were four major categories of social groups: big 
bourgeoisie, middle bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, workers and unemployed.13 The big 
bourgeoisie referred to bureaucratic capitalists (guanliao zibenjia) whose capital was tied 
to the Nationalist Party (kuomingdang)14 and comprador capitalists (maiban zibenjia) 
whose capital was tied to foreign capitals. The middle bourgeoisie were the so-called 
national capitalists (minzu zibenjia) whose capital had nothing to do with the Nationalist 
Party and/or foreign capitals.
11 Jonathan Unger, “The Class System in Rural China: A Case Study,” in Class and Social Stratification in 
Post-Revolution China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 121-41.
12 Mao, “Analysis o f the Various Strata o f Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes toward Revolution.”
13 Zedong Mao, “Analysis o f the Classes in Chinese Society,” in Collected Works o f  Mao Tse-Tung (1917- 
1949), Volumes 1-2, 91-99; Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
14 Before 1949, the Nationalist Party (kuomingdang) was the ruling party of the Republic o f China. After 
the civil war (1946-1949), the Communist Party defeated the Nationalist Party and established the People’s 
Republic o f China in 1949.











Table 9. The Ownership of Lands in Rural China Before and After Land Reform
Landlord and Rich Peasants 
Total East West Middle 
China China China
Middle Peasants and Poor Peasants 
Total East West Middle 
China China China
Before Percent of Rural Population <10 4 5.87 5.69 >90 — — —
Land
Reform
Average Possession o f Arable 
Lands per  Person {mu)
—  14.26 13.87 14.9 --- 0.6 0.4 0.74
Percent o f Arable Lands >70 36.49 45.79 37.68 <30 18.5 14.71 13.84
After Percent of Rural Population —  — — — — — — —
Land
Reform
Average Possession of Arable 
Lands per  Person {mu1)
—  2.12 1.52 1.92 --- 2.4 2.05 2.15
Percent of Arable Lands 8 2.76 4.62 4.33 >90 44.29 46.04 42.38
Source: Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 40. 




The petty bourgeoisie included teachers, lawyers, doctors, low-level business and 
government employees, small merchants, and handicrafts operators and so on. The 
workers mainly consisted of industrial workers and the so-called urban coolie laborers 
(.kuli). There is no reliable data describing the percent of each group in the urban 
population.
The class of big bourgeoisie and landlords were the ruling class during the period 
of the Republic of China (1911-1949). Three things should be noted here: first, the social 
structure in the cities was also pyramid-shaped, with the class of big bourgeoisie 
occupying the apex and the other social groups at various levels beneath them; second, 
over 80 percent of Chinese population lived in the rural areas and less than 20 percent 
lived in the cities; third, with economic development and the gradual industrialization in 
the first part of twentieth century, the middle class, including managerial personnel, 
professionals, small businessmen, and white-collar office workers, emerged in the cities.
Based on the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates,151 calculated the 
percent o f middle class in Chinese society in 1949. If we group managers, civil servants, 
professionals and self-employed laborers together, the middle class constituted 
approximately 7% of Chinese population (Table 10). This small but gradually rising 
middle class had gained some economic and/or political independence under the rule of 
the Nationalist Party and had a greater degree of self-determination in regard to such 
matters as their life style and occupational advancement, much like their counterparts in 
Western societies.16
15 Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China.
16 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
Table 10. The Distribution of Social Groups in Chinese Society in 1949
Social Groups Percentage (%)
Administrative Personnel of State Affairs and Social affairs 0.48
Capitalists 0.37
Managers 0.37
Civil Servants1, Professionals 2.57
•y






Source: Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China, 40.
Note: 1. The group of civil servants equals the sector of white-collar office workers in the 
middle class.
- y
. The group o f self-employed laborers equals the sector of medium and small-size 
businessmen in the middle class.
MAOIST CHINA (1949-1978): DESTRATIFICATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF 
THE MIDDLE CLASS
A. The Destratification o f  the Maoist Era
The new policies of the post-1949 Maoist regime represented a major departure 
from the policies of the pre-1949 era: under the Maoist regime, the government was 
committed to the elimination of class differences in order to create a classless and equal 
society. The direct consequence of these policies was the so-called “destratification”, in
17which the observed class lines of the prior-1949 era were eliminated.
To achieve this goal, the Communist Party first took measures to eliminate the 
economic bases o f private economy. The CCP had already begun implementing a policy
17 William L. Parish, “Destratification in China,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution 
China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 84-120.
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of land reform in 1946 in the rural areas of northern China that were under its control and 
in 1950-1953 it brought this campaign to the rest of China. In the land reform campaign, 
the Party classified the rural population according to five categories: landlords, rich 
peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasants and other workers, based 
upon Mao Zedong’s analysis of the various strata of Chinese peasantry. The Party 
confiscated most o f the wealth and land of the landlord and rich peasant classes and 
redistributed them to the poor peasant and hired peasant classes. The direct result of the 
land reform campaign was a dramatic change in the distribution of land: before the land 
reform, the landlord and rich peasant classes owned more than 70 percent of the arable 
land, whereas after the land reform, they owned only 8 percent; the middle and poor 
peasant classes occupied less than 30 percent of the arable land before reform, whereas 
after the land reform they owned more than 90 percent (Table 9).
During the land reform campaign, the Party also identified two new classes of 
people—the so-called “counter-revolutionaries” and “bad element.” These “counter­
revolutionary” or “bad element” classes referred to those people who, prior to 1949, had 
been members of the local Nationalist Party political authorities, landlords’ henchmen, 
active opponents of the Communist Party, or simply bullies and bandits.18 These 
counter-revolutionaries and bad elements together with the landlords and rich peasants 
formed the so-called “four bad categories” (sileifenzi) that were the officially designated 
enemies of the middle and poor peasant classes. According to the official policy, the 
wealth and land of these “four elements” had to be taken away.19
18 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 699.
19 Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification 
in China.”
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Immediately after the land reform, the Party initiated socialist collectivization in 
the rural areas. There were three rationales behind this campaign o f agricultural 
collectivization: first, the private land owned by the peasants after the land reform was 
not compatible with a socialist economy; second, the Party believed that collectivization 
was the only means by which the economic inequalities that continued to exist among 
peasants in the rural areas after the land reform could be rectified; and, third, 
collectivization was designed to mobilize peasant labor for the purpose of increasing 
agricultural growth.20 Beginning in 1952, the Party took measures to set up mutual aid 
teams, “lower level” agricultural producers’ cooperatives and “high level” agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives. As of 1952, about 40 percent of the peasant households 
participated in the mutual aid teams, 0.1 percent had joined the “lower level” agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives, and less than 0.1 percent had joined the “high level” agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives.21 In 1955-1956, the collectivization program was carried to 
completion. The “high level” agricultural producers’ cooperatives were widely 
established; as of 1957, about 1.2 hundred million peasant households were members of 
these “high level” cooperatives (Table 11). In 1958, most of these cooperatives were 
transformed into people’s communes (renmin gongshe). After that, almost all of rural 
land was owned by the people’s communes collectively and the basis of the private 
economy in the rural areas was eliminated: individuals did not have ownership of land 
and could not buy or sell land.
20 Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China', Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, 
“Agricultural Strategies and Rural Social Changes in Communist China since 1949: A Macrosociological
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
Table 11. The Development of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1956
Number of Cooperatives (in 0.4 1.5 11.4 63.4 75.2 78.9
ten thousands)
High level Cooperatives 0.0001 0.0002 0.02 0.05 54.4 75.3
Lower Level Cooperatives 0.4 1.5 11.4 63.3 21.6 3.6
Number o f Peasant 5.9 27.5 229.7 1692.1 11782.2 12105.2
Households in Cooperatives 
(in ten thousands)
in High level Cooperatives 0.2 0.2 1.2 4.0 10742.2 11945.0
in Lower level Cooperatives 5.1____ 27.3 228.5 1688.1 1040.1 160.2
Source-. Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 44.
In the urban areas, by 1950, the Party had nationalized the enterprises owned by 
the bureaucratic and comprador capitalists. Over time, most of these enterprises evolved 
into state-owned enterprises under the direct administration of the central government. In 
1950, the government began to make efforts to reduce the control of national capitalists 
over their enterprises. In the same period, the number of these private enterprises and 
their output increased, reaching a peak in 1954 (Table 12). During this same period, the 
government also launched a program of collectivization of the industrial and commercial 
enterprises owned by the petite bourgeoisie—the so-called handicraft industry (shou 
gongye). As a consequence of these policies, the number of private enterprises declined 
to only 869, and their output declined to the value of 2.9 million Chinese yuan (Table 12) 
Most of the self-employed small merchants and handicrafts operators joined the 
handicraft cooperatives: as of 1956, about 92 percent of the self-employed small 
merchants and handicrafts operators had joined the handicraft cooperatives, with about 8
Assessment,” in Power and Policy in the PRC, ed. Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 
1985), 266-81.
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percent maintaining the status of self-employment.22 Over time, most of these jointly 
managed enterprises and handicraft cooperatives evolved into collective enterprises under 
the administration of local government.23
After 1958, national capitalists “became ordinary employees in their enterprises if 
they continued to work, but they were eligible to draw interest on the much reduced 
official valuation of their previous capital investment.”24 Most of the small merchants 
and handicrafts operators became ordinary salaried employees in the handicraft 
cooperatives.
Table 12. The Socialization of Capitalist Industry (ziben zhuyi gongye)
Year Number Employees 
(in 10,000)
Gross output
(in hundred million yuan)
1949 123165 164.4 68.28
1950 133018 181.6 72.78
1951 147650 202.3 101.08
1952 149571 205.7 105.26
1953 150275 223.1 131.90
1954 133962 179.6 103.41
1955 88809 131.0 72.66
1956 869 1.6 0.29
Source: Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 47.
In the cities, the Party informally classified the urban population according to five 
categories: bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, petite 
bourgeoisie, workers and unemployed, based upon Mao Zedong’s analysis of the classes
21 Hsiao, “Agricultural Strategies and Rural Social Changes in Communist China since 1949,” 270.
22 Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary China, 49.
23 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
24 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 704.
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♦ 9 ̂in Chinese society. The “counter-revolutionary” or “bad element” class designations 
were used in the cities to refer to those who had ties with the Nationalist Party or foreign 
capitals and who were active opponents of the Communist Party before 1949. These 
counter-revolutionaries and bad elements together with the bureaucratic and comprador 
bourgeoisie constituted the officially designated enemies in the cities.26
The result of the land reform campaign in the rural regions and the socialization 
of industry and commerce in the urban areas was that the basis of the private economy 
was eliminated. Almost no Chinese citizens enjoyed the private ownership of productive 
assets (i.e., land or capital or enterprises); there was no concept of private property in the 
1954 Chinese Constitution. In conclusion, by 1958, the economic foundations of class 
differentiation were almost completely eliminated from Chinese society.
Second, the Party took measures to control occupational mobility and 
occupational advancement in urban China. Almost all urban citizens were assigned to 
various types o f work units (danwei), on which they were dependent for their salary, food, 
housing, education, welfare and other necessities. According to the official definition, 
the work unit is “an independent accounting unit with three characteristics: (1) 
administratively, it is an independent organization; (2) fiscally, it has an independent 
budget and produces its own accounting tables o f earnings and deficits; (3) financially, it
25 Mao, “Analysis o f the Classes in Chinese Society.”
26 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
27 The Chinese constitution has been changed four times due to the change of national politics. The 1954 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated by the National People’s Congress on 
September 20, 1954. The 1954 Constitution was replaced in the midst of the Cultural Revolution by the 
1975 Constitution o f the People’s Republic o f China to reflect the politics o f the Cultural Revolution. This 
Constitution was superseded in 1978 by the 1978 Constitution of the People’s Republic o f China. Both the 
1975 Constitution and the 1978 Constitution suffered from the Cultural Revolution. The current 
Constitution is the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China which was adopted by the National 
People’s Congress on December 4, 1982. The 1982 Constitution reflects Deng Xiaoping’s determination to
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has independent accounts in banks and has legal rights to sign contracts with government 
or business entities.”28
In general, there were four major types of work units: (1) government and party 
agencies (dangzhengjiguan), (2) public organizations (shiye danwei), (3) state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (guoyou qiye), and (4) collective enterprises (jiti qiye).29 Government 
or party agencies represented the state and the Party, and included ministries, bureaus, 
and various departments and offices of the Communist Party from the central level down 
to the local level. Public organizations were nonprofit institutions in the public arena and 
included “education and research institutions, and organizations in the medical, 
publishing, broadcasting, and entertainment sectors.”30 Most of these public 
organizations were, in varying degrees, administered by the government and the Party. 
State-owned enterprises were enterprises in the service and production arena that 
generated profits and were owned by the central government. Most state-owned 
enterprises were administered by the central government directly; other state-owned 
enterprises were administered by the local governments of the areas in which they were 
located. Collective enterprises were not owned by the central government and 
consequently were not administered by the central government directly. Collective 
enterprises were financially sponsored and administered by the local governments of the 
areas in which they were located.
lay a lasting institutional foundation for China’s modernization and it downplays the importance of class 
struggle and places top priority on development.
28 Xiaogang Wu, “Work Units and Income Inequality. The Effect of Market Transition in Urban China,” 
Social Forces 80, no. 3 (2002): 1073.
29 Wu, “Work Units and Income Inequality;” Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
30 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China, 57.
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The work units not only fulfilled their administrative or production 
responsibilities, but also assumed important social responsibilities, including that of
31providing employees with housing, education, and social welfare. Thus, in the cities 
during the Maoist period, it was difficult to survive unless one was associated with a 
work unit “because housing, food, and other social services were hardly available through
32the market.” However, the urban citizens’ living standards and the services received 
from the work units depended upon the position of his/her work unit in the socialist 
hierarchy. Usually, the higher the position of the work unit in the hierarchy, the more
33resources it would have to redistribute to its employees. Under the socialist system, 
government and party agencies are distributors and all enterprises have to submit their 
products and profits to government or party agencies for distribution. Thus, government 
and party agencies have greater access to resources than public organizations and 
enterprises. And the socialist system “tended to favor state-owned work units because 
they were considered the base of the communist regime. State-owned work units had 
priority when acquiring resources from the government from which to provide housing 
and [other social services] to their employees.”34
3 c
At the end of the 1950s, after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP 
launched a rigid registration (hukou) system that assigned all members of Chinese society 
to one of two categories: urban or rural. According to this registration system, “all
31 Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the Changing Social Contract 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
32 Wu and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China.”
33 Wu, “Work Units and Income Inequality;” Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China.
34 Wu, “Work Units and Income Inequality,” 1074.
35 In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward campaign under the new “General Line for Socialist 
Construction”. The Great Leap Forward was aimed at accomplishing the economic modernization in China 
at a vastly faster pace. In urban China, this campaign focused on steel production through collectivization
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Chinese households were registered in the locale where they resided and also were 
categorized as either agricultural or non-agricultural households.”36 The agricultural or 
non-agricultural status was determined at birth, based on the mother’s status, and was 
fixed for life.37 The rural peasants were assigned to different people’s communes based 
on their current residence and worked in the agricultural production of the people’s 
communes in order to receive food rations for their households. Generally, the peasants 
were underprivileged: they had no access to the education, housing, and health care that 
were enjoyed by most urban employees in work units.
The direct result of the work unit program in the cities was that Chinese society 
became “work unit dependent”. Through the work unit program, the CCP controlled the 
occupational mobility and advancement of urban citizens. It was the CCP and 
government that assigned every citizen to the various work units; after these assignments 
were made, the opportunities for inter-work unit mobility were very few. For example, 
under the work-unit control of labor, “only half the workers could change jobs in lifetime 
or l% -2%  per year.”38
Moreover, the occupational advancement was determined by the CCP and 
government. Tife chances under the Maoist regime were, according to many studies, 
primarily determined by one’s exhibited or presumed political loyalties to the CCP. In 
addition, “political criteria are systematically incorporated and enforced in the allocation
and mass labor. In rural China, this campaign focused on the creation of a new political-economic 
system— the people’s communes. However, the Great Leap Forward ended with economic failure in 1959.
36 Wu and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China.”
37 Wu and Treiman, “The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China;” Kam Wing 
Chan and Li Zhang, “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes,” 
The China Quarterly 160 (1999): 818-55.
38 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” 93.
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of opportunities for higher education, better jobs, and more power and privilege.”40 
According to Susan Shirk, the emphasis on political loyalties “contributes to the 
processes of political consolidation.,Al The system of reward according to political 
loyalties is much more amenable to political control than is a system of reward according 
to merit. And the definition of political loyalty is very flexible, which allows the CCP 
elites to exploit it to promote their loyal supporters.
Generally, the Maoist period saw the transformation of Chinese society into a 
relatively egalitarian one in which there were no observable class differences within the 
Chinese society and the CCP controlled all aspects of ordinary citizens’ life. However, 
this does not mean that the CCP had completely eliminated inequality. New systemic 
patterns emerged in the Maoist society. First, economic inequalities between the rural 
and urban regions grew significantly, rather than shrinking. As has been mentioned, rural 
peasants, who were fixed to their communes, were separated from access to social 
welfare resources. In the Maoist period, “the urban-rural income gap grew from 
approximately 2:1 in the 1950s to anywhere from 3:1 to 6 :l .”42 Second, economic 
inequalities among different work units in the urban areas became significant. The quality 
and availability o f social welfare resources such as housing, health care, and other 
services varied significantly according to the type and hierarchical status o f the work 
units.
39 Yang Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations;” Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China;” and 
idem, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review  60 (1995): 
309-28.
40 Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations,” 687.
41 Susan L. Shirk, “The Decline o f Virtuocracy in China,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post- 
Revolution China, ed. James L. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 59.
42 Walder, “Social Change in Post-Revolution China,” 415.
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Even the economic bases of social classes were eroded; the Maoist regime still 
constantly emphasized the importance of “class struggles”. In the early period of the 
regime, the family class background was adopted as the main indicator of a class enemy. 
In the rural areas, the families belonging to the so-called “four bad categories” were 
heavily struggled against and discriminated against during the whole Maoist period. For 
example, “the systematic discrimination against former landlords and rich peasants in 
rural areas was so severe that it was almost impossible for males of this status to 
marry.”43 In the urban areas, the families belonging to the bureaucratic and comprador 
bourgeoisie together with the counter-revolutionaries and bad elements suffered 
systematic discrimination. In both the rural and the urban areas, the Maoist policies did 
not seem to “have encouraged the pre-1949 elites and their offspring to blend into the rest 
o f society.”44 In the 1960s, this ascriptive definition was de-emphasized, as Mao Zedong 
shifted toward greater reliance on behavioral manifestations of political attitudes to 
define class enemies. During the Cultural Revolution, many government and Party 
cadres were “struggled against” as the agency of capitalists within the Party based on 
their behavioral manifestations.45 According to Mao Zedong, there were two exploiting 
classes within the country: one was the old exploiting class remaining from the pre-1949 
society; the other was a new exploiting class that had emerged from within the Party.46
43 Ibid., 418.
44 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 705.
45 Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China;” Stuart R. Schram, “Classes, Old and New, Mao 
Zedong’s Thought, 1949-1976,” in Class and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China, ed. James L. 
Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 29-55.
46 Schram, “Classes, Old and New, Mao Zedong’s Thought, 1949-1976.”
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B. The Elimination o f  the Middle Class
In the period prior to 1949, when there was a greater amount of “physical and 
social space where such [class] could escape state control and supervision,” a small 
middle class had emerged and gained some economic and/or political independence. In 
the Maoist era, however, this class was transformed into one that was “fundamentally 
dependent on the party-state in every sphere of life,” and was “reduced to a politically 
subordinate stratum of the salaried civil servants [or workers].”47
There were several aspects to this transformation. First, the land reform campaign 
in the rural region and the socialization of industry and commerce in the urban region 
eliminated the private economy. As a result, most of the self-employed small merchants 
and handicrafts operators lost control of their businesses and became ordinary employees 
of handicraft cooperatives. Thus, one important element of the middle class— the petite 
bourgeoisie— was transformed into a politically subordinate stratum of salaried workers.
Second, the Party controlled the occupational mobility and advancement of urban 
workers through the system of work units, assigning managers and professionals to 
positions in the various types o f work units and determining their occupational 
advancement based on their political loyalties. Additionally, immediately after 1949, the 
CCP adopted the system of unified job assignment (tongyi fenpei) and, as a result, college 
graduates lost their autonomy in regard to employment. Thus, the remainder of the 
middle class— managers and professionals—was transformed into the politically 
subordinate stratum of the salaried civil servants and college-educated students, who had 
previously constituted a significant part of the middle class, were forced into the role of 
salaried civil servants. After the founding of the PRC, the Party announced a national
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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policy for allocating jobs for college students graduating in 1950, and by 1953— “the first 
year when all university students were post-1949 matriculants—the system was a 
standard routine of university life from which no graduate was exempt.”48
Thirdly, the Party launched political campaigns to strengthen its control over 
managers and professionals. The 1958 Hundred Flowers Campaign classified more than 
500 thousand managers and professionals as “rightists” and most of these “rightists” were 
sent to rural China to be reeducated by the peasants. In the political campaigns that 
followed, these rightist households suffered systematic discrimination. The Maoist 
regime overtly discriminated against intellectuals, and their social status declined 
dramatically, culminating in the Cultural Revolution. Additionally, many professionals 
and managers were “pulled down” from their places and “replaced with new cadres 
(workers, peasants, and soldiers) who lacked the education, professional training, and 
know-how to manage the specific tasks at hand.”49 During the Cultural Revolution, the 
educational system was completely disrupted. Between 1966 and 1969, no new students 
were admitted to college. From 1970 to 1977, colleges recruited only those students who 
had been recommended by their work units, a decision that was made solely on the basis 
of students’ political loyalties and family backgrounds.50
Finally, the homogenization of consumption patterns and lifestyles in the Maoist 
era eliminated the distinctive lifestyle of the middle class.51 This homogenization of 
consumption patterns and lifestyles was primarily caused by two factors: first, the system 
of rationing used in the distribution of consumption items, housing, and other social
47 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 272.
48 Ibid., 258.
49 Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China,” 797.
50 Ibid.
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services, could not form the basis for widely differing consumption patterns;52 second, 
the distinctive middle class consumption patterns and lifestyles were politically risky.
For example, during the Cultural Revolution, distinctive lifestyles were used as one of the 
major indicators of class enemies. For this reason, well-educated professionals and 
managers were careful to adopt, to the extent possible, the lifestyle of the working class. 
This need to repress the distinctive lifestyles and cultural consumptions that the pre-1949 
Nationalist Party had left relatively unrestricted meant that “the professional and 
managerial stratum lost important resources with which to define and reproduce 
themselves socially.”53
With the elimination of the ownership of private property and with the assertion 
of complete control over occupational employment in the urban areas, the CCP 
successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent middle class into an obedient stratum. 
Furthermore, the CCP banned all middle class civic organizations (such as professional 
organizations or recreational clubs), as a result of which the ability of the members of the 
middle class to interact with each other in significant ways was eliminated.
REFORM CHINA (1978-): DIFFERENTIATION AND THE RISE OF THE NEW 
MIDDLE CLASS
A. Social Differentiation in the Reform Era
The post-Mao reform (since 1978) era represented a rupture from the Maoist 
period (1949-1978) and it changed the patterns of social stratification in Chinese society
51 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China.”
52 Whyte, “Inequality and Stratification in China,” 696.
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dramatically: Maoist China was characterized by the so-called “destratification”; 
however, post-Mao China was characterized by the return of the pre-1949 social 
stratification patterns. Since 1978, Chinese society has become differentiated and 
divided and clear class lines have emerged.
First, the CCP gradually legitimized the existence of private economy in Chinese 
society and took measures to encourage its development.54 The development of private 
economy in China has experienced three major stages: The first stage (1978-1983) is 
marked by the official revival of private business. However, in this stage the CCP only 
officially recognized the individual businesses (getihu).55 For example, Article 11 of the 
1982 Chinese Constitution states that, “the individual economy of urban and rural 
working people, operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the 
socialist public economy.” Originally, the sector o f individual businesses was “intended 
to play a marginal, stopgap role and to act as a ‘supplement’ to the state and collective 
sectors, ‘filling the gaps’ they left in the economy, particularly in the distribution of 
consumer goods and services and in employment.”56 And the Chinese government’s 
decision to recognize the individual economy was also a reaction to a practical need, that 
is, to solve the severe problem of urban youth unemployment.57 During the Cultural 
Revolution, Mao Zedong sent millions of urban students to rural China to accept re­
education from peasants. Since reform, most of these young people have returned to 
urban areas. This put unprecedented pressure on the government and the Party for
53 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China,” 271.
54 Yongnian Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).
55 The individual businesses are only permitted to employ less than eight non-family employees.
56 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises, 8.
57 Feng Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform 
(SUNY: State University o f New York Press, 1995).
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employment. To absorb such a great influx o f youth labor, the government adopted the
CO
policy of developing individual economy to absorb these unemployed youths.
The second stage (1984-1992) is characterized by the rise of the private 
enterprises (siying qiye),59 which are distinguished from the individual business. In April 
1988, the National People’s Congress revised Article 11 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution 
and allowed private business to hire more than the previously permitted eight non-family 
employees, thus officially recognizing the existence of private enterprises.60 The new 
Article 11 states that, “the government allows the private economy to exist and develop 
within the limits prescribed by law.” Accordingly, in June 1988, the State Council issued 
the “Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises” to govern the activities of private 
firms. According to the “Tentative Stipulations”, private enterprises are profitable 
economic organizations that are owned by individuals and employ more than eight 
people.61
The individual economy has grown rapidly since the CCP’s new policy of 
developing the individual economy. Table 13 indicates that in 1980 the share of the 
individual economy in national gross industrial output was almost negligible, while at the 
end of 1980s the share of the individual economy increased to 5.4 percent. In 1978 when 
the CCP relaxed control over the individual economy, only 150,000 people in urban areas 
were involved in individual businesses; however, by the end of 1980s this number had 
increased to 806,000.62 The striking growth of the individual economy laid a
58 Ibid.
59 The private enterprises are those who employ more than eight non-family employees.
60 Wang, Chinese Private Economy since Reform and Openness.
61 Wang, Chinese Private Economy since Reform and Openness; International Finance Corporation,
C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises.
62 Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China.
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considerable amount of wealth in individual hands. And the accumulation of capital in 
private hands prepared for the emergence of private enterprises. Some successful 
individual economy grew and took on more employees and became private enterprises. 
And, “it was estimated that by the end o f 1988, China had 500,000 [individually owned 
businesses] that could be called private firms.”63 Meanwhile, some private enterprises 
grew out of the leasing of small and medium state or collective enterprises to individuals.









Other types of 
enterprises %
Total %
1980 76.0 23.5 0 0.5 100
1985 64.9 32.1 1.9 1.2 100
1990 54.6 35.6 5.4 4.4 100
1991 56.2 33.0 4.8 6.0 100
1992 51.5 35.1 5.8 7.6 100
1993 47.0 34.0 8.0 11.1 100
1994 37.3 37.7 10.1 14.8 100
1995 34.0 36.6 12.9 16.6 100
1996 33.7 36.5 14.4 15.4 100
1997 29.8 35.9 16.9 17.4 100
1998 26.5 36.0 16.0 21.5 100
Source: Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China, 66.
It was not until 1988 that Chinese government officially recognized the existence 
of private enterprises. Thus, at this stage, private enterprises had to circumvent the 
official prohibitions in two ways: first, they falsely registered as individually owned 
business but in practice they employed more than 8 employees. For example, many of
63 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises, 9.
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the specialized rural households (zhuanyehu) were originally registered as individual 
economy and became so specialized that there was no difference between their activities 
and those of private enterprises.64 Second, they falsely registered as collective 
enterprises—the so-called “red hat enterprises”. Individuals usually “obtained collective 
registration by arrangement with state or collective enterprises, or with organizations 
such as street committees or township and village business corporations” and they paid a 
regular “administration fee” to these organizations.65 By doing so, private entrepreneurs 
were able to circumvent the official limits set by the government, and also to take 
advantage o f benefits enjoyed by state-owned or collective enterprises such as tax 
concessions in the first few years of operation.
The third stage (1993 to the present) starts from Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
southern tour in September 1992. In this famous southern tour, Deng Xiaoping called for 
a continued reform of China’s economy and determined China’s future transition to a 
market economy. In the following Fourteenth CCP Congress in 1993, the socialist 
market economy was first endorsed as China’s goal of reform.66 After Deng Xiaoping 
called for further market oriented reforms in 1992, attitudes toward private economy 
changed. The government made genuine measures to encourage the development of 
private economy. As a result the social status of private entrepreneurs and individual 
businesses were increased in Chinese society. All these changes and the greater profits 
generated by private economy attracted more Chinese citizens, and even party cadres and 
government officials became involved in the sector of private economy. After Deng’s
64 Susan Young, “Private Entrepreneurs and Evolutionary Change in China,” in C hina’s Quiet Revolution: 
New Interactions between State and Society, ed. David G. Goodman and Beverley Hooper (Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 105-25.
65 Ibid., 110.
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southern tour in 1992, party cadres and government officials were allowed, even 
encouraged to become involved in the activities of private economy—the so-called 
“plunging into the sea o f commerce” (xiahai). At the end of 1992 party cadres and 
government officials was the second largest group in the private economy sector, but by
f t  7the mid-1990s they had become the largest group among private entrepreneurs.
In September 1997, the Fifteenth CCP Congress recognized the sector of non­
state economy as an important component of the socialist economy. And in March 1999, 
the National People’s Congress revised the 1982 Chinese Constitution and legalized the 
status of non-state economy and private ownership.68 The reform of SOEs since 1995 
accelerated the pace of privatization of the state economy. As I will discuss later, in 1995 
the central government formulated a policy—the so-called “keep the large ones and let 
the smaller ones go” (zhuada fangxiao) to reform SOEs. The direct result o f such policy 
was that most of the small and medium state-owned enterprises or collective enterprises 
were privatized.69 And in March 1998, the government issued a directive requiring all 
the red hat enterprises to take off the red hat to show their private ownership. Private 
entrepreneurs no longer needed the red hat to do their business.
As a consequence of these policies, private entrepreneurs and self-employed 
individual businesses expanded rapidly in the 1990s and became the greatest beneficiary 
of the Dengist reform.70 Table 13 indicates that the gross industrial output from the state- 
owned enterprises declined from 55 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1998, while that by
66 International Finance Corporation, C hina’s Emerging Private Enterprises.
67 Yongnian Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change (London: Eastern 
Universities Press, 2004), 264.
68 Association o f Chinese Private Economy, ed., Chinese Private Economy Yearbook 2000-2001.
69 Lowell Dittmer and Lance Gore, “China Builds A Market Culture,” East Asia 19, no. 3 (2001): 9-50; 
International Finance Corporation, China’s Emerging Private Enterprises.
70 Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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individually owned enterprises increased from 5 percent to 16 percent during the same 
period. And the other types of enterprises, comprising private enterprises and joint 
venture enterprises, increased to 22 percent.
Second, the importance of work units in urban citizens’ life declined. The post- 
Mao period represents “a fundamental break from the state socialist redistributive system
71 ♦in the Mao era.” The Chinese government has initiated administrative reform since the 
1980s to restructure the state apparatus to suit market oriented reform and has reduced the 
scope of state participation in the economy.72 By 1998, most industrial ministries of the 
State Council had been abolished, and these ministries were transformed into enterprises, 
or trade associations (hangye xiehui) or macro-regulatory agencies.73 The Chinese 
government also pushed most public organizations to become enterprise entities and 
expelled them from the state ranks. Before reform, most people who worked in the 
public organizations were classified as state cares and thus lived on the government 
payroll. After reform, most public organizations became financially independent and the 
government only subsidized a few of them.74
The reform of SOEs was the most difficult. Since the early 1980s, the CCP has 
taken measures to reform SOEs and gradually granted SOEs greater autonomy. In the 
beginning, the government intended to invigorate SOEs by yielding a proportion of 
profits to the enterprises.75 In 1987, the government introduced the contract 
responsibility system (CRS). According to the CRS, “SOEs were contracted to pay
71 Zhou, The State and Life Chances in Urban China, 39.
72 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A Market Culture;” International Finance Corporation, C hina’s 
Emerging Private Enterprises', Pearson, China’s New Business Elite', Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
73 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A Market Culture.”
74 Tao-chiu Lam and Jerry L. Perry, “ Services Organizations in China: Reforms and Institutional 
Constraints,” Policy Studies Review  18, no. 1 (2001): 16-35.
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income tax and adjustment tax on a specific level of profit. If they exceeded the 
contracted level of profit, they were taxed at a lower rate on their additional profit.. ..The 
CRS aimed to improve enterprise performance by strengthening financial responsibility, 
emphasizing profitability, and giving enterprises greater autonomy in decision-making.”76 
In the late 1980s, the government realized that SOEs should have greater authority in 
planning their production activities and developed a form of “separation of ownership 
rights from operating rights”. Thus, the SOE managers were granted more autonomy 
with regard to the management of enterprises. For example, in January 1992, all SOEs 
were given freedom to hire and fire staff “without consulting a municipal labour plan or 
obtaining the approval of their own bureaucratic superiors as had been general practice 
since the late 1950s.”77
Beginning in 1995, the government formulated a new policy— “keep the large 
ones and let the smaller ones go”. According to this policy, the government will only 
keep under its ownership 500 to 1,000 large state firms, while the smaller SOEs will be 
re-organized through a package of policy measures including mergers, acquisitions, 
leasing, and sales. The direct result of such policy was that most of the small and 
medium state enterprises or collective enterprises were privatized. Meanwhile, since 
1990, the government has also stripped SOE workers of their privileges such as life-time
78employment, housing, medical care and pensions. By 1997, tens of millions of SOE 
workers have been “laid o ff’ (xiagang) as the result of the “keep the large ones and let 
the smaller ones go” policy.
75 Chen, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China.
76 Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China, 111.
77 Debora S. Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai: A Research Note,” The China Quarterly 157 (1999): 
28.
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The direct result of the decline of the role of work unit in the urban cities was that 
the CCP no longer monopolized occupational mobility and ordinary Chinese citizens had 
greater freedom to choose their own occupations. Before 1978 Chinese urban citizens 
were fixed to work units for lifetime and the opportunities for inter-work units mobility 
were very few. With the deepening of reform, Chinese citizens gradually obtained their 
own discretion to determine their own job. In September 1992 the Chinese government 
announced that “employees could henceforth move at their own discretion between state, 
private and collective enterprises,” which is “a clear blow to the administrative barriers 
that has previously obstructed [job mobility].”79 The empirical studies by Deborah Davis 
indicated that “between January 1990 and July 1995, 41 per cent [of Shanghai residents] 
had changed employer at least once; 5 per cent [of them] had changed three or more 
times. Moreover in most cases switching employers simultaneously involved changing to 
a different line of work, a pattern that stands in clear contrast with past practice where 
many people spent an entire career with one employer.”80
The second result is that the occupational advancement was no longer determined 
by the CCP and government. After 1978 more and more Chinese citizens worked outside 
of work units, such as initiating their own business or working in private, foreign and 
joint-venture enterprises. Thus, the Party and government could not influence the 
occupational advancements of this part of the population. As for those who still worked 
in work units, the party has gradually de-emphasized the importance of political loyalties
78 Dittmer and Gore, “China Builds A Market Culture.”
79 Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai,” 28-29.
80 Ibid., 34.
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to determine one’s upward advancement.81 Because of the need to promote economic 
modernization, the pattern of cadre recruitment and advancement has been changed. For 
example “many new middle-level and high-level cadres are professionals because 
recruitment in the state bureaucracy now favors university degree holders, professional 
training, and other forms of human capital.”82
Generally speaking, in the post-Mao period, because of the large-scale 
implementation of the self-responsibility system and market-oriented reforms and 
processes, the value and prestige of certain occupations changes accordingly.83 There is a 
clear trend toward assigning better benefits to those professional and managerial 
positions commanding knowledge and education. The status hierarchy that places white- 
collar work above blue-collar work has formed: the managerial-professional persons are 
better paid than the blue-collar workers and lead a unique lifestyle and consumption 
culture from the blue-collar workers.
In sum, during the whole period of the post-Mao China, Chinese society was 
transformed from a relatively equal society before 1978 to a severely unequal one after 
1978 in which the CCP relaxed its control of Chinese ordinary citizens’ life chances.
And some clear class differences are observed within Chinese society and analyzing this 
emerging class society has been an important theme in the research among Chinese 
scholars. As I have mentioned in Chapter II, the latest study on China’s social classes 
was done by a research team led by a well-known Chinese sociologist Lu Xueyi at the
81 For more on this point, please see Cao, “Careers Inside Organizations;” Parish and Michelson, “Politics 
and Markets;” Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order;” Walder, Li, and Treiman, 
“Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.”
82 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 371.
83 Deborah S. Davis, “Skidding: Downward Mobility among Children of the Maoist Middle Class,”
Modern China 18, no. 4 (1992): 410-37; and idem, “Job Mobility in Post-Mao Cities: Increases on the 
Margins,” The China Quarterly 84 (1992): 1062-85; Lin and Xie, “Occupational Prestige in Urban China.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Science. The research team found a 
social stratification with ten social strata: a) administrative personnel of state affairs and 
social affairs, (b) managerial personnel, (c) private entrepreneurs, (d) professionals, (e) 
civil servants, (f) self-employed individuals, (g) service workers, (h) industry workers, (i) 
peasants, and (j) unemployed and semi-unemployed.84
B. The Rise o f  New Middle Class
The post-Mao reform changed the social structure and consequently paved the 
road for the emergence o f the middle class. As I defined in Chapter II, China’s middle 
class includes mainly four occupational groups: private entrepreneur of small or medium 
business (i.e., self-employed laborers in the Chinese context), managerial personnel, 
professionals, and white-collar office workers (i.e., civil servants in the Chinese context). 
The distribution of each occupational group in Chinese society is summarized by the 
following Table 14.
First, the managerial stratum began attaining more and more autonomy and 
independence from the Chinese state and represented the central players in the rising 
market economies in urban China.85 There are three sub-types of the managerial stratum: 
the first is the cadres of SOEs and collective enterprises; with the enterprise reform, most 
o f them became professional managers of these enterprises. The second is the managers 
of private enterprises; and the third is the managers of foreign-related enterprises (i.e.,
84 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes’, and idem, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China.
85 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary 
C hina’s Social Classes’, and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China’, Zheng and Li, Social 
Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China’, Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary 
China.
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equity joint venture, contractual joint venture, and solely foreign-owned enterprises)—the 
so-called sanzi q iy e %6 According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates, 
until 2000, the managerial stratum occupied around 1.5 percent in the structure of 
Chinese society (Table 14).87
Table 14. The Distribution of Four Middle Class Occupational Groups in Chinese
Society, 1999
The Occupations Percent of each
Composition of occupational
the Chinese group in Chinese
Middle Class Society
Managerial The cadres of SOEs and collective enterprises; the 1.5
Personnel managers o f private enterprises; the managers of 
foreign-related enterprises
Professionals Scientific researchers, all kinds of technicians and 
managerial personnel of scientific and technical 
work and their assistants, economic and legal 
professionals (i.e., accountants, lawyers and so on),
5.1
Civil Servants1
teaching staff and cultural and sports workers.
The staff members in the government and party 
agencies; the office workers and staff members in 
public organizations and all types of enterprises
4.8
Self-Employed Small business owners (having enough capital to 4.2
Laborers2 hire less than 8 non-family employees but they 
themselves participate in management), self­
employers (having enough capital to run a business 
but hiring no employees), small share speculators 
and share holders and those who live on bank 
interest
Source: Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China's Social Classes, 44.
Note: ’. The group of civil servants refers to the sector of white-collar office workers in 
the middle class in the Chinese context.
2. The group of self-employed laborers refers to private entrepreneurs of medium and 
small-size businessmen in the middle class in the Chinese context.
86 Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change, 286.
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Second, professionals are those occupations that involve specialized training and 
skills. This stratum engaged exclusively in various types of professional and scientific, 
technical and service work in various economic entities, including government and party 
agencies, public organizations, and state-owned enterprises as well as various types of 
nonpublic entities. It mainly includes scientific researchers, all kinds of technicians and 
managerial personnel of scientific and technical work and their assistants, economic and 
legal professionals (i.e., accountants, lawyers and so on), teaching staff and cultural and 
sports workers. This stratum is characterized by the possession of human capital. 
According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the 
professional stratum comprised around 5.1 percent of Chinese society (Table 14).88
Third, private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses are those owners of 
businesses that employed less than eight non-family employees. This stratum includes 
small business owners (having enough capital to hire less than 8 non-family employees 
but they themselves participate in management), self-employers (having enough capital 
to run a business but hiring no employees), as well as small share speculators and share 
holders and those who live on bank interest.89 According to the estimate offered by Lu 
Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the group of private entrepreneurs of small or 
medium business made up around 4.2 percent of Chinese society (Table 14).90
Finally, the group of white-collar office workers is mainly composed o f civil 
servants that include staff members in the government and party agencies, public 
organizations, and office workers in all types of enterprises. There are two sub-groups of
87 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
88 Ibid.
89 Chunling Li, “The Class Structure of China’s Urban Society during the Transitional Period,” Social 
Sciences in China 23, no. 1 (2002): 91-99.
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civil servants: one is the so-called gongwuyuan, the staff members in the government and 
party agencies; the other is the group of office workers and staff members in public 
organizations and all types of enterprises. In specific, gongwuyuan refers to those staff 
members in the government and party agencies whose bureaucratic ranks are lower than 
chu in the central government or provincial governments, and whose bureaucratic ranks 
are lower than ke in the local governments.91 There are two reasons to include civil 
servants in the category o f the middle class. First, in Western settings, civil servants in 
most circumstances are recognized as an integral component of the middle class.92 
Second, in the Chinese context, as I have discussed before, most civil servants hold 
white-collar jobs and possess some cultural, economic, and organizational capital. 
According to the estimate offered by Lu Xueyi and his associates, until 2000, the group 
of civil servants comprised around 4.8 percent in the structure o f Chinese society (Table 
14).93
Four factors contribute to the dramatic expansion of China’s middle class: the 
enlargement of college education, the development of private economy, the inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and the reform of enterprises and public organizations.94
First, as I have discussed, since 1978 the government legalized the existence of 
the private economy and made efforts to encourage its development and thus, the private 
sector re-emerged in Chinese society and grew rapidly. The tremendous growth of the 
private sector created a large population of private entrepreneurs of small or medium
90 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
91 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
92 Wright, Class Counts', Mills, White Collar, Kahl, The American Class Structure.
93 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes.
94 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary 
China's Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social
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business and created positions for managerial personnel and professionals in big private 
enterprises.
Second, in Western society, education is the essential accelerator o f the formation 
of the middle class. Since 1978, the rapid expansion of higher education has resulted in a 
rapid expansion of the size of the new middle class.95 Table 15 illustrates that there was 
only a tiny number of students in higher education (85.6 ten thousands students) in 1978. 
However, since 1978 this number has greatly expanded. University admission rates 
increased rapidly after 1998, with 43 percent increase in 1999, and another 20 percent 
increase in 2000.96 Table 15 indicates that from 1999 to 2003, the total enrollment in 
higher education nearly tripled. These graduates from higher education formed the 
backbone o f the formation of the managerial and professional strata.97 Meanwhile, the 
system of unified job assignment was gradually phased out and graduates from higher 
education became gradually autonomous in job-seeking and career pursuit. By 1993, “70 
per cent of that year’s graduates had found employment on their own.”98 By 1995, the 
old system of unified job assignment was almost abolished. After that, colleges only 
helped students find job offers and students had to compete for jobs on their own. And 
increasingly more college graduates found a job through “labor markets” (the so-called 
rencai shichang).
Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China', So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in 
China.”
95 Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary C hina’s Social Classes', So, “The Changing Pattern of 
Classes and Class Conflict in China;” Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
96 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
97 In post-Mao China the correlation between educational attainment on the one hand and occupational 
advancement and income on the other hand re-emerges and becomes apparent, see, Lu, ed., Research 
Report on Contemporary China’s Social Classes.
98 Davis, “Self-Employment in Shanghai,” 30.
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Third, the inflow of foreign capital created a large population of managerial 
persons and civil servants for China. Since 1978, the FDI flow into China is soaring high: 
“[f]rom 1979 to 1999 China pulled in over $306 billion in utilized FDI, second only to 
the United States worldwide. Compared with other socialist or post-socialist economies, 
China’s ability to attract FDI has been unprecedented.”99
Table 15. 1978-2004 The Enrollment of Students in 4-Year Colleges and
Universities
Year Yearly Enrollment 
(in 10,000)




1978 40.2 85.6 16.5
1980 28.1 114.4 14.7
1985 61.9 170.3 31.6
1986 57.2 188.0 39.3
1987 61.7 195.9 53.2
1988 67.0 206.6 55.3
1989 59.7 208.2 57.6
1990 60.9 206.3 61.4
1991 62.0 204.4 61.4
1992 75.4 218.4 60.4
1993 92.4 253.6 57.1
1994 90.0 279.9 63.7
1995 92.6 290.6 80.5
1996 96.6 302.1 83.9
1997 100.0 317.4 82.9
1998 108.4 340.9 83.0
1999 159.7 413.4 84.8
2000 220.6 556.1 95.0
2001 268.3 719.1 103.6
2002 320.5 903.4 133.7
2003 382.5 1108.6 187.7
Source: Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, 305-306.
99 Mary E. Gallagher, ‘“ Reform and Openness’ Why China’s Economic Reform have Delayed 
Democracy,” World Politics 54 (2002): 346.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
According to the source of Chinese government, FDI in China is expected to reach 
US$100 billion in every year of the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). More than 
US$50 billion foreign direct investment flowed into China in 2002, with the result of 
China taking the American place as the world’s largest recipient o f foreign direct 
investments.100 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
also predicts that China will overtake the US to become the largest FDI host country in 
the world. The inflow of foreign capital intensified the economic inequalities in Chinese 
society: those people who were employed in the sanzi enterprises (i.e., equity joint 
venture, contractual joint venture, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises) were better paid 
than the rest of Chinese society. The managers of the sanzi enterprises were the first 
group o f de facto  professional managerial workers emerging from the post-Mao China. 
Until now, this group of people has been one of the major components of China’s 
managerial stratum. As I will discuss in the following Chapters, this group o f people 
accepted training from these foreign-related enterprises and learned foreign management 
practices and thus were gradually exposed to the influences of foreign culture which 
might change their political cultural orientations and attitudes toward political affairs.
Finally, the reform of enterprises and public organizations stimulated the 
formation of the middle class. The reform of state-owned enterprises and collective 
enterprises made all the managers in these enterprises become a part of the newly- 
emerging middle class.101 This group of managers is the biggest component of China’s 
managerial stratum and it took advantage of the enterprise reform to gain tremendous
100 “Actually Used FDI in China Exceeds 48 Billion US dlrs,” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 2 January 
2003.
101 Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary 
China; So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
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personal wealth and outstanding social status.102 The reform of public organizations 
made the previously subordinate professionals become a gradually independent stratum. 
Rather than remain dependent on the Party, the professional stratum became more 
autonomous in determining their careers and occupational mobility and generally they 
have much more say in the management of public organizations.103
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MIDDLE CLASS
The dramatic change of social structure in the past 50 years tends to suggest the 
role of state institutions in influencing the patterns of social stratification in Chinese 
society. What is the relation between the state and the newly-emerging middle class 
since the outset of the Post-Mao reform? The market transition theory suggests that the 
Chinese middle class is expected to grow more independently and to occupy a much 
more favorable position, since most of the group holds market power. By contrast the 
state-centric framework underscores the continued importance of the state institutions in 
influencing ordinary Chinese citizens’ life chances during the reform era.104 The premise 
of the state-centric model is based on an insight from new institutionalism theories that 
the state plays a crucial role in setting up institutional contexts within which social forces 
interact.105 Based on this assumption, many scholars suggest that the Chinese middle 
class is still far from becoming completely independent; rather this class is dependent
102 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
103 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lam and Perry, “Services Organizations in China.”
104 Bian and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power;” Nee and Matthews, “Market 
Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Rona-Tas, “The First Shall Be 
Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism;” Zhou, “Economic 
Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics 
under State Socialism.”
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upon the state power.106 In the following section, I will discuss the dependence of the 
Chinese middle class from two perspectives: one is the nature of China’s economic 
reform; the other is the development of corporatist institutions within the Chinese society 
since the economic reform.
A. The Nature o f  China’s Economic Reform
The fundamental characteristic of China’s economic reform is that it happened
without significant political reform. The party still monopolized the political control over
this country. By asking the question of why Chinese economic reform could succeed
without political reform, Susan Shirk uses an institutional approach by looking at patterns
of competition among politicians who operate in an institutionalized political setting in
Chinese context to explain the happening of Chinese economic reform.107 The
fundamental difference between the Soviet and Chinese institutions is that Soviet
economic institutions are more centralized. On the other hand, however, the Chinese
economic institutions are less centralized and the local governments have more autonomy
108compared with the Soviet model. Many of the economic activities in China occurred 
outside of the national plan, which made fewer obstacles in the post-Mao economic 
reform. The result of this institutional difference was that the Soviet Union has to reform
105 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, ed., Bringing the State Backin', North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and 
Democracy, Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
106 Goodman, “The New Middle Class;” Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Zweig, “Undemocratic 
Capitalism;” Gongqin Xiao, “The Rise of the Technocrats,” Journal o f Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 59-65; 
Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China.”
107 Susan L. Shirk, The Logic o f  Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1993), 7.
108 Shirk, The Logic o f  Economic Reform in China', Andrew G. Walder, “Sociological Dimensions of 
China’s Economic Transition: Organization, Stratification, and Social Mobility,” (2003). Stanford
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its centralized economic administrative structure first. The low level of centralization in 
the Chinese institutional setting gives Chinese leaders either at the national level or the 
local level more opportunities to initiate economic reforms without political reform, and 
encourages the local governments to pursue their own development.109
Starting in 1980, China implemented a fiscal revenue-sharing system between any
two adjacent levels of governments. The basic idea is that a lower-level regional
government contracts with an upper-level regional government on the total amount (or
share) o f tax and profit revenue to be remitted for the next several years; the lower-level
government keeps the rest.110 These fiscal contracts were fixed so that the division of
revenues among different levels of governments could be predicted. Rights to flows of
revenues were clarified among different levels of governments. Thus each level of
government was allowed to retain a specified proportion of revenues collected over a
targeted amount and each level of government had to be responsible for their own
financial budget.111 The importance o f this institutional setting is that it induces a strong
positive relationship between local interests and local economic prosperity at all levels of
governments. This local autonomous system generates considerable pressure on local
*
governments to compete with each other in supporting profit-making enterprises and pro-
University, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Working Paper, Available [Online]: < 
http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/20208/> [28 Feb 2006].
109 Jean C. Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations o f Local State Corporatism in China,” World 
Politics 45, no. 1 (1992): 99-126; and idem, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional 
Economy,” The China Quarterly 144 (1995): 1132-49; and idem, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional 
Foundations o f  Economic Reform  (Berkeley: University o f California Press 1999); Shirk, The Logic o f  
Economic Reform in China; Andrew G. Walder, “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: an 
Organizational Analysis o f China’s Transitional Economy,” American Journal o f  Sociology 101, no. 2 
(1995): 263-301; and idem, “Sociological Dimensions o f China’s Economic Transition.”
110 Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political 
Basis for Economic Success,” World Politics 48, no. 1 (1996): 50-81.
111 Walder, “Sociological Dimensions o f China’s Economic Transition.”
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growth policies. As argued by Shirk, such a decentralized structure has been the 
institutional foundation for rapid economic growth in post-Mao China.112
These financial changes provide for substantial independence of the local 
governments in China, from the provincial to the township, which ensures that 
governments in each region assume primary responsibility for economic development in 
that region.113 Hence, these governments possess both significant fiscal autonomy from 
the central government and considerable independent authority over their economies. 
Therefore, the fundamental characteristic of Chinese economic reforms is that the 
intended reform fuses the economy with profit incentives and limited market functions on 
a decentralized basis.114 However, this reform produced a hybrid system that still retains 
some of the fundamental features of a command economy. This halfway place between 
planned economy and market economy has the effect of lodging a web of interests 
between local governments and enterprises under their jurisdiction. This web of interests, 
in turn, dictates a pattern of mutually beneficial behavior between these two crucial actors 
in the Chinese economy.115
For example, the development of the sector of private enterprises in Wenzhou was 
the result of compromise and cooperation between the local society and the agents of the 
local government. Local government and party cadres played a vital role, often colluding 
with local society to circumvent those policies adopted in Beijing that might constrain the
112 Shirk, The Logic o f  Economic Reform in China.
113 Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success;” 
Shirk, The Logic o f  Economic Reform in China.
114 Yasheng Huang, “Web of Interests and Patterns o f Behaviors o f Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies 
and Enterprises during Reform,” The China Quarterly 123 (1990): 431-58; Shirk, The Logic o f  Economic 
Reform in China.
115 Jean Oi termed this collusive pattern between local governments and enterprises under their jurisdiction 
“local state corporatism”, see Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State
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growth of private business.116 In Wenzhou, one of the widespread forms which private 
business took in the 1980s was known as the guahu (the so-called “red hat enterprises”). 
Guahu firms attached themselves to an established collective or state unit, trying to avoid 
the restrictions of private business. Kristin Parris argues that such new local economic 
practices as guahu firms illustrate that even under the existing state institution and 
ideology, the local society was able to “work the system” for its own benefit.117 And he 
further suggests that in the local level of China there exists the interpenetration of state 
and private business interests, and he calls this close relationship that developed between 
them “local state corporatism”.
This collusive pattern of behavior between local bureaucrats and private 
enterprise may lead to the formation of an implicit political coalition between them.118 
As a result, “the emerging state-capitalist relation is characterized by the fusion of 
political capital of the cadres, [and] the economic capital of the capitalists.”119 The direct
result of the de-centralization without political reform is the continued importance of
• • n ostate power in the distribution of resources to different social groups. As suggested by
Corporatism in China;” and idem, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and 
idem, Rural China Takes Off.
116 Kristin Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform: The Wenzhou Model of Development,” The 
China Quarterly 134 (1993): 242-63.
117 Ibid.
118 Huang, “Web of Interests and Patterns of Behaviors of Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and 
Enterprises during Reform;” Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism 
in China;” and idem, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural 
China Takes Off', Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform.”
119 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 369.
120 For more on this point, please see, Bian and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence o f Power;” 
Nee and Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Parish 
and Michelson, “Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban 
China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism;” Walder, Li, and Treiman, 
“Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.” However, on the other hand, the market transition 
theory focuses on new market institutions whose advance forges new interests and pushes aside the 
importance o f political institutions and emphasizes that the emergence of a market economy will substitute 
the role o f state power in the distribution of resources within Chinese society, for example see, Nee, “A
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William Parish and Ethan Michelson, the newly-emerged social groups still have a
continuing “need to have linkages with state bureaucrats and state-run enterprises.”121
Figure 1 clearly indicates that the formation of different social class groups
involves both the role of state institutions and market institutions. Those people who sit
in the top o f the hierarchy of both state institutions and market institutions formed the
upper class and it mainly included administrative personnel of state affairs and social
affairs, and private entrepreneurs. This is an all-powerful hybrid which can be called a
“cadre-capitalist” class. This hybrid state-capitalist class has “monopolized political
capital, economic capital, and social/network capital in the Chinese society”, and its
members are “the beneficiaries of the existing arrangements of partial reforms, mixed
122economy, and hybrid ownership.” Those people who sit in the bottom of the hierarchy 
o f both state institutions and market institutions form the largest population of lower class. 
The middle class is composed of those who had medium positions along the hierarchy of 
both state institutions and market institutions.
Accordingly, the formation of the middle class in contemporary China follows 
two distinct paths. The first is through the state institutions, where middle class positions 
in government and party agencies, state-owned enterprises and public organizations are 
considered to be “closed” positions, and the access to these positions is subject to
123screening for political loyalty and party membership.
Theory o f Market Transition;” and idem, “Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism;” and idem, 
“The Emergence o f a Market Society.”
121 Parish and Michelson, “Politics and Markets,” 1044.
122 So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China,” 369.
123 Walder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime.”








11 irket Institutions 
Figure 1. The Two-Track Formation of Middle Class
This sub-group of the middle class employed in the public sector, which includes the 
managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public organizations, and 
staff members in the government and party agencies and public organizations, is, in 
varying degrees, still affected by state power. The second path is through the market 
institutions, where middle class positions in the private sector are considered to be “open” 
positions, and the access to these positions is determined by the workings of the market 
institutions. As suggested by Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews: “the shift to markets 
opens up alternative sources of rewards not controlled by the redistributive state, and this
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shift thereby reduces dependence on the state.”124 Thus, this sub-group of the middle 
class employed in the private sector, which includes the managers in the private and 
foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the private sector, self-employed laborers, 
and white-collar office workers in the private entities, is much more independent than the 
first one in terms of its relationship to state power.
B. Corporatist Institutions and the Autonomy o f  the Middle Class
Philippe Schmitter in his milestone academic work, “Still the Century of 
Corporatism?” defines neo-corporatism125 as “a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.”126
With the rise of neo-corporatism research in developed countries, there is a group 
of scholars who focus on state corporatist practices in the less developed countries. Even
124 Nee and Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism,” 408.
125 It is Philippe Schmitter that first elaborates on the concept of corporatism and makes distinctions 
between two subtypes of corporatism, societal corporatism and state corporatism. Societal corporatism is 
also used as neo-corporatism, liberal corporatism, for example, see, Alan Cawson, Corporatism and 
Political Theory (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986); Philippe Schmitter, “Still the Century o f Corporatism?” 
Review o f  Politics 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-130; Leo Panitch, “The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies,” in Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, ed. Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard 
Lehmbruch (London: Sage, 1979), 119-46; Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Liberal Corporatism and Party 
Government,” Comparative Political Studies 10, no. 1 (1977): 91-126; and idem, “Consociational 
Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism,” in Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, ed. 
Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (London: Sage, 1979), 53-61. Since neo-corporatism, liberal 
corporatism, and societal corporatism refer to the same concept, this study adopts neo-corporatism for the 
sake of clarity.
126 Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?”
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though both neo-corporatism and state corporatism127 concentrate on the relations 
between the state and society, neo-corporatism emphasizes the compromise and 
consensus between them, while state corporatism emphasizes state control of society. 
Alan Cawson adopts the measure of interest contestation to make distinctions among 
state corporatism, neo-corporatism, and pluralism.128 The variable underlying this 
continuum is the intensity of interest contestation (See Figure 2). Within the framework 
of pluralism, there is complete interest contestation; neo-corporatism stands in the 
middle, in which the interest contestation has to be mediated by the corporatist 
organizational arrangements; on the other extreme, within the framework of state 
corporatism, there is very limited interest contestation and interest representation is 
controlled by the state.
State Corporatism + — ► N eo-Corporatism  ^— +■ Pluralism
Interest Contestation
Figure 2. The Relations between State Corporatism, Neo-Corporatism and
Pluralism
127 It is Philippe Schmitter that first elaborates on the concept o f corporatism and makes distinctions 
between two subtypes of corporatism: societal corporatism and state corporatism. State corporatism is also 
used as authoritarian corporatism. Since state corporatism and authoritarian corporatism refer to the same 
concept, this study adopts state corporatism for the sake of clarity.
128 Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory.
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The theory of corporatism can explain a) state involvement in the national 
economy and b) the dynamics of interaction between the state and society. When 
explaining economic origins of political decline in the Communist world, scholars 
propose that the Communist countries also practice state corporatism to restructure the 
state-society relations to promote economic development.129 The Communist countries 
practice state corporatism not only for economic development, but also for continued 
control of society. The Communist state creates vertical centralized associations in each 
specific sector and places them under strict state control, with the purpose of pre-empting 
any horizontal coalescing of societal interests resulting from economic development.130
As suggested by David Goodman, the organic theory of state and society, the 
acceptance of “natural” inequalities among people, and the effort to establish corporate
organizations as intermediaries between private entrepreneurs and state agencies are
• * 1^1 evidence of state corporatism in China. Margaret Pearson also emphasizes that the
establishment of corporatist arrangements in post-Mao China is in the process of
devolving some of the state’s power to society so as to stimulate economic
development.132 Generally speaking, this process has gone through two stages with
different characters: a) local state corporatism (1978-1992), and b) organized state
corporatism (1992 - now). The period of local state corporatism is characterized by the
workings o f local government that coordinates economic enterprises in its territory as if  it
129 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model,” The Australian 
Journal o f  Chinese Affairs 33 (1995): 29-53; and idem, ““Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in 
an East Asian Context,” in China After Socialism: In the Footsteps o f  Eastern Europe or East Asia? ed. 
Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe), 95-129.
130 Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model.”
131 Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
132 Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite.
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was a diversified business corporation.133 As I have discussed, the decentralization 
provides incentives and institutional foundations for a strategy of local state-led 
development. This local state corporatism has the effect of lodging a web o f interests 
between local state agencies and economic actors under their jurisdiction and thus, in 
turn, dictates a pattern of mutually beneficial behaviors between them.134
Since 1992, when Deng Xiaoping campaigned to promote the development of a 
socialist market economy in China, the Chinese government adopted a series of measures 
to restructure the relations between social and economic actors and the state. First, the 
Party has made genuine efforts to use corporatist organizations (e.g., Self-Employed 
Labourers’ Associations, the Industrial and Commercial Federation, and the Private 
Enterprises Association) to link the state with the social and economic actors with the 
intention of thereby being able to control. The second measure of the CCP to connect the 
society is to encourage party members to plunge into the sea of business, a step widely 
known as xiahai. The third measure of linking the state and society is to recruit the 
newly-emerged social groups (e.g., private entrepreneurs, middle class) into the CCP.135 
Even the Chinese government does not use the corporatist terminology to describe the 
changing relations between the state and society; corporatist structures may exist even in 
the absence of an awareness of corporatism in the state’s doctrine.136
First, these corporatist associations have a dualist nature. On the one hand, the 
associations are licensed by the state and under the directives from the state; on the other
133 See Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China;” and idem, 
“The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural China Takes Off.
134 Huang, “Web o f Interests and Patterns of Behaviors of Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and 
Enterprises during Reform;” Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism 
in China;” and idem, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy;” and idem, Rural 
China Takes Off, Parish, “Local Initiative and National Reform.”
135 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 107.
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hand, the associations have a limited degree of delegated self-regulation of the interests 
o f their sectors. According to Bruce Dickson, the associations in China have a dual 
function: they are designed to give the state a right to control over organized interests in 
society, and also to represent their members’ interests.137 For example, in the sector of 
foreign enterprises, the China Association for Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
(CAEFI) works as a bridge which links foreign enterprises with the government, in which 
the government exerts the control function and foreign enterprises articulate their 
interests. Pearson argues that the CAEFI’s role is genuinely Janus-faced and fits the 
criteria central to state corporatism: (1) the state sanctioned and established the CAEFI 
and its branches; (2) it has granted the CAFEI a de facto  monopoly—there is only one 
national association in the foreign sector, and each locality has only one branch; (3) a 
clear hierarchy exists between the national association and local branches.138
The direct result of such corporatist institutions is that most middle class persons 
are assigned to different corporatist associations, and these associations provide a two- 
way conduit between the Party-state and the middle class: by top-down transmission of 
state directives and control, mobilization of the middle class to register political support 
of the Party-state; and by bottom-up transmission of the interests of the middle class. As 
I will discuss in Chapter V, currently, most formal organizations are corporatist 
associations, thus, the sector of middle class lacks organizational resources to act 
collectively to challenge the rule of the Party-state.
136 Ibid., 61.
137Ibid.
138 Margaret M. Pearson, “The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Societalist Corporatism in 
Foreign Enterprises,” The Australian Journal o f  Chinese Affairs 3 1 (1994): 25-46.
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Second, because of the fact that the Party encouraged party members to plunge 
into the sea o f business and took efforts to recruit members from the newly-emerged 
social groups, the percent of party memberships in the private sector has increased 
dramatically. For example, by the mid-1990s, former party cadres had become the 
largest group among private entrepreneurs.139 I have mentioned that the Chinese middle 
class can be divided into two sub-groups: public sector and private sector. With the 
increase in the percent of party memberships in the private sector, and given the fact that 
most managers and staff members in the public sector hold party memberships, one 
would expect that the percentage of party membership within the group of middle class is 
quite high. For example, in a southern city, Shenzhen, around 36 percent of managers 
have party credentials, 27 percent of professionals are party members, and around 14 
percent of small and medium-size private businessmen hold party membership (Table 16). 
From Table 16, we see a clear trend: first, the political elites in China—the group of 
administrative personnel of state affairs and social affairs all have party credentials; 
second, the sector of the middle class, including managers, professionals, staff members 
in the public sector, and small and medium-size private businessmen, ranks second in 
terms of the percent of party membership; third, the traditional leadership class, workers 
and peasants, has been made peripheral, and the party membership of this class has 
declined since the beginning of the post-Mao reform. The holding of party memberships 
by middle class individuals indicates the close relations between the group of middle 
class and the Party.
139 Zheng, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Change.
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Table 16. The Distribution of Party Members in Ten Social Strata in 4 Cities
Shenzhen Hefei Hanchuan Zhenning
Administrative Personnel of 100.0 77.5 100.0 100.0
State Affairs and Social Affairs
Managerial Personnel 35.7 58.8 53.8 —
Private Entrepreneurs 22.2 24.4 9.1 0.0
Professionals 27.2 25.2 17.8 24.0
Civil Servants1 28.2 40.7 54.5 46.3
Self-Employed Laborers 13.7 10.4 7.7 5.2
(■Getihu) 2
Service Workers 10.4 7.6 10.6 3.9
Industry Workers 0.0 13.3 5.9 10.3
Peasants — — 4.3 5.2
Unemploymed and Semi- 2.0 9.1 1.8 3.9
Unemployed
Source: Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary China’s Social Classes, 36.
Note: ’. The group of civil servants equals the sector of white-collar office workers in the 
middle class.
2. The group of self-employed laborers equals the sector of medium and small-size 
businessmen in the middle class.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of the middle class in Western societies has experienced three 
stages and its composition changed accordingly. During the period of capitalist 
revolution (which is, from seventeenth to eighteenth century), free-farmers, artisans, and 
urban bourgeoisie constituted the main components of the middle class in Western 
societies.140 With economic development, the early trade capitalism has been replaced by 
industrial capitalism, and the composition of the middle class has changed accordingly. 
Starting from the industrial-capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
“a moderately prosperous middle class of small business people and shopkeepers
140 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New 
Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
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replaced the artisans as the middle class of the industrial-capitalist system.”141 During 
this period, small businessmen, merchandized farmers, and some professionals 
constituted the majority of the middle class. Since World War II, high-tech industrial 
capitalism replaced industrial capitalism, and a new type of middle class has emerged and 
become the backbone of the middle class: technocrats, professionals, managers, 
bureaucrats, and white-collar office workers,142 and the old middle class of industrial 
capitalism (i.e., small businessmen and merchandized farmers) dramatically shrunk in the 
composition o f the middle class. The evolution of the middle class in Western societies 
can be better demonstrated by Table 17.


























Unlike the Western middle class, the development of China’s middle class was 
extremely influenced by national politics and government policies. In the past one
141 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective, 158.
142 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New  
Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Kahl, The American Class Structure', Mills, White 
Collar, Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism', Wright, Class Counts.
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hundred years, the change of state institutions and government policies dictated the 
patterns of social stratification in Chinese society. Until the early twentieth century, 
China was still far away from the modern world in any sense. Industrial output 
represented only a tiny part of GDP; and most Chinese people were peasants. With 
economic development and slow industrialization in the first part of the twentieth 
century, a middle class emerged in China, including managerial personnel, professionals, 
small businessmen, and white-collar office workers. Before the establishment of 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, managerial personnel, professionals, small 
businessmen, and white-collar office workers constituted approximately 7% of Chinese 
population.
After 1949, China’s society has been characterized by a statist society which was 
ruled by a strong Leninist Party, and private economy has been gradually eliminated, and 
private entrepreneurs, small and medium-size businessmen, and independent 
professionals had disappeared within Chinese society.143 During this period, the Party 
successfully transformed the pre-1949 independent middle class into an obedient stratum. 
However, since the onset of post-Mao reform, Chinese society has become differentiated 
and divided. Obvious patterns of social stratification re-emerged within Chinese society. 
The middle class has emerged and become an important social force and will increasingly 
characterize China’s social stratification. The more independent managerial and
143 Davis, “Social Class Transformation in Urban China;” Kraus, Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism', Lu, 
ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary 
China.
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professional strata, the expanding civil servants, and the newly emerging small and 
medium-size businessmen constitute the majority of this newly emerging middle class.144
The composition of China’s new middle class is different from its Western 
counterparts. Free-farmers or merchanized farmers never became an important part of 
China’s middle class. More importantly, the rise of the middle class in China is a direct 
consequence of rapid state-led economic development in the last two decades. The 
activities o f the party-state have been the primary source of the formation o f the middle 
class in China: those civil servants and managerial and professional strata from the 
government and Party agencies, government-affiliated administrative units and state- 
owned enterprises constitute more than half of China’s new middle class.145
Given this unique social context, I expect that the political orientations o f the 
Chinese middle class are not unified but divided and I emphasize that the division of the 
middle class between the public sector and the private sector tends to produce different 
views toward democracy. The middle class individuals employed in the public sector 
have close relations with the Communist Party and government and enjoy many 
privileges sanctioned by the Party and government, thus they have a vested interest to 
maintain the status quo. As Luigui Tomba observed, members of the Chinese middle 
classes whose social status is dependent upon the Party-state (e.g., professionals in the 
public sector) “are generally supportive of the present national leadership and feel that 
their social status today is largely dependent on the reform policies and the present
144 Bian, “Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility;” Lu, ed., Research Report on Contemporary 
C hina’s Social Classes', and idem, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social 
Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China', Qiu, The Changes o f  Social Stratification in Contemporary 
China', So, “The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China.”
145 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f the Cities in Contemporary China.
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program to manage the economy.”146 As a result, they may not demand a transparent, 
democratic political system; instead they are concerned about that the dramatic change of 
current political system may endanger their interests since they may lose those privileges 
that they are currently enjoying from the Party-state.
On the other hand, the subgroup of the middle class employed in the private 
sector (i.e., the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in 
the private sector, self-employed laborers, and white-collar office workers in the private 
entities) can reasonably be expected to champion the cause of democracy. These middle 
class individuals employed in the private sector are much more independent from the 
Communist Party and government, since the career successes of this subgroup o f middle 
class were dependent upon their market power rather than upon patron-client relations 
with the Party-state.
146 Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing,” 24.
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CHAPTER IV
DOES CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT DEMOCRACY?
This chapter attempts to address the crucial question of whether the middle class 
in China thinks democratically by examining the attitudinal orientations o f the middle 
class toward a variety o f political issues and compares the middle class’ political attitudes 
toward these issues with the rest of the Chinese population. The individual-level theory 
o f the middle class in the West suggests that middle class individuals do think 
democratically; that is, they have attitudes in support of democratic principles. This 
argument is based on three explanations: rational choice theory, learning-generalization 
theory, and social interaction theory.
This dissertation argues that the Chinese middle class has a divided view on 
democracy. As documented in the previous chapter, due to the continued importance of 
the state institutions during the reform era, at least one half of the Chinese middle class is 
employed in the public sector. The middle class individuals employed in the public 
sector have close relations with the Party-state and enjoy many privileges sanctioned by 
the Party-state; on the other hand, the middle class individuals in the private sector are 
much more independent from the Party-state and generally they are not entitled to the 
government benefits that are enjoyed by the group of the public-sector middle class. This 
division within the Chinese middle class, of course, has important theoretical 
implications: the two sub-groups of the middle class may have different views on self- 
interest and socio-political life. In this chapter, I will continue my discussion of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
differences between the two sub-groups of the middle class and compare their attitudinal 
orientations toward democracy.
WHY POLITICAL ATTITUDES MATTER?
When explaining the conditions that give rise to American democracy, Alexis de 
Tocqueville emphasized the importance of egalitarian norms in American society,1 and 
thereby ignited the research on the role of political culture in democracy. Contemporary 
democracy theorists have achieved a consensus that a set of pro-democratic values held at 
the individual level is conducive to the establishment and consolidation of democracy. 
Democracy theorists identify certain distinctive clusters of democratic attitudes that are 
widely held among individuals, such as the belief in popular sovereignty, commitment to
• • . . . . .  2the equality o f citizens, and the principle of majoritarian decision-making. These 
clusters o f democratic attitudes are durable and form subjective orientations that are seen 
as the driving force for the emergence and maintenance of democracy.
Traditional Chinese political culture has always been regarded as an obstacle to 
democratic transition.4 Confucian culture “emphasized the group over the individual,
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner, translated by 
George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
2 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); J. Ronald Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979); and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
3 Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, “A Renaissance of Political Culture?” American Journal o f  
Political Science 40, no. 3 (1996): 632-59; and idem, “Social Capital and Politics,” Annual Review o f  
Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 47-73; Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, 
Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and idem, 
“The Renaissance o f Political Culture,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203-30.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal o f  Democracy 2 (1992): 12-35; Lucian W. 
Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: C hina’s Political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the 
University o f Michigan, 1988); and idem, The Spirit o f  Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992); Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f  
Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights” and “lacked a tradition of rights 
against the state.” Within the Confucian society, “harmony and cooperation were 
preferred over disagreement and competition” and “the maintenance of order and respect 
for hierarchy were central values.”5 Therefore, traditional Chinese political culture is 
attributed as being non-democratic or anti-democratic. Moreover, the Chinese people 
have often been characterized by political apathy, ignorance of politics, fear of politics, 
and political intolerance.6
In addition, some China analysts suggest that the Chinese people will choose 
socio-political stability over democracy because they are afraid that the transition to 
democracy may cause socio-political chaos.7 Moreover, the CCP has used the example 
of socio-political chaos in former Soviet Republics and East European countries after the 
fall of communist regimes to persuade the Chinese people that political stability is a
o
prerequisite for national economic health and the individual’s general well-being. 
Furthermore, since 1990, nationalism has become increasingly popular within the 
Chinese population; indeed some empirical studies report that the Chinese people have 
demonstrated strong nationalist sentiment.9 It is argued that the Chinese government has 
made efforts to promote nationalism in order to block Western influences and buttress its
5 Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” 24.
6 Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from A 
Survey,” Daedalus 122, no. 2 (1993): 95-123.
7 Lijun Qiao and Tianze Chen, China Cannot Afford Chaos (Beijing: Chinese Party School Press, 1994).
8 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China', Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “Valuation o f Individual 
Liberty vs. Social Order among Democratic Supporters: A Cross-Validation,” Political Research Quarterly 
53, no. 2 (2000): 427-39.
9 For example, see Jie Chen, “Urban Chinese Perceptions of Threats from the United States and Japan,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (2001): 254-66; and idem, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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legitimacy in the 1990s.10 The direct result of such strong nationalist sentiment is that 
China’s state-led nationalism has triumphed over the appeal of democracy.11
However, some recent field observations on contemporary Chinese political
12culture suggest that there is evidence for the emergence of democratic values in China. 
These studies based their conclusions on the results of public opinion surveys and suggest 
that Chinese political culture is in transition. As summarized by Suzanne Ogden, China
• ITshows some signs o f a democratic political culture.
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND HYPOTHESES
What is the political orientation of the Chinese middle class? Specifically, does 
the Chinese middle class have the same democratic attitudes as its counterparts in the 
developed countries?
The predominant view, within the individual-level studies o f the middle class in 
the West, suggests that middle class individuals do think democratically: that is, they
10 Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences of China’s Patriotic 
Fervor,” in Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000, ed. Shiping Hua (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2001), 103-32; 
Suisheng Zhao, “We are Patriots First and Democrats Second: The Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the 
1990s,” in What i f  China doesn't Democratize? Implications fo r  War and Peace, ed. Edward Friedman and 
Barrett L. McCormick (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 21-48.
11 Zhao, “We are Patriots First and Democrats Second.”
12 Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, “Culture Shift and Regime Legitimacy: Comparing Mainland China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong,” in Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000, ed. Shiping Hua (Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, 2001), 320-47; Daniel V. Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, “The Prospects for 
Democratization in China: Evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study,” in China and Democracy: 
Reconsidering the Prospects fo r  a Democratic China, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
189-206; Nathan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China;” Suzanne Ogden, Inklings o f  
Democracy in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002); Tianjian Shi, “Cultural Values 
and Democracy in the People’s Republic o f China,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 540-59; Jie Chen and 
Yang Zhong, “Defining the Political System of Post-Deng China: Emerging Public Support for a 
Democratic Political System,” Problems o f  Post-Communism  45, no. 1 (1998): 30-42; Yanlai Wang, 
Nicholas Rees, and Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan, “Economic Change and Political Development in 
China: Findings from a Public Opinion Survey,” Journal o f  Contemporary China 13, no. 39 (2004): 203-22.
13 Ogden, Inklings o f  democracy in China.
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have attitudes in support of democratic principles.14 This argument is based on three 
explanations: rational choice theory, learning-generalization theory, and social interaction 
theory. These general arguments form the theoretical basis for my assessment of the 
political attitudes of the middle class people in urban China.
A. Rational Choice Theory
The fundamental assumption of rational choice theory is that political interaction 
is basically an economic transaction that is guided in its course by the actor’s rational 
choices among alternative outcomes.15 In the political realm, rational individuals pursue 
“utility maximization, or under conditions of uncertainty, expected utility 
maximization.”16 Democracy theorists (e.g., Seymour Lipset, Ronald Glassman) employ 
rational choice theory to argue that middle class individuals support democracy because 
they perceive democracy to be the best form of government to protect their interests.
Class theorists believe that social class status determines the interests of the 
people, that individuals have full knowledge of their interests, and that they know which 
form of government will best help them to secure these interests. For example, according 
to the radical Marxist thinkers, the working class’ interest is to liberate itself from the 
fetters of the political system implemented by the exploitative class and to form an equal
14 For example, see Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification 
with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political 
Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Milbrath, Political Participation; Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The 
Effects of Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government;” Lipset, Political 
Man.
15 Fore more on this point, see Mary Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1998); Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational 
Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and  
Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 19-41; Donald Green and lan Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory: A Critique o f  
Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory o f  Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
16 Green and Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory.
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and classless society, while the exploitative class’ interest is to perpetuate their ownership
of the means of production and preserve their exploitative relations with the working
class. Accordingly, the working class is more supportive of a socialist government,
while the exploitative class is more supportive of a repressive state.
The quasi-Marxist scholar Barrington Moore has argued that the class o f large
landlords is the most implacable advocate o f a repressive state because they rely heavily
on state power to maintain their “labor repressive” production. He has also suggested
that the bourgeoisie class might be a democratic force.17 As owners of large-size
business, the bourgeoisie has an interest in less state intervention in their market activities
18and in a well-functioning and independent market for business. However, the 
democratic impulse of the bourgeoisie can be overestimated. On many occasions, the 
bourgeoisie has relied on the power of a repressive state to acquire monopolies, 
government subsidies, favorable market position and cheap labor.19
Unlike members of other social classes, middle class individuals have strongly 
supportive attitudes toward democracy because they realize that democracy thus far is the 
best system to protect their individual rights and property. Unlike members of the upper 
classes who not only own much larger properties but usually enjoy formal or informal 
clientelist ties with the state power that could be used to protect their properties and other 
interests, those of the middle class generally lack these close connections with powerful
17 Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making o f  
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
18 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle 
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy.
19 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy', Ruth Berins Collier, 
Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Guillermo O ’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 
University o f California, 1973).
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political patrons.20 Without these political connections, middle class citizens have to rely
on such democratic institutions as the popular election of leaders and the limitation of
state power to protect their own rights and property from the actions of powerful
intruders (e.g., the government and its officials).21
According to the conceptualization employed in this dissertation, the middle class
in urban China includes mainly four occupational groups— self-employed laborers,
managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants. Like their counterparts in
Western societies, most members of these groups own a relatively substantial amount of
property: all entrepreneurs own their businesses, while most managerial personnel,
22professionals, and white-collar office workers possess at least their apartments. Does 
the Chinese middle class perceive democracy as the best form of government to protect 
its property?
Two sub-groups of the Chinese middle class have different opinions in regard to
this question. The middle class people employed in the public sector have close relations
with the Party-state and thus they may rely on those ties with the Party-state to assure the
protection o f their property. Moreover, the public-sector middle class enjoys many
privileges sanctioned by the Party-state; thus it has a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo. For example, my interview with Mr. B, a middle-level manager in a state-
owned enterprise, reflects this orientation. Mr. B said:
“If my interest was impinged on, I have many ways to solve the problem. And I 
believe that I am situated in a good position in this society to be able to protect
20 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle 
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
21 Ibid.
22 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in 
Urban China;” Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class: Social Engineering in Beijing.”
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my own interest... .Democracy.. .No, I do not need democracy to protect my 
interest... .1 do not think people like me need democracy.”
However, the middle class people employed in the private sector show a completely
different attitude toward democracy. This group of the middle class in the private sector
usually does not have close relations with the Party-state, and its material well-being
mainly derives from the market institutions; thus it does not have to be dependent on the
Party-state. On many occasions, when their interests are impinged on, the private-sector
middle class people lack any powerful political patron to help them and very often have
to rely on legal weapons; thus the private-sector middle class people have a fairly strong
demand for an institutionalized democracy. For example, my interview with Mr. D, an
owner of small company which employed 6 people, reflects this orientation. Mr. D said:
“Government does not respect the interest of private enterprises, especially the 
small ones. The policy-making process is not transparent, and the policies change 
so fast.. ..My company is very small, and I have many parents such as Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce, Bureau of Tax and so on. To maintain good relations 
with these parents, you have to bribe them ... .1 hate that... .Democracy is good. 
Under democracy, we can use our votes to express our interests, to make 
government respect our interests.”
As mentioned before, all middle class individuals possess at least their apartments. 
Prior to the period of reform, urban residents did not have the ownership of their 
apartments. Legally, the ownership of all apartments belonged to the Party-state. All 
urban residents were assigned to different work units, which offered urban residents free 
housing.23 Since 1978, the Chinese government took steps to privatize the housing and
23 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing-, Tang and Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform', Zhou, The 
State and Life Chances in Urban China', Martin King Whyte, “The Politics o f Life Chances in the People’s 
Republic o f China,” in Power and Policy in the PRC, ed. Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview 
Press, 1985), 244-65.
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the Party-state no longer provided free housing.24 Therefore, all urban residents have to 
purchase apartments either through the work units at subsidized rates or through the 
market at higher market rates. As a result, the privatization of housing created two types 
o f home ownerships: commercial apartment (shangpingfang) ownership and work-unit 
subsidized apartment (danwei fu li fang) ownership. Usually, the private-sector middle 
class has the commercial apartment ownership; while the public-sector middle class has
25the work-unit subsidized apartment ownership.
Just like their Western counterparts, the Chinese middle class may also be 
inclined to take actions to deal with problems that affect their apartment property. But 
the two sub-groups react to these problems differently. The public-sector middle class 
tends to contact their work units to solve these problems if its apartment property is being 
impinged on. Such behavior perhaps reflects the underlying fact that this group has close 
ties with the Party-state and thus it has institutional channels to voice its concerns. On 
the other hand, the private-sector middle class tends to organize itself to act collectively. 
Many studies have documented lots of collective acts by the private-sector middle class 
in defending its property rights.26 For example, the private-sector middle class has 
organized its own associations, such as home-owners’ associations, to bargain
24 Yaping Wang and Alan Murie, “The Process of Commercialisation of Urban Housing in China,” Urban 
Studies 33, no. 6 (1996): 971-89; Rebecca L.H. Chiu, “Commodification of Housing with Chinese 
Characteristics,” Policy Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2001): 75-95.
25 For more on this point, see Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home- 
Owner Self-Organization in Urban China;” Tomba, “Creating an Urban Middle Class;” Chiu, 
“Commodification o f  Housing with Chinese Characteristics.”
26 For example, see Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New 
Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China;” “Yige mingxing shequ de liyi boyi” 
(The Rights Struggle o f A Star Community), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang Weekend), 29 May 29 2003; 
“Quan Beijing youchanzhe lianhe qilai” (All Home Owners in Beijing Unite), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang 
Weekend), 14 August 14 2003.
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collectively with the government and the property developing companies.27 Such
collective act reflects the democratic aspirations of the private-sector middle class. As
Mrs. H in her interview said:
“We spent our money buying our apartments. The government could not impinge 
on our interests on its own will. If that happens, we have no other choices but to 
organize ourselves and bargain with the government collectively.”
The Iron Tower {tie ta) Right Protection campaign of 2005 is a good example of
the democratic impulse of the private-sector middle class. In this case, residents of the
H u i’long’guan Community in Beijing’s Changping District launched a community rights
campaign— the so-called Right Protection. Local government wanted to construct a
telecom building close the Hui ’long ’guan Community. Residents o f the Ilid 'long ’guan
Community believed that the electromagnetic radiation of the antenna in the telecom
building may impair their health and thus they strongly opposed the construction of this
building. Most o f the residents are young intellectuals and business people from the
private sector, and they have a strong sense of democratic values. In this case, the
residents’ awareness of their rights has been awakened and they called for more
democratic and transparent community self-governance 28 In the last five years, incidents
relating to property-rights protection have increased in large and medium-sized cities.
Owners of commercial apartments, most of whom are members of the private-sector
middle class, have engaged in many activities to protect their property, such as collecting
signatures through Internet online forum, organizing home-owners’ associations, and
27 Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing 
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
28 Ren Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights: Organizations to Protect Homeowners’ Rights are an Indication 
that Community Politics are on the Rise,” Beijing Review 48, no. 30 (2005): 34-35.
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calling for a more democratic decision-making process than currently prevails in the
29management of community affairs.
In the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction of Urban Residential Communities,”
I asked Beijing residents the following question: “If your apartment property has been 
impinged on, what will you do?” It is not surprising to see that 60 percent of the public- 
sector middle class would choose to contact the leaders of the work units. On the other 
hand, more than 70 percent o f the private-sector middle class would take one o f the 
following actions: contacting the newspaper, going to court, and organizing associations 
of property owners to act collectively (Table 18), all of which may be regarded as more 
democratic in nature than the act of contacting the leaders of the work units.
Table 18. Comparison of Measures of Rights Resistance between the Two Sub­
groups of the Middle Class
If  your apartment property Public-Sector Middle Private-Sector Middle
has been impinged on, what Class Class
will you do? (%) (%)
Contacting the leaders of 60 0
work units
Contacting government 20 23
officials at all levels
Organizing associations of 3 20
property owners to work
collectively
Suing in court 5 14
Contacting the newspaper or 12 43
other media
29 For example, see Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” “Yezhu weiquan shouduan jilie, guifan 
shichang xuyao juexin” (Homeowners’ Rights Resistance Escalates and Determination is Needed to 
Regulate the Market), Zhongguo jingying bao (China Business News), 18 August 2003; “Yezhu zai 
xingdong” (Homeowners are Taking Action), Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang Weekend), 14 August 2003; Ben 
Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level,” Far Eastern Economic Review 166, no. 42 (2003): 35-37; 
“Yezhu weiyuanhui—yezhu weiquan heyi cheng xianxiang” (Home-Owners’ Associations— Why is the 
Homeowners’ Rights Resistance so Widespread)? Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 17 December 2004.
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B. Learning-Generalization Theory
According to learning-generalization theory, subjective attitudes and habits 
cultivated in one social sphere will affect attitudes and behavior in other spheres as 
well.30 Democracy theorists (e.g., Ronald Glassman) employ this theory to argue that the 
democratic orientations of middle class individuals are generated by the subjective 
attitudes and habits that they have learned in their social lives. As small property owners, 
the relation of middle class individuals “was a relation not of command and obedience 
but of man-to-man bargaining. Any one man’s decisions, with reference to every other 
man, were decisions of freedom and of equality.”31 Middle class individuals are likely to 
treat others as equals and accept bargaining as a normal way of dealing with people if 
they want to achieve consensus in the market and their social life.32 This spirit of 
equality and bargaining can be transferred to their political life.33 Thus, middle class 
individuals who are accustomed to bargaining in their economic and social life tend to 
emphasize the importance of bargaining in their political life, which is one of the most 
important aspects of the spirit of democracy.34
Moreover, according to learning-generalization theory, the job conditions of the 
middle class will affect their subjective attitudes through a process of learning from the 
job and generalizing what has been learned to other social and political realms.35 For
30 Karl Marx, Early Writings, edited and translated by T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); 
and idem, The Grundrisse, edited and translated by David McLellan (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
31 Mills, White Collar, 8.
32 Ibid.
33 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990); Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective.
34 Ibid.
35 Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact o f  Social 
Stratification (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1983); Melvin L. Kohn and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Social 
Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis o f  the United States and Poland  (Cambridge: Basil
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example, white-collar professionals who do intellectually demanding work will exercise
• . . .  3 5their intellectual expertise not only on the job but also in their social and political lives. 
Business owners managing small or medium-sized businesses will value the concept of 
self-direction and independence more highly in all social and political spheres.37 
Furthermore, the experience of running a business and supervising others and/or 
possessing intellectual expertise makes middle class people feel competent to run
• j o
political organizations. Thus, middle class persons tend to regard political leaders as
39colleagues rather than god or heroes and consequently are inclined to regard the 
performance of political leaders as something to be evaluated, which, in turn, leads to 
democratic aspirations and appeals.
Has the Chinese middle class learned these modern attitudes? Regarding this 
question, two sub-groups of the Chinese middle class show different attitudes: on the one 
hand, the public-sector middle class carries less of the spirit of equality and compromise 
and registers no support for the conception of self-direction and independence. However, 
the private-sector middle class has a higher level of both the spirit of equality and 
compromise and the conception of self-direction and independence.
Blackwell, 1990); James S. House, “Social Structure and Personality,” in Social Psychology: Sociological 
Perspectives, ed. Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 525-61.
36 Kohn and Slomczynski, Social Structure and Self-Direction; Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, “The 
Reciprocal Effects o f the Substantive Complexity of Work and Intellectual Flexibility: A Longitudinal 
Assessment,” American Journal o f  Sociology 84 (1978): 24-52; and idem, Work and Personality.
37 Kohn and Slomczynski, Social Structure and Self-Direction; Cobum and Edwards, “Job Control and 
Child-Rearing Values;” Jeylan T. Mortimer and Jon Lorence, “Work Experience and Occupational Values 
Socialization: A Longitudinal Study,” American Journal o f  Sociology 84 (1979): 1361-85; and idem, 
“Occupational Experience and the Self-Concept: A Longitudinal Study,” Social Psychology Quarterly 42 
(1979): 307-23.
38 Lane, Political Life.
39 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical 
Perspective.
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As documented in the previous chapter, the private-sector middle class mainly 
includes the managers in the private and sanzi enterprises,40 professionals in the non­
public sector, private entrepreneurs of small and medium businesses and those white- 
collar office workers in the non-public entities. The members of the private-sector 
middle class are actively involved in the market economy and their success and career are 
determined by the market institutions.41
The everyday transactions with other people in the marketplace enable the 
private-sector middle class to understand two of the essential characteristics o f the market 
economy: equality and negotiation. In the marketplace, all parties involved in the 
transaction are equal: there is no relationship of command and obedience but rather one 
of bargaining between peers. The completion of any transaction depends on the 
willingness of all involved parties. Moreover, during the transaction, all involved parties 
will bargain with each other and achieve a desirable result that is acceptable for all parties. 
For example, my interview with Mr. M, a middle-level manager of a big private 
enterprise, reflects this orientation. Mr. M said:
“The market means a free transaction between two people, one of which has 
something to sell; and the other has the money to buy... .The relationship between 
them is equal. You can not force one party to sell, and you can not force the other 
party to buy either. The transaction shall be based on the negotiation of both 
parties.”
In addition, the experiences of running business and supervising others and/or 
possessing intellectual expertise in the marketplace enable the private-sector middle class
40 Sanzi enterprises refers to those foreign-related enterprises such as equity joint venture, contractual joint 
venture, and solely foreign-owned enterprises.
41 For more on this point, please see, Bian and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power;” 
Nee and Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism;” Parish 
and Michelson, “Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban 
China;” Zhou, Tuma, and Moen, “Stratification Dynamics under State Socialism;” Lu, ed., Social Mobility 
in Contemporary China; Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China; Zhang, 
Conflict and Uncertainty.
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to attain the values of self-direction and independence. Self-employed people in small or 
medium-sized businesses usually make their own decisions in their daily management 
and it is therefore natural for them to value highly the concepts of self-direction and 
independence in their social life.42 Managers in the non-public sector such as private and 
sanzi enterprises are used to making their decisions without consultation with the 
government and Party cadres. Furthermore, their promotions and career are not 
determined by the Party-state, but rather by their job performance. Such independence in 
their daily work activities and career choices will gradually be transferred to their sense 
of self-direction and independence in the non-work areas of life. Professionals in the 
non-public sector possess intellectual expertise in their areas of work and they seek their 
own opportunities for upward mobility in the marketplace by using their intellectual 
expertise. This authority in regard to their work life and personal development endows 
those professionals with a sense o f self-direction and independence in their non-work 
life.43
In regard to these qualities, special attention shall be given to the group of 
managers in sanzi enterprises. They are the first group of the Chinese people that 
accepted training from these foreign-related enterprises and learned foreign management 
practices, and in the course of doing so brought the new idea of Western market culture 
to China, acting as a bridge linking the reforming China and the Western world. Because
42 For example, see Wentao Xiao, “Zhongguo zhongjian jieceng de xianzhuang he weilai fazhan” (The 
Current Situation and Future Development o f China’s Middle Stratum), Shehuixue yanjiu  (Sociological 
Research) 2001, no. 3: 93-98; Wei Zhang, “Zhongchan jieceng yu zhengzhi zhixu” (The Middle Class and 
Political Order), Jianghan luntan (Jianghan Forum) 2004, no. 1: 5-9.
43 For example, as Wei Zhang documented, the professionals and managers in the private sector have 
modem attitudes such as independence and self-direction. Because unlike the professionals and managers 
in the public sector who relied on the Party-state for employment, promotion, medical care, and housing, 
the professionals and managers in the private sector had to rely on themselves. Please see his book,
Conflict and Uncertainty. And also, please see Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary China', Zheng and 
Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
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they were exposed to the influences of foreign culture, this group of managers in sanzi 
enterprises gradually acquired modern values such as those of self-direction and 
independence in their daily lives, and later on they spread these values to the rest of the 
Chinese population. Additionally, in their daily work in the foreign-related enterprises, 
this group of managers in sanzi enterprises became exposed to modern democratic ideas 
such as those of equality, individual freedom, and responsive government. As some 
empirical studies show, managers in sanzi enterprises function as a transmission belt for 
democratic ideas from the Western world to China.44
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class mainly includes the managers in 
the state-owned enterprises, professionals in public organizations, and staff members in 
the government and party agencies and public organizations. This group of the public- 
sector middle class is still largely involved in the state power and their success and career 
are determined by the state institutions.45
Unlike the marketplace, the relations within the state institution are not 
characterized by equality and compromise, but by command and obedience. The 
everyday transactions within the state institutions are not conducive to the cultivation of 
modern values such as the spirit of equality and negotiation. Instead, the daily practices
44 For more on this point, please see Doug Guthrie, Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: the Emergence o f  
Capitalism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Michael A. Santoro, Profits and 
Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Qiuzhi 
Xue and Hui Zhuge, “Kuoguo gongsi yu zhongguo zhongchan jieceng de xingcheng yu fayu” 
(Transnational Corporations and the Formation and Development of the Chinese Middle Class), Guanli 
shijie (Management World) 1999, no. 4: 171-81.
45 Walder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime;” Parish and Michelson, 
“Politics and Markets;” Zhou, “Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China;” Bian 
and Logan, “Market Transition and the Persistence of Power.”
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within the state institutions tend to reinforce those values such as obedience and respect 
for hierarchy.46
In addition, the experiences of obeying orders from the Party-state make the 
public-sector middle class less likely to be familiar with modern values such as self- 
direction and self-independence. Moreover, unlike the private-sector middle class, the 
public-sector middle class has less control over their upward mobility and career. Rather, 
occupational advancement and mobility for the public-sector middle class are dictated by 
the Party-state.47 The little control they have over their own life opportunities makes it 
less likely for the public-sector middle class people to learn modem values such as those 
o f self-direction and self-independence.
To compare the attitudinal differences between these two sub-groups of the 
middle class with regard to the values such as those of equality and negotiation, as well 
as the concepts of self-direction and independence, I asked my respondents the following 
questions in the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction of Urban Residential 
Communities”:
1. Do you think that the interpersonal relations (or interpersonal transactions) 
shall be conducted in an equal way?
2. Shall we respect the idea that all people in modern society are entitled to have 
their own particular interest?
3. Do you think that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to negotiate 
with each other?
46 Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
47 Walder, Li, and Treiman, “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime;” Chunling Li, Duanlie 
yu  suipian: dangdai zhongguo shehui jieceng fenhua shizheng fenxi (Cleavage and Fragment: An Empirical 
Analysis on the Social Stratification of the Contemporary China) (Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2005); Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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4. To what extent do you believe that you have control over the success in your 
life?
As Table 19 clearly indicates, over 70 percent of the public-sector middle class 
does not support the idea of equal relations in the social interactions, while over 80 
percent o f the private-sector middle class does support this idea. With regard to the 
matter of their confidence in their control over their lives, more than 90 percent of the 
people in the private-sector middle class have this confidence, while only 30 percent of 
the people in the public-sector middle class register such confidence. With regard to the 
value of negotiation, 95 percent of the private-sector middle class people agree that all 
people in modem society are entitled to have their own particular interest, and 96 percent 
of them agree that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to negotiate with each 
other. On the other hand, only 43 percent of the public-sector middle class people agree 
that all people in modern society are entitled to have their own particular interest, and 
only 47 percent of them agree that the best way to cooperate in modern society is to 
negotiate with each other.
C. Social Interaction Theory
According to social interaction theory, people tend to interact with members of 
their own class and these intra-class interactions tend to strengthen the individuals’ 
existing political attitudes. So, because the other middle class individuals that they tend 
to interact with typically support democracy, middle class individuals’ social interactions 
tend to strengthen their support for democracy.
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Table 19. Comparison of Modern Spirit of Equality and Independence between the
Two Sub-groups of the Middle Class
Private-Sector Middle Public-Sector Middle
Class Class
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Response Response Response Response
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Do you think that the 
interpersonal relations 
(or interpersonal 
transactions) shall be 
conducted in an equal 
way?
80 20 30 70
Shall we respect the 
idea that all people in 
modem society are 
entitled to have their 
own particular interest?
95 5 43 57
Do you think that the 
best way to cooperate 
in modern society is to 
negotiate with each 
other?
96 4 47 53
To what extent do you 
believe that you have 
control over the success 
in your life?
93 7 30 70
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Social interaction theory argues that members of different social classes have 
different social interaction networks, especially outside the workplace, and they will tend 
to acquire ways of thinking and behavior through interacting with others.48 As my 
analysis unfolds in Chapter II, social interaction is a principal mediating mechanism by 
which class positions affect individual political attitudes and action, because “people tend 
to inter-act with each other in terms of their objective class position, and such interaction 
is a prerequisite for the capacity to perform successfully class-related political roles.”49 
According to Heinz Eulau, class positions determine individuals’ social interaction 
networks, and the social interaction per se influences the development of individuals’ 
class-appropriate ways of thinking and behavior.50 This is a mutually reinforcing process. 
Once class-appropriate ways o f thinking and behavior have formed, they will guide 
individuals’ social interaction in political realms.
In the Western societies, middle class individuals have strongly supportive 
attitudes toward democracy because they realize that democracy is the best system to 
protect their individual rights and property. Social interaction among middle class 
individuals will tend to strengthen such attitudinal orientations. Moreover, social 
interaction will help middle class individuals translate such attitudinal orientations into 
the class-appropriate ways of political thinking: middle class individuals shall think 
democratically. In sum, middle class individuals tend to interact with those who are also 
members of the middle class and are more likely to exhibit democratic thinking in their
48 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects 
of Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government;” Melvin L. Kohn, Class 
and Conformity: A Study in Values (Homewoord, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1969).
49 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior,” 524.
50 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” and idem, “Identification with Class and 
Political Perspective.”
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everyday lives. If this is true, class-appropriate ways of political thinking would arise
“through mechanisms of social learning and reinforcement.”51 Does this hold true for
China’s newly rising middle class?
The two sub-groups of the Chinese middle class have distinctively different social
networks. First, the people in the private-sector middle class tend to interact with those
who are also from the private sector. For example, private entrepreneurs of small and
medium-sized businesses tend to interact with each other, and they exchange information
regarding business opportunities through such networks. In the 2004 Beijing interview
on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” I asked my respondents the
following interview question: “In your social networks, who do you interact with most
often and closely?” Most private entrepreneurs of small and medium businesses have
chosen “private entrepreneurs of small and medium businesses” as the people with whom
they interact most often and closely.
And also, I observed that managers in the private sector tend to interact with other
managers in the private sector; and professionals in the private sector tend to interact with
other professionals in the private sector. The close interaction within the private-sector
middle class has created a class-appropriate culture, including lifestyles, attitudes and
behaviors. For example, my interview with Mrs. O, a middle-level manager of a big
foreign enterprise, typically conveyed this pattern. Mrs. O said:
“We have different social networks (quanzi). And there are different cultures and 
norms for different social networks. It is natural for middle class in the private 
sector to gather around... .People usually call the middle class in the private sector 
‘bourgeoisie (xiaozi) ' , since we have very distinctive social lifestyles.”
51 Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects o f Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations 
towards Government,” 473.
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Since the private-sector middle class tends to interact with each other, this close 
interaction may reinforce these modern values such as those of equality and negotiation, 
as well as of self-direction and independence, and may reinforce the perception of 
democracy as the best form of governance.
Second, the people in the public-sector middle class tend to interact with those 
who are also from the public sector. In my 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class and 
its Political Attitudes and Behavior”, I observed that managers in the public sector tend to 
interact with other managers in the public sector, professionals in the public sector tend to 
interact with other professionals in the public sector, and white-collar office workers in 
the public sector tend to interact with other white-collar office workers in the public 
sector. Moreover, the people in the public-sector middle class clearly understand the 
difference between them and those in the private sector. As Mrs. P, a university 
professor, said:
“It is very clear that those middle class in the private sector are different from us. 
And we have different social networks. I seldom make friends with those middle 
class individuals from the private sector... .We still rely on the government, and 
they rely on the market. Thus, it is so natural that they have their own networks 
and form their own culture; and we have our own networks and form our own 
culture.”
Since the public-sector middle class tends to interact with each other, this close 
interaction may reinforce those traditional orientations such as the values of respect for 
hierarchy and the concepts of reliance on the Party-state, and may also reinforce their 
undemocratic orientations.
Based on these observations, I am positing the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis: The middle class in the private sector has strong democratic attitudes; 
on the other hand, the middle class in the public sector has significantly weaker 
democratic attitudes.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DEMOCRATIC VALUES
What is the best method to measure the degree of democratic orientations among 
the Chinese population and its middle class in particular? There is no consensus on this 
question. Since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,52 the importance of participant 
political culture has been recognized in democracy literature. Accordingly, several 
studies of Chinese politics adopted political efficacy as an important dimension to 
measure the degree of democratic orientations among China’s general population.53 
However, this measurement does not directly capture democratic orientations per se.
The concept of democratic values that is central to this dissertation is based on the 
following synopsis by James Gibson: a “democratic citizen [is] one who believes in 
individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust 
of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient 
but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as 
constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes.”54 
In accordance with this understanding of what it means to be a democratic citizen, this 
dissertation will measure the political orientations toward democracy among China’s
52 See their seminal work, The Civic Culture.
53 For example, see Nathan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China;” Shi, “Cultural Values 
and Democracy in the People’s Republic of China;” Wang et al., “Economic Change and Political 
Development in China.”
54 James Gibson, “The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in Nascent 
Russian and Ukrainian Democracies,” in Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States 
o f  Eurasia, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 55-56.
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general population and its middle class in particular through an assessment of each of the 
following three sub-dimensions: support for competitive election, support for equal 
protection and rights for all people, and support for sovereignty of the people’s will.
SUPPORT FOR COMPETITIVE ELECTION
Competitive election is one of the essential characteristics of democracy.55 
According to Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is a polity that is an “institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”56 Schumpeter and 
other democracy theorists have even gone so far as to equate democracy with competitive
c n
elections. Therefore any assessment of the degree of democratic attitudes held by the
c  o
general population must include a measurement of the support for competitive election. 
According to Chen and Zhong, “it is even more relevant to tap into the level of support 
for competitive elections in China, since Chinese political culture has been deemed 
inherently non-democratic.”59
To determine the extent of Chinese citizens’ support for competitive elections, I 
asked my respondents the following two questions in the 2000 Beijing survey on 
“Election and Urban Local Self-governance”:
55 Dahl, Polyarchy.
56 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1947), 269.
57 For example, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, ed., The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1978); Huntington, The Third Wave', Guillermo O ’Donnell, “Illusions 
About Consolidation,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 40-57.
58 For example, see James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin. “Democratic Values and the 
Transformation o f the Soviet Union,” Journal o f  Politics 54, no.2 (1992): 329-71; Chen and Zhong, 
“Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China;” Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
59 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China,” 32.
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1. Do you think that election is a better way to choose political leaders than Party 
appointment?
2. Do you think that it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate elections to 
choose government officials at the district level?
The respondents were asked to answer each of two questions on a 5-point scale, 
with “ 1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not sure”,
“4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”. I believe that these two 
questions are very relevant to measure the level of support for competitive elections. 
Because, according to Samuel Huntington, a competitive election involves at least two 
components— that more than one candidate can compete for votes freely, and that the 
electorate shall include all adults regardless of gender, race, income, education and 
class.60
The support for competitive elections is of particular interest in the Chinese 
society. Because, the direct and multi-candidate election of government officials has 
been a rare practice in China, limited to the elections of leaders in the urban and rural 
local governments and the elections of representatives to the People’s Congress at the 
district-level in the urban areas and at the township-level in the rural areas.61 Moreover, 
in the 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior”,
60 Huntington, The Third Wave.
61 According to the 1982 Chinese Constitution, the National People’s Congress has the highest power in 
China. Chinese Premier and cabinet members are elected by the National People’s Congress. However, 
the representatives to the National People’s Congress are not directly elected. Only those representatives to 
the People’s Congress in the district-level in the urban areas and in the township-level in the rural areas are 
directly elected by the electorate. Article 97 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution provides that “deputies to 
the People’s Congresses of counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, 
nationality townships and towns are elected directly by their constituencies.” For more on this point, see 
Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing; Tang and Parish, 
Chinese Urban Life under Reform ; Melanie Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese 
Countryside,” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 736-48; M. Kent Jennings, “Political 
Participation in the Chinese Countryside,” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 361-72.
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I observed that many middle class people in the private sector demanded the direct,
multi-candidate elections of government officials, at least at the district level. For
example, my interview with Mrs. K, a middle-level manager of a big private enterprise,
reflects this attitude. Mrs. K said:
“I agree that all government officials at all levels should be chosen by a process of 
direct, multi-candidate elections. Even the Chinese Constitution gives us the right 
to vote; but we can not elect representatives to the National People’s Congress, to 
the Provincial-level People’s Congresses, to the City-level People’s Congresses. 
Even though we do have the right to vote for the representatives to the District- 
level People’s Congresses, the election itself does not make too much sense.
There are not enough candidates for us to choose from. And these candidates are 
always designated by the Party.”
Table 20 shows the following findings: 1). The private-sector middle class 
registered a higher level of support for competitive election than the lower class, the 
public-sector middle class and the upper class. Approximately 84 percent of the people 
in the private-sector middle class agreed that election is a better way to choose political 
leaders than Party appointment, and about 88 percent of them agreed that it is time to 
promote direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government officials at the district 
level. Furthermore, less than 10 percent of the private-sector middle class disagreed with 
both statements.
2). The public-sector middle class expressed a lower level of support for 
competitive elections than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 28 percent of 
the people in the public-sector middle class did not agree with the statement that election 
is a better way to choose political leaders than Party appointment and only 49 percent of 
them registered agreement with this statement. Still about 32 percent of the public-sector 
middle class people disagreed with the statement that it is time to promote direct, multi-
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candidate elections to choose government officials at the district level and only 44 
percent o f them registered agreement with this statement.
Table 20. Support of Competitive Election by Class Identity
1. Do you think that election is 
a better way to choose political 
leaders than Party appointment?
2. Do you think that it is time to 
promote direct, multi-candidate 
elections to choose government 
officials at the district level?
Negative Positive Not 
Response Response sure 
(%) (%) (%)
Negative Positive Not 
Response Response Sure 
(%) (%) (%)
Upper Class 30 44 26 35 37 28
Public-Sector 28 49 23 32 44 24
Middle Class 
Private-Sector 8 84 8 6 88 6
Middle Class 
Lower Class 14 60 26 10 65 25
Note: For Question 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 48.9; df = 6; p = 0.00; for Question 2: 
Pearson Chi-Square = 51.4; df = 4; p = 0.00.
3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support competitive elections 
than those in the private-sector middle class, as indicated by their responses to both 
questions. But they have a higher level of support for competitive elections than the 
people in the public-sector middle class and the upper class. About 60 percent of 
respondents from the lower class registered agreement with the statement that election is 
a better way to choose political leaders than Party appointment and 65 percent o f them 
registered agreement with the statement that it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate 
elections to choose government officials at the district level.
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4). The upper class people are the least democratic and they expressed the lowest 
level of support for competitive election. Approximately 30 percent of the upper class 
people disagreed with the statement that election is a better way to choose political 
leaders than Party appointment and 35 percent of them registered disagreement with the 
statement it is time to promote direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government 
officials at the district level.
Based on my analysis of these survey results, I find that the group o f the Chinese 
private-sector middle class is positively associated with support for competitive elections. 
The Chinese private-sector middle class supports the idea that election is a better way to 
choose political leaders than Party appointment and believes that it is time to promote 
direct, multi-candidate elections to choose government officials at the district level. On 
the other hand, the group of the public-sector middle class shows a strong negative 
attitude towards the institution of competitive elections. Such findings are consistent 
with my theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.
SUPPORT FOR EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ALL PEOPLE
Democracy is the political system in which the rights of all citizens are equally 
protected under the rule of law regardless of their origins, race, gender, income, 
education, and class. According to John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, freedom 
exists only when standing law protects all people. Therefore, any assessment of the 
degree of democratic attitudes held by the general population must include a 
measurement of the support for equal protection of rights for all people.
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According to Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “in China, belief in equal protection and 
rights is a critical indicator of democratic values, since its traditional culture still works
fcd)against such democratic norms.” As suggested by Lucian Pye, there are no equal 
relations within the traditional Confucian culture. In Confucian culture, there is no 
equality, only superiors and inferiors, and there is a sharp divide between friends and foes. 
Moreover, the Confucian culture is extremely group-oriented. People tend to identify 
with their group and discriminate against those who lie outside their group.63
After two decades of economic reform, support for equal protection for all people 
was growing in the Chinese society. For example, in 1995, around 85 percent of Beijing 
residents registered support for the norm of equal protection for all people.64 Another 
example is the great popularity of the newspaper— “Nanfang zhoumo (Nanfang 
Weekend) ”— in current China. “Nanfang Weekend” has been regarded by independent 
intellectuals as the center of liberal thoughts in current China, and it advertised its 
missions as “even if we do not agree with your words, we will fight to the death for your 
right of free speech.” It argued that all people should have the equal rights of free speech 
regardless of their wealth, educational attainment, and occupation. Such a concept of 
equal rights for all people has attracted strong responses from the Chinese urban 
population in the late 1990s.65 Moreover, my 2004 Beijing interview on “Middle Class 
and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” has also provided evidence of the rise of the 
demand for equal rights. Especially among the subgroup of the private-sector middle 
class, there is a very strong demand for the equal protection of rights for all people. For
62 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System o f Post-Deng China,” 32.
63 Pye, The Spirit o f  Chinese Politics.
64 Chen and Zhong, “Defining the Political System of Post-Deng China.”
65 For example, many readers wrote letters to the editors in “Nanfang Weekend' to support all the modern 
democratic ideas that “Nanfang Weekend' promoted, particularly the idea of equal rights for all people.
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example, my interview with Mr. W, an independent scholar, reflects this attitude. Mr. W 
said:
“Have you heard of the ‘BMW case’ which occurred in 2003? The BMW case 
began in October 2003 when a tractor pulling a load of green onions through a 
crowded market in the northern city of Harbin, in the province of Hei ’longjiang, 
scraped a BMW driven by Ms. Su Xiuwen. Ms. Su reportedly bit the peasant and 
his wife who had got down from their tractor to apologize, then rammed her car 
into the crowd, killing the peasant’s wife and injuring twelve others. Ms. Su was 
given only a two-year suspended sentence for the so-called ‘accidental traffic 
negligence’. This led to a great amount of disapproval, complaint, and even 
protest among the Chinese internet citizens because Ms. Su was reportedly a 
daughter-in-law of the chairman of Hei ’longjiang Provincial Political 
Consultative Conference... .1 was active in participating in the discussion o f the 
BMW case in internet. And many of our friends also actively participated in the 
discussion of the BMW case. We all felt angry that there was no justice in this 
case, and it became obvious that the current government only protected those 
wealthy and powerful people. Of course, equal protection of rights for all people 
under the rule of law is the most important issue in current China. In the BMW 
case, it was very obvious that the current government discriminated against the 
poor peasant family. Today, the victim was the poor peasant family; maybe 
tomorrow, the victim will be my family.”
To determine the extent of Chinese citizens’ support for the equal protection of 
rights, I asked my respondents the following question in the 2004 Beijing survey on 
“Construction of Urban Residential Communities”: “Do you agree with the following 
two statements:
1. All people should be entitled to vote, regardless of his/her family origin, 
occupation, education level, or income.
2. The judicial system should treat all people equally.
The respondents were asked to answer each of these two questions on a 5-point 
scale, with “ 1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not 
sure”, “4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”.
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Table 21 shows the following findings: 1). The people in the private-sector 
middle class registered a higher level of support for equal protection than those in the 
lower class, public-sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 92 percent of 
the people in the private-sector middle class agreed that all people should be entitled to 
vote, regardless of his/her family origin, occupation, education level, or income, and 95 
percent o f them registered agreement with the statement that the judicial system should 
treat all people equally.
Table 21. Support for Equal Protection and Rights by Class Identity
1. All people should be entitled 
to vote, regardless of his/her 
family origin, occupation, 
education level, or income
2. The judicial system should 
treat all people equally
Negative Positive Not 











Upper Class 33 54 13 30 55 15
Public-Sector 27 59 14 15 60 25
Middle Class 
Private-Sector 5 92 3 2 95 3
Middle Class 
Lower Class 11 81 8 13 75 12
Note\ For Statement 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 53.9; df = 6; p = 0.00; for Statement 2: 
Pearson Chi-Square = 61.0; df = 6; p = 0.00.
2). The people in the public-sector middle class have a lower level of support for 
equal protection than those in the private-sector middle class. Approximately 27 percent 
of public-sector middle class registered disagreement with the statement that all people 
should be entitled to vote, regardless of his/her family origin, occupation, education level,
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or income. Only 59 percent of the people in the public-sector middle class registered 
agreement with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote and only 60 
percent o f them registered agreement with the idea that the judicial system should treat all 
people equally.
3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support the equal protection of 
rights for all people than those in the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher 
level of support for equal protection than the people in the public-sector middle class and 
the upper class. Approximately 81 percent of respondents from the lower class registered 
agreement with the idea of equality o f voting rights, and 75 percent of them registered 
agreement with the idea that the judicial system should treat all people equally.
4). The people in the upper class are the least democratic, and they have the 
lowest level of support for equal protection. Approximately 33 percent o f the upper class 
disagreed with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote and 30 percent of 
them registered disagreement with the statement that the judicial system should treat all 
people equally. On the other hand, only 54 percent of respondents from the upper class 
registered agreement with the statement that all people should be entitled to vote, and 
only 55 percent of them registered agreement with the idea that people should have equal 
standing before the judicial system.
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the Chinese private- 
sector middle class is positively associated with support for equal protection. The 
Chinese private-sector middle class does support the idea of equality of voting rights and 
equal standing before the judicial system. On the other hand, the group o f the public-
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sector middle class shows a strong negative attitude towards the idea of equal protection. 
Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.
SUPPORT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S WILL
As many democracy scholars point out, democracy is a system wherein the people
of a society control the government. In a democratic society, sovereignty originates from
the people living in this society and is delegated to the government.66 In China
sovereignty of the people’s will is an extremely critical indicator of democratic values
because there is no tradition in China of popular influence on government. It is often
argued that the political culture of China is rooted in Confucian absolutism, which was
without a liberal tradition. The traditional Confucian culture emphasized authority over
liberty, and lacked a tradition of rights against the state, and granted a sage with
“mandate o f heaven” to rule the country.67
After two decades of economic reform, support for sovereignty of the people’s
will was on the rise in the Chinese population, especially in the private-sector middle
class. For example, my interview with Mrs. H, an independent lawyer who opened her
own law company, reflects this attitude. Mrs. H said:
“The government officials at all levels (from street level to city level, and up to 
central government) never cared about the people’s will and voice. They made 
policies just by their will, and never solicited our opinion, even though they 
claimed themselves to be representative of the people’s interest. Of course, we 
need further reform. We need to reform the structure of the current political 
system, so that it is more attentive to the people’s will and voice.”
66 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, John Locke (1632-1704), Two Treatises o f  Government (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967); Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and 
Regimes (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).
67 Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave;” Pye, The Spirit o f  Chinese Politics.
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In addition, a survey conducted by the Chinese Communist Youth League and the 
National Student Federation clearly indicated that the younger generation tended to value 
a set o f tangible individual interests (e.g., making money and personal development), 
rather than national interest.68
To determine the extent of Chinese citizens’ support for sovereignty of the 
people’s will, I asked my respondents to evaluate the following two statements in the 
2004 Beijing survey on “Construction of Urban Residential Communities”:
1. The government policies should be guided by the people’s will.
2. When individual interests are in conflict with state interests, we should sacrifice
our personal interests for the sake of state interests.
The respondents were asked to answer each of these two questions on a 5-point 
scale, with “1” indicating “strongly agree”, “2” indicating “agree”, “3” indicating “not 
sure”, “4” indicating “disagree”, and “5” indicating “strongly disagree”.
Table 22 indicates the following findings: 1). The private-sector middle class 
registered a higher level o f support for sovereignty of the people’s will than the lower 
class, the public-sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 95 percent of 
the people in the private-sector middle class agreed that the government policies should 
be guided by the people’s will, and 98 percent of them registered disagreement with the 
idea that individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake o f state interests.
2). The public-sector middle class has a lower level of support for sovereignty of 
the people’s will than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 47 percent of the 
people in the public-sector middle class did agree with the statement that when individual 
interests are in conflict with state interests, the individual should sacrifice his/her
68 See the Hong Kong magazine Zhengming, no. 8 (August 2000), p. 27.
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personal interests for the sake of state interests. Meanwhile, only 55 percent of the 
people in the public-sector middle class registered agreement with the statement that the 
government policies should be guided by the people’s will.
Table 22. Support for Sovereignty of People’s Will by Class Identity
1. The government policies 
should be guided by the people’s 
will.
2. When individual interests are in 
conflict with state interests, we 
should sacrifice our personal 



















Upper Class 37 44 19 35 50 15
Public-Sector 30 55 15 40 47 13
Middle Class 
Private-Sector 3 95 2 98 1 1
Middle Class 
Lower Class 12 73 15 61 20 19
Note: For Statement 1: Pearson Chi-Square = 57.6; df = 6; p = 0.00; for Statement 2: 
Pearson Chi-Square = 63.0; df = 6; p = 0.00.
3). The people in the lower class are less likely to support sovereignty of the 
people’s will than those in the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher level 
of support for sovereignty of the people’s will than those in the public-sector middle class 
and the upper class. Approximately 73 percent of respondents from the lower class 
registered agreement with the statement that the government policies should be guided by 
the people’s will, and 61 percent of them registered disagreement with the statement that 
individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of state interests.
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4). The people in the upper class are the least democratic, and they have the 
lowest level of support for sovereignty of the people’s will. Approximately 37 percent of 
the people in the upper class disagreed with the statement that the government policies 
should be guided by the people’s will and 50 percent of them registered agreement with 
the statement that individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of state 
interests. On the other hand, only 44 percent of the people in the upper class registered 
agreement with the statement that the government policies should be guided by the 
people’s will and only 35 percent o f them registered disagreement with the statement that 
individuals should sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of state interests.
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the Chinese private- 
sector middle class is positively associated with support for the sovereignty of the 
people’s will. The Chinese private-sector middle class supports the idea that the 
government policies should be guided by the people’s will and that personal interests are 
more important than state interests. On the other hand, the group of the public-sector 
middle class shows a strong negative attitude towards the institution of the sovereignty of 
the people’s will. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and 
support my hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
This chapter makes distinctions between two sub-groups of the middle class: 
public sector and private sector. The middle class individuals employed in the private 
sector are much more independent from the Party-state. Much like their Western 
counterparts, the middle class people in the private sector perceive democracy as the best
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form of governance to protect their properties. And they strongly demand the legal- 
institutional constraints upon the power of Party-state to guarantee the proper functioning 
o f the market, to reduce the widespread corruption, to protect their private property and 
their bourgeois lifestyle. Moreover, the middle class people in the private sector have 
acquired modern values such as those of equality and negotiation, as well as of self­
independence in their daily lives and work. Such modem ideas are closely related to 
democratic values and can be easily translated into democratic attitudes. In addition, the 
close interaction within the private-sector middle class may reinforce such democratic 
attitudes.
On the other hand, those middle class individuals employed in the public sector 
have close relations with the Party-state and enjoy many privileges sanctioned by the 
Party-state; thus they have a vested interest to maintain the status quo. They do not 
demand a transparent, democratic political system; instead they worry that a dramatic 
change from the current political system may endanger their interests since they may lose 
those privileges that they are currently enjoying as a result of their relationship with the 
Party-state. Moreover, the middle class people in the public sector did not learn those 
modern ideas; rather they persisted in their traditional mentality, such as those of 
obedience and respect for hierarchy, reflecting the culture of their daily lives and work. 
The close interaction within the group of the public-sector middle class tends to reinforce 
such undemocratic attitudes.
Based on the 2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Self- 
governance”, I find that the middle class in the private sector registered a higher level of 
support for competitive election than the middle class in the public sector and other
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segments o f the Chinese population. Based on the 2004 Beijing survey on “Construction 
of Urban Residential Communities”, I find that the middle class in the private sector 
registered a higher level of support for equal protection for all people and support for 
sovereignty of the people’s will than the middle class in the public sector and other 
segments of the Chinese population. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical 
arguments that the middle class in the private sector has strong democratic attitudes and 
that the middle class in the public sector has significantly weaker democratic attitudes. 
The middle class in the private sector is the most democratic within Chinese society in 
terms of these three dimensions: support for competitive elections, support for equal 
protection and rights for all people, and support for sovereignty of the people’s will. On 
the other hand, the middle class in the public sector shows a fairly strong negative 
attitude towards democracy in terms of these three dimensions.
It is not surprising to see that the upper class is the least democratic since this 
class is the greatest beneficiary of current political institutions and has a vested interest in 
maintaining those institutions. The lower class has shown a moderate support of 
democratic values. It is less democratic than the middle class in the private sector, but it 
is more democratic than the middle class in the public sector and the upper class. In the 
2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance”, I find that the 
lower class people registered a higher level of support for competitive elections than the 
middle class in the public sector and the upper class. In the 2004 Beijing Survey on 
“Construction of Urban Residential Communities”, I find that the lower class registered a 
higher level of support for equal protection under the law and support for sovereignty of 
the people’s will than the middle class in the public sector and the upper class.
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In the urban areas the lower class is mainly composed of the working class. Since 
1978, the social status of China’s working class has changed fundamentally. The reform 
of state-owned and collective-owned enterprises has altered the pattern o f “organised 
dependence” and paternalism characteristic of state-labor relations in Mao’s era.69 In 
Mao’s era, the Chinese working class benefited greatly from their relationship with the 
Party-state; by contrast, in the reform era, China’s working class is emerging as the loser. 
The Chinese working class has become the subordinate class and their discontent has 
risen consequently. Many studies have observed different forms of labor struggles— 
ranging from everyday workplace resistance, petitions, work stoppages and strikes to 
public protest, violence, independent unionism and political movements that exemplify 
the discontent of the Chinese working class.70
China’s current regime has lost the political support of the working class. As 
concluded by Martin King Whyte, “China’s political leaders no longer can take comfort 
in their ability to turn to the workers for support in facing a crisis. Instead, they must 
worry about whether they can maintain control over their increasingly unhappy and 
fractious proletariat.”71 The result of China’s economic reform is paradoxical: China’s 
leaders’ purpose in initiating reform was to increase support for the regime; however,
79economic reform gradually undercut this support. The political support o f China’s 
working class for the regime has gradually retreated in the period since 1978. Thus, 
China’s working class has naturally shown a strong attraction to democracy.
69 Lee, “Pathways of Labor Insurgency.”
70 Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency;” Whyte, “The Changing Role of Workers;” Weston, “China’s 
Labor Woes.”
71 Whyte, “The Changing Role of Workers,” 196.
72 Lee, “Pathways o f Labor Insurgency.”
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CHAPTER V
DOES CHINA’S MIDDLE CLASS ACT IN WAYS THAT PROMOTES
DEMOCRACY?
As the previous chapter delineates, the two subgroups of the middle class have 
shown different attitudinal orientations toward democracy. The private-sector middle 
class is the most democratic within the Chinese society, whereas the public-sector middle 
class shares, though to a lesser degree, the negative attitudes toward democracy with the 
upper class and is less democratic than the lower class. Does the private-sector middle 
class, who supports democratic values, act in ways that will promote democracy? Does 
the public-sector middle class, who holds negative attitudes toward democracy, act in 
ways that will impede the transition to democracy? This chapter is intended to address 
these two critical questions.
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
According to the literature on the Western middle class, the middle class people, 
who support democratic principles, do act in ways that promote democracy. Under a 
democratic system, these middle class individuals, who have attitudes in support of 
democratic principle, are more likely to participate in a variety of conventional political 
activities that have important consequences for the proper functioning of democracy.
This argument is based on the following theories:
(1) Political Efficacy Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the 
social group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have a high
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level o f political efficacy: that is, they are more confident about their role in public affairs 
and are more competent to participate in politics than members of the lower class.1 Many 
empirical studies have reported that, “political participation and subjective competence 
are positively related. An increase in the level of one is accompanied by an increase in 
the level of the other.”2
Why do middle class individuals have a high level of political efficacy?
According to previous studies of the middle class in the Western societies, this political 
confidence and competence come mainly from three sources. One is the experience and 
intellectual expertise related to the occupations and professions of middle class 
individuals. As Chapter IV has discussed, according to learning-generalization theory, 
the job conditions of the middle class affect their subjective attitudes through a process of 
learning from the job and generalizing what has been learned to other social and political 
realms. The experience of running a business, supervising others, and/or possessing 
intellectual expertise makes middle class people feel competent to participate in all types 
of actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system.3
A second source o f this political confidence and competence is the possession of a 
greater degree of knowledge about public and political affairs. Due to the nature and 
needs of their occupations, middle class people have a greater stake than the working 
class in the acquisition of information about public policies and politics in general. For 
example, owners of small/medium businesses, managers, and professionals need to have
1 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and 
Political Role Behavior;” Lipset, Political Marc, Milbrath, Political Participation', Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 
“Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Glassman, The Middle Class and 
Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global 
Perspective', Verba and Nie, Participation in America.
2 Milbrath, Political Participation, 59.
3 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective', and idem, The New Middle 
Class and Democracy in Global Perspective', Lane, Political Life.
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timely information about changes in government policies and of political leaders at 
various levels, which could directly affect their immediate and long-term interests related 
to their occupations and professions. As Robert Luskin argues, people in the middle class 
have “more politically impinged occupations [that require] more political 
information.. .about what the government is doing or is likely to do .. .and what effects its 
actions are likely to have.”4
A third source o f the middle class’s political confidence and competence is 
psychological security, which to a significant extent derives from economic security. On 
the other hand, the poorer class lacks economic security and, therefore, psychological 
security as well. “The lower one goes on the socioeconomic ladder, the greater economic 
uncertainty one finds. White-collar workers, even those who are not paid more than 
skilled manual workers, are less likely to suffer the tensions created by fear o f loss of 
income... .Such insecurity will of course affect the individual’s politics and attitudes.”5 
Empirical studies have found that people who feel quite secure economically are also 
likely to feel that they are politically effective and have an effective voice in political 
affairs.6 Thus the middle class, which has more economic security, is expected to be 
more confident about political participation and the effectiveness of political participation.
(2) Political Interest Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the 
social group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have a 
greater degree of interest in political and public affairs. At least some cross-national
4 Robert C. Luskin, “Explaining Political Sophistication,” Political Behavior 12, no. 4 (1990): 336.
5 Lipset, Political Man, 106.
6 Lane, Political Life, 224.
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empirical studies have shown that those people who are more interested in and concerned 
about public affairs and political matters are more likely to be active participants.7
Why are middle class individuals more interested in politics? First, there is the 
explanation offered by rational choice theory. Middle class individuals are small 
property owners. The conventional wisdom of political scientists holds that property 
owners have a greater stake in politics and thus they are more likely to be interested in 
and concerned about political matters and public affairs. Driven by economic interest, 
middle class individuals are more likely to be sensitive to government policies that 
generate negative effects on their property.8
Second, social interaction matters. As I have discussed, members of different 
social classes have different social interaction networks. Since middle class individuals 
tend to interact with members of their own class, and since members o f the middle class 
generally are more interested in politics and tend to be politically engaged, a middle class 
member is more likely to encounter more political stimuli than members of the other 
social classes. And when this occurs, social interaction effects would arise through 
mechanisms of social reinforcement.9
(3) Resources Theory, which states that middle class individuals are the social 
group that is most likely to act on their democratic beliefs because they have resources 
(e.g., time, money and civic skills) to do so. In other words, I would rather argue that
7 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, 
Voting: A Study o f  Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1954); Campbell et al., The American Voter; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political 
Participation, Part I,” and “Part II;” Verba and Nie, Participation in America; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman 
Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
8 Glassman, China in Transition; and idem, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical 
Perspective; and idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective.
9 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Role Behavior;” Walsh, Jennings and Stoke, “The Effects 
o f  Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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middle class individuals participate in all types of actions (or “non-actions”) for the rise 
and/or maintenance of a democratic system since they have the resources o f time, money, 
and civic skills to do so.10
The middle class is characterized as a class with leisure time.11 The middle class 
has enough leisure time available for matters not closely related to the subsistence of 
daily life. Political activity “takes an amount of leisure above the minimum to ring 
doorbells, write letters, read magazine articles”; voting, political campaigning and 
contacting government officials very often require a great amount of leisure tim e.12 
Therefore, a differential in leisure time can account for some of the differential in 
political activity.
Money is an important resource for all types of political actions for the rise and/or
> I T .  •
maintenance o f a democratic system, since it “is impossible to contribute to a campaign 
or other political cause without some discretionary income.”14 Obviously, middle class 
people have more discretionary income than lower class people and so can more easily 
afford to participate in political activities.
Civic skills are defined in this study as “communications and organizational 
abilities.”15 This definition allows us to make distinctions between civic skills and a 
subjective feeling of efficacy. Even though there is a strong positive correlation between
10 Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; Milbrath, Political 
Participation; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.
11 Mills, White Collar; Kahl, The American Class Structure.
12 Lane, Political Life, 223.
13 Milbrath, Political Participation; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality; Verba and Nie, 
Participation in America; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political 
Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Steven J. 
Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993).
14 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, 289.
15 Ibid.
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civic skills and a subjective feeling of efficacy, civic skills are different and relatively 
objective. Those persons who “can speak or write well or who are comfortable 
organizing and taking part in meetings” . . .“should find political activity less daunting and 
costly and, therefore, should be more likely to take part.” Moreover, those civic skills 
“allow participants to use inputs of time and money more effectively, making them more 
productive when they are active.”16
The workplace is one of the most important social institutions for the 
development of civic skills. Owners of small/medium businesses, managers, and white- 
collar professionals, for example, are more likely to possess civic skills since they have 
more opportunities to practice managing, supervising and organizing skills and increase 
their intellectual expertise in their work lives. As summarized by Sidney Verba and his 
colleagues, “having a job is, of course, a necessary first step toward acquiring civic skills 
in the workplace, but the nature of the occupation is also important. Teachers or lawyers 
are more likely to have opportunities to enhance civic skills—to organize meetings, make 
presentations, and the like—than are fast-food workers or meat cutters.”17
These Western individual-level theories form the theoretical basis for my 
assessment of the political behaviors of the middle class individuals in urban China.
A. Political Efficacy o f  the Two Groups o f  the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has a higher 
level o f political efficacy than the public-sector middle class and other social groups.
This expectation is based on the following argument.
16 Ibid., 304.
17 Ibid., 314-315.
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As documented in Chapter III, the Chinese private-sector middle class includes
mainly the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the
private sector, private entrepreneurs who run small and medium businesses, and those
white-collar office workers in the private entities. Like their counterparts in Western
societies, their experiences running business, supervising others, and/or possessing
intellectual knowledge make the private-sector middle class feel competent to participate
in all types o f political activities. For example, self-employed individuals who run small
or medium businesses usually make their own decisions in the daily management o f those
businesses and therefore tend to see political leaders as colleagues engaged in the
management of political organizations.18 Managers in the private sector such as those
who run private or foreign-related enterprises are accustomed to making decisions
without consulting the government and Party cadres, and thus acquire a strong sense of
self-direction and competence that is easily transferred to the political sphere.19 My
interview with Mr. F, a middle-level manager in a foreign-owned enterprise, has provided
evidence for this argument. Mr. F said:
“I am confident to participate in politics... .1 have managed quite a big part of 
business in this company and supervised over 20 employees. Managing a 
political organization shall be no more difficult than managing a company. Due 
to the nature of my occupation, I have to keep informed about public policies. 
Thus I have accumulated enough political knowledge to take part in political 
activities.”
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class, which mainly includes the 
managers in the state-owned enterprises, professionals in the public organizations, and 
staff members in the government and party agencies as well as public organizations, is 
still controlled, in varying degrees, by the state power. As the previous chapter indicates,
18 Glassman, China in Transition.
19 Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China', Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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the public-sector middle class has less control over its career and social mobility, since 
the occupational advancement and mobility for the public-sector middle class is largely 
determined by the Party-state. Moreover, the attitudes of the public-sector middle class
are influenced by the values that prevail in the workplace, such as those of obedience and
20respect for hierarchy. Therefore, this group of the public-sector middle class is less
likely to acquire a sense of social-political competence from their work experience.
To measure Chinese urban residents’ sense of political efficacy, I asked my 
respondents to evaluate the following two statements in the 2004 Beijing survey on 
“Construction of Urban Residential Communities”:
1 .1 feel that I have a fairly good understanding of local political and public affairs.
2 .1 consider myself well-qualified to participate in the decision making process of 
local political and public affairs.
Respondents were asked to answer each of the two questions on a 5-point scale, 
with “ 1” indicating “strongly disagree” and “5” indicating “strongly agree”. The values 
of these two questions were combined to form an additive index to capture residents’ 
sense o f political efficacy, where “2” referred to the least level of political efficacy, and 
“ 10” stood for the highest level o f political efficacy. This political efficacy index is then 
trichotomized into three categories: high, intermediate, and low levels.
Table 23 clearly indicates the following findings: 1) The middle class people in 
the private sector have a higher sense of political efficacy than the lower class, the public- 
sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 95 percent of the private-sector 
middle class individuals indicate that they have a fairly good understanding o f local
20 For example, please see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary 
China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
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political and public affairs and they are well-qualified to participate in the decision 
making process o f local political and public affairs. Additionally, only 5 percent o f them 
disagree with these two statements.
Table 23. Political Efficacy by Class Identity
Political Efficacy Upper Class Public-sector Private-sector Lower Class
Index1 Middle Class Middle Class
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Low 3 15 5 40
Medium 32 35 20 30
High 65 50 75 30
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 49.3; df = 6; p = 0.00
\  The original political efficacy index is trichotomized into three categories: high, 
intermediate, and low levels.
2) The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level o f political 
efficacy than the private-sector middle class. Only 60 percent o f the public-sector middle 
class individuals indicate that they have a fairly good understanding of local political and 
public affairs and they are well-qualified to participate in the decision making process of 
local political and public affairs.
3) The lower class people are least likely to be politically efficacious. 
Approximately 40 percent of respondents from the lower class indicate that they have a 
fairly good understanding o f local political and public affairs and they are well-qualified 
to participate in the decision making process of local political and public affairs. In 
addition, 40 percent of respondents from the lower class disagree with these two 
statements.
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4) The upper class showed a fairly strong sense of political efficacy. 
Approximately 90 percent of respondents from the upper class agree with the statements 
that they have a fairly good understanding of local political and public affairs and that 
they are well-qualified to participate in the decision making process of local political and 
public affairs. This finding could be explained by the fact that the majority of the upper 
class people have institutional channels that facilitate their involvement in the process of 
government decision-making. As Chapter II indicates, the upper class is composed of the 
administrative personnel of state affairs and social affairs, and private entrepreneurs. The 
administrative personnel of state affairs and social affairs are bureaucrats in government 
agencies and are advantageously positioned at the heart of the political system. Private 
entrepreneurs possessed the large means of production and were gradually co-opted by
• . 9 1the party-state, becoming a part of the ruling class.
B. Political Interest o f  the Two Groups o f  the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has a greater 
degree o f interest in political and public affairs than the public-sector middle class and 
other social groups. This expectation is based on the following argument.
As the previous chapter indicates, most members of the Chinese middle class own 
a relatively substantial amount of property: all small entrepreneurs own their businesses, 
whereas most managerial personnel, professionals, and white-collar office workers 
possess at least their apartments. The conventional wisdom of political scientists holds 
that property owners have a greater stake in politics; and so they are more likely to be 
interested in and concerned about political matters and public affairs.
21 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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However, the middle class people in the public sector have close relations with 
the Party-state and thus they may rely on those ties to assure the protection of their 
property. As a result, the public-sector middle class has little motivation to be interested 
in political affairs. On the other hand, the private-sector middle class usually does not 
have close relations with the Party-state; therefore, it has to rely on other methods to 
protect its property, such as using legal weapons, contacting government officials, and 
organizing associations of property owners. In addition, unlike the public-sector middle 
class people who buy the government-subsidized apartments through their work unit, the 
private-sector middle class people buy their apartments from the market for a very high 
market price and thus are very sensitive to those government policies that may have 
negative effects on the value of their apartment properties. Additionally, many empirical
studies have documented a variety of actions taken by the private-sector middle class to
22defend their apartment properties.
To measure Beijing residents’ interest in political and public affairs, I asked my 
respondents two questions in the 2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Self- 
governance” :
1. When you get together with your friends, do you discuss political matters and 
public affairs frequently?
2. How interested would you say you are in political matters and public affairs? 
Respondents were asked to answer each of the two questions on a 3-point scale,
with “1” indicating “not at all,” “2” indicating “somewhat,” and “3” indicating “very 
often” (for Question 1) or “very much” (for Question 2). The values of these two
22 Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing 
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
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questions were combined to form an additive index that captures residents’ interest in 
public affairs, where “2” represented the least interest and “6” represented the highest 
interest in public affairs. This political interest index is then trichotomized into three 
categories: high, intermediate, and low levels.
Table 24 clearly indicates the following findings: 1) The middle class people in 
the private sector have a higher level of political interest than the lower class, the public- 
sector middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 98 percent of the private-sector 
middle class people indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters 
and that they will discuss political matters with their friends. In addition, only 2 percent 
o f them say “no” to both questions.
Table 24. Political Interest by Class Identity
Upper Class Public-sector Private-sector Lower Class
Political Interest Middle Class Middle Class
Index1 (%) (%) (%) (%)
Low 12 16 2 32
Medium 50 41 38 38
High 38 43 60 30
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 55.0; df = 6; p = 0.00
1. The original political interest index is trichotomized into three categories: high, 
intermediate, and low levels.
2) The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level of political 
interest than the private-sector middle class. Only 57 percent o f the public-sector middle 
class individuals indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters 
and that they will discuss political matters with their friends.
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3) The lower class people are least likely to be politically engaged.
Approximately 48 percent of respondents from the lower class indicate that they are at 
least somewhat interested in political matters and that they will discuss political matters 
with their friends. In addition, about 30 percent of respondents from the lower class say 
“no” to both questions.
4) The upper class people are less likely to be politically engaged than the private- 
sector middle class, but they have a higher level of political interest than the lower class 
and the public-sector middle class. Approximately 88 percent o f respondents from the 
upper class indicate that they are at least somewhat interested in political matters and that 
they will discuss political matters with their friends. Additionally, only 12 percent of 
middle class persons say “no” to both questions.
C. Resources o f  the Two Groups o f  the Chinese Middle Class
It is my expectation that the Chinese private-sector middle class has more 
resources (i.e., money and civic skills) than the public-sector middle class and other 
social groups. This expectation is based on the following arguments.
Money is an important source of all types of political actions.23 The private-sector 
middle class people, having more disposable income than the public-sector middle class 
and the lower class, can more easily afford to participate in political activities. Quite a 
few studies have documented that, as the major beneficiary of the post-Mao reform, the
23 Milbrath, Political Participation', Verba and Nie, Participation in America; Rosenstone and Hansen, 
Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America', Verba,, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political 
Equality', Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.
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private-sector middle class has become one of the richest social groups in the Chinese 
society. 24
As owners of small or medium-sized businesses, managers, and white-collar 
professionals, the private-sector middle class individuals are more likely to possess civic 
skills, since they have plenty of chance to practice managing, supervising and 
organizational skills in their work life. For example, my interview with Mrs. T, a low- 
level manager in a foreign-related enterprise, has provided evidence for this argument.
Mrs. T said:
“I have been a professional manager since 1990. In my routine work, I have been 
exposed to lots of meetings and workshop. And I have organized meetings, and 
made presentations for over 10 years. So, I am confident to say that I am well 
equipped with communications and organizational abilities.”
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class has less control over its work.
In their work life, the public-sector middle class people must follow the government and
Party orders and thus have little chance to practice the above-mentioned civic skills.25
Based on the above discussions, it may be concluded that the private-sector
middle class people, like their Western counterparts, are also interested in political
matters, and are feel efficacious to participate in politics, and are endowed with resources
(i.e., money and civic skills) to do so. In addition, as the previous chapter indicates, the
private-sector middle class has strong pro-democratic orientations. Thus, I expect that
the private-sector middle class is very likely to participate in various forms o f political
activities that will promote democratization in contemporary China. On the other hand,
24 For more on this point see, Johnston “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International Affairs;” 
Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China', David G. Goodman, “The People’s 
Republic o f China: the Party-state, Capitalist Revolution and New Entrepreneurs,” in The New Rich in Asia: 
Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution, ed. Richard Robison and David G. Goodman 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 225-42; and idem, “The New Middle Class.”
25 For example, please see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, Lu, ed., Social Mobility in Contemporary 
China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
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the public-sector middle class people, is less interested in political matters, and has a 
lower level of political efficacy, and are endowed with less resources to participate in 
political affairs than the private-sector middle class. In addition, as the previous chapter 
indicates, the public-sector middle class has negative attitudes toward democracy. 
Therefore, I expect that the public-sector middle class will not participate in political 
activities that may promote democracy in China, moreover, I expect that the public-sector 
middle class will participate in political activities that will strengthen the rule o f the 
current regime.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
To test my theoretical argument that the private-sector middle class will act in 
ways that will promote democracy in China and that the public-sector middle class will 
act in ways that will impede the transition to democracy, I selected two types of political 
activities that explore the different political behavioral orientations of the two sub-groups 
of the middle class: participation in civic organizations and participation in the urban 
self-government system.
A. Conventional Political Participation in Current China
In the democratic societies, the middle class is more likely to participate in 
conventional political activities than other social groups. This participation is crucial for 
the maintenance and functioning of a democratic system.26 According to Sidney Verba 
and his associates, conventional political activities are “legal acts by private citizens that 
are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel
26 Dahl, Polyarchy, Lane, Political Life\ Milbrath, Political Participation.
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and the actions that they take”.27 Moreover, Verba and his associates identify four modes 
o f  conventional political participation: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and 
particularized contact. From the outset o f the post-Mao economic and political reforms,
ordinary Chinese citizens have been participating in public affairs and politics at least at
28the local level, even though the Chinese political system is at most semi-democratic. 
Studies of Chinese politics have identified several common modes o f conventional 
political participation: voting, campaign behavior, particularized contact, and civic
• • • 29participation.
What are the participatory orientations of the two sub-groups o f the middle class 
in regard to these conventional political activities? Will the two sub-groups of the middle 
class have different participatory orientations?
This dissertation is going to explore these two questions by examining (1) how 
the two sub-groups of the middle class act in the civic organizations, and (2) how the two 
sub-groups of the middle class act in the urban self-government system. There were 
several reasons to choose the civic organization and urban self-government system as the 
case to study the participatory orientations of the two sub-groups o f middle class people. 
First, all Chinese middle class people are urban residents, thus it is necessary to study 
political behavioral orientations of the middle class people by examining how they act in
27 Verba,, Nie, and Kim, Participation and Political Equality, 46.
28 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing', Tang and Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform', Manion,
“The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside;” Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese 
Countryside;” Hsin-Chi Kuan and Siu-Kai Lau, “Traditional Orientations and Political Participation in 
Three Chinese Societies,” Journal o f  Contemporary China 11, no. 31 (2002): 297-318; Jie Chen, 
“Subjective Motivations for Mass Political Participation in Urban China,” Social Science Quarterly 81 
(2000): 645-62; Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, “Why Do People Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?” 
Journal o f  Politics 64 (2002): 178-97.
29 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing', Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside;” 
Jennings, “Political Participation in the Chinese Countryside,” Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban 
China.
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the public affairs and politics in the urban areas of China. People’s participation in the 
civic organizations and the urban self-government by no means exhaust their political 
behaviors in urban China; nonetheless, they may serve as a good test of the relationship 
between people’s class identity and political behavioral orientations in urban China. 
Second, people from all socio-economic classes of the urban areas are familiar with the 
civic organizations and the urban self-government system, and they tend to act in a more 
sophisticated way in the civic organizations and the urban self-government system. 
Therefore, people’s participation in the civic organizations and the urban self-government 
may represent their fundamental political behavioral orientations. Third, in the reform 
era, people are free to choose to participate or not to participate in the civic organizations 
and the urban self-government.30 For this reason, survey questions about these acts were 
“unlikely to make respondents give interviewers false answers.”31 Thus, people’s 
behavioral orientations toward the civic organizations and the urban self-government 
provide a good opportunity to study the impact of class identity on their behavioral 
orientations.
B. Testable Hypotheses
Civic organizations work in several ways to help people become active in support 
of the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system.32 First, these civic organizations 
may provide extensive exposure to political matters, in the form of both informal political
30 In the Mao era, Chinese citizens were required by the party to participate in these political activities to 
show their support for the regime. Non-participation was punished by the party.
31 Shi, Political Participation in Beijing, 27.
32 Lane, Political Life; Lipset, Political Man; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward 
Consolidation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Robert Putnam, Robert 
Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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discussions and formal consideration o f political matters at meetings.33 As a result, these 
civic organizations “would be acting as channel of political communication or as a 
potential means of arousing political interest in citizens.”34 Second, leaders of these civic 
organizations “often make deliberate attempts to mobilize the ranks to political action.”35 
Third, civic organizations will generate beneficial impacts on individuals’ democratic 
orientations. Civic organizations “instill in their members habits of cooperation, 
solidarity, and public-spiritedness.”36
However, the nature of Chinese civic associations is different from those in 
Western societies. Most formal civic organizations in China are under the complete 
control of the party-state or dependent upon the party-state. On the other hand, most 
private organizations and informal social networks have a certain level of autonomy and 
independence from the party-state.37 Thus, the private-sector middle class individuals’ 
democratic belief may lead them to participate in private organizations and informal 
social networks and are less likely to take part in formal civic organizations that are 
sponsored by the Party-state. Like their counterparts in Western societies, the private- 
sector middle class individuals have plenty of resources, such as money and civic skills, 
to afford them to be actively engaged in private civic organizations. Moreover, the 
private-sector middle class people have motivations to participate in private civic 
organizations, because they realize that by organizing and participating in private civic 
organizations, they can act collectively to protect their property and interests. For
33 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, Milbrath, Political Participation; Verba and Nie, 
Participation in America.
34 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, 177.
35 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, 309.
36 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work.
37 However, in the Chinese society, the distinction between “formal” and “private” civic organizations is 
very fuzzy. In many cases, Chinese civic organizations may have combined characters: “formal” and 
“private” .
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example, numerous studies have documented that the private-sector middle class people 
have formed home-owners’ associations (yezhu weiyuanhni) to seek the protection of 
their property interests and rights collectively.38 In addition, the private-sector middle
class has a high level o f social and political competence, which is a necessary condition
r  . . . . . .  . . . . 1 0tor proactive participation in private civic organizations.
On the other hand, I expect that the public-sector middle class is more likely to 
participate in the government-sponsored civic organizations and less likely to participate 
in private civic organizations. The public-sector middle class people have close ties with 
the Party-state, thus they are more likely to have affective attachments to current political 
authority, which, in turn may lead them to participate in formal civic organizations. 
Besides, the Party-state has taken steps to mobilize the public-sector middle class to 
become members of formal civic organization, aiming to strengthen the control of the 
public-sector middle class.40 On the other hand, the public-sector middle class people are 
very wary about the development of private civic organizations since these organizations 
do not fit with their undemocratic belief.41 In addition, the public-sector middle class 
individuals do not have resources, such as money, civic skills, and socio-political 
competence, to organize and participate in private civic organizations.
Based on the above discussion, I am positing the following hypothesis:
I I I : Chinese middle class individuals in the private sector are less likely to 
participate in form al civic organizations and more likely to become involved in
38 For example, see Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” and Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? 
New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
39 For example, see Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty. And also, please see Lu, ed., Social Mobility in 
Contemporary China', Zheng and Li, Social Structure o f  the Cities in Contemporary China.
40 For example, Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty, and Goodman, “The New Middle Class.”
41 For example, see Yingfang Chen, “Xing’dong’li yu zhidu xianzhi: dushi yundong zhong de zhongchan 
jieceng” (Behavioral Capacity and Institutional Constraints: The Middle Class in Urban Social Movements), 
Shehuixueyanjiu  (Sociological Studies) 2006, no.4: 1-20; Zhang, Conflict and Uncertainty.
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autonomous private organizations, whereas Chinese middle class individuals in the 
public sector are more likely to participate in formal civic organizations and less likely to 
become involved in autonomous private organizations.
As this chapter will discuss later, the self-government system in urban China was 
still semi-democratic, if not non-democratic, since it was in general dominated and 
controlled by the party-state. As a result, the system itself may not be consistent with the 
expectations o f those who strongly believe in democratic principles, such as the free 
popular elections of leaders and equal protection for all people. Thus, the private-sector 
middle class people who believe that a political system should be democratically formed 
through competitive election may have a negative evaluation of the current forms of 
conventional political participation; in turn, this negative evaluation may cause the 
private-sector middle class to engage in non-participatory action as protest against the 
current system.
Based on this discussion, I am positing the following two hypotheses with regard 
to the participatory orientations of the private-sector middle class:
H2: The private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic belief that a political 
system should be democratically form ed leads to their negative evaluation o f  the 
currently-implemented urban self-government system.
H3: In turn, this negative evaluation causes the private-sector middle class 
individuals to engage in non-participatory action.
On the other hand, since the middle class people in the public sector enjoy some 
formal (i.e., corporatist institutions) and informal channels (i.e., personal ties) to the 
party-state power, they are more likely to identify themselves with the current semi-
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democratic regime and possess affective attachments to current political authority. 
Moreover, the public-sector middle class has strong negative attitudes toward democracy. 
And this undemocratic belief may lead to their positive evaluation of the current forms of 
conventional political participation. In turn, this positive identification with the current 
regime and affective attachments to current political authority will cause middle class 
individuals in the public sector to engage in the participatory action as support for the 
current system.42
Based on this discussion, I am posting the following two hypotheses with regard 
to the participatory orientations of the public-sector middle class:
H4: The public-sector middle class individuals ’ undemocratic belief may lead to 
their positive evaluation o f the currently-implemented urban self-government 
system;
H5: In turn, this positive evaluation causes the public-sector middle class 
individuals engage in participatory action.
Overall, this chapter argues that the private-sector middle class people, who have 
democratic orientations, will act in a democratic way; that is, they are more likely to 
participate in private civic organization, and less likely to participate in the urban self- 
government system. On the other hand, this chapter argues that, the public-sector middle 
class people, who have undemocratic belief, will act in an undemocratic way; that is, they 
are more likely to participate in the government-sponsored civic organization and urban 
self-government system.
42 Chen, “Subjective Motivations for Mass Political Participation in Urban China;” and idem, Popular 
Political Support in Urban China.
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CIVIC PARTICIPATION OF THE TWO SUB-GROUPS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
In this section, I will compare the participatory orientations in civic organizations 
between the two sub-groups of the middle class. Before doing that, however, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the nature of Chinese civic organizations.
A. The Nature o f  Chinese Civic Organizations
Since the 1978 reform, the number of China’s civic organizations has increased.
In the years between 1979 and 1992, the number o f national civic organizations has risen 
sevenfold (averaging 48% a year), and the average increase of provincial civic 
organizations has developed even faster.43 By the end of 2002, there were 133,340 civic 
organizations in China.
Current studies of Chinese politics question the autonomy of these civic 
organizations 44 As He Baogang has suggested, the assumption that these organizations 
are autonomous and independent is not warranted.45 The expectation that China’s civil 
organizations will perform the same democratic functions as their Western counterparts is 
far from being a reality. According to He, “Chinese autonomous organizations are 
neither completely autonomous from the state nor completely dependent on the state ....
It is the feature of partial autonomy and overlapping with the state that makes Chinese 
social associations a semi- or quasi-civil society.”46 Moreover, as Chapter III has 
discussed, these civic organizations are licensed by the Party-state and under the
43 Minxin Pei, “Chinese Civic Associations: An Empirical Analysis,” Modern China 24, no. 3 (1998): 285- 
318.
44 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China', Pearson, China’s New Business Elite', Unger and Chan, “China, 
Corporatism, and the East Asian Model.”
45 Baogang He, The Democratic Implications o f  Civil Society in China (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 
1997).
46 Ibid., 7-8.
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directives o f the Party-state. According to Bruce Dickson, the civic organizations in 
China have a dual function: they are designed to give the Party-state a means by which to 
control organized interests in society and also to represent their members’ interests.47
On the other hand, many Chinese scholars and watchers have observed the 
development o f private organizations and even unofficial organizations in the Chinese 
society, which are more independent from the government’s control.48 For example, as 
suggested by Ian Johnson, China’s citizens “have started to demand more from their 
government,” and “these sorts of demands have given rise to numerous unofficial— and 
in many cases illegal— groups outside the government’s control: hence, civil society.” 
Such civic groups are “pushing for change” and “China is in a transition from a society of 
strong governmental control to one where civil society controls more.”49
This dissertation makes distinctions between two types o f civic organizations: 
state-controlled civic organizations and autonomous private organizations. The state- 
controlled civic organizations include most formal civic organization such as trade unions, 
associations of private entrepreneurs, and trade associations (hangye xiehui). Political 
and economic civic organizations are typical state-controlled organizations.50 The 
autonomous private organizations include sport or recreation organizations, art, music or 
educational organizations, academic organizations and public interest organizations.
Most of these organizations have a certain level of autonomy and independence from the
47 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
48 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in 
Urban China;” Luigi Tomba, “Residential Space and Collective Interest Formation in Beijing’s Housing 
Disputes,” The China Quarterly 184 (2005): 934-51; Ian Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil 
Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 551-54.
49 Johnson, “The Death and Life o f China’s Civil Society,” 553.
50 For a detailed discussion, please see He, The Democratic Implications o f  Civil Society in China', Dickson, 
Red Capitalists in China', Pearson, C hina’s New Business Elite', Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and 
the East Asian Model.”
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Party-state.51 Public interest organizations refer to those autonomous organizations 
seeking to promote the public interest, and they are the active and robust part of civil 
society and play a direct role in promoting public interest.52
B. The Comparison between the Two Types o f  Civic Organizations
In contemporary China, all civic associations have to register with government 
agencies and conform to regulations issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. According 
to the “Regulations on the Management of the Registration of Societal Organizations” 
which was issued by the State Council in 1989, all new civic organizations have to be 
approved by government agencies, which have authority over the applicants’ proposed 
domains o f activities, before they can register with the offices o f the Ministry o f Civil 
Affairs.53 In this respect, there is no significant difference between state-controlled civic 
organizations and private organizations. However, some public interest organizations do 
not register with government agencies at all. For example, some internet-based public 
interest networks organize most of their activities on the Internet and they do not have 
formal organizational structures or staff; therefore, they are completely outside the 
government’s control.54
51 For a detailed discussion, please see He, The Democratic Implications o f  Civil Society in China; Gordon 
White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City,” The Australian Journal o f  
Chinese Affairs 29 (1993): 63-87; B. Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” in Civil society in China, 
ed. Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 46-67.
52 Johnson, “The Death and Life of China’s Civil Society.”
53 Pei, “Chinese Civic Associations.”
54 Tamara Renee Shie, “The Tangled Web: Does the Internet Offer Promise or Peril for the Chinese 
Communist Party?” Journal o f  Contemporary China 13, no. 40 (2004): 523-30; Guobin Yang, “The 
Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment,” Journal o f  Contemporary China 12, no. 
36 (2003), 453-75; Nina Hachigian, “The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States,” The 
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 41-58; Guobin Yang, “Weaving a Green Web: The Internet and 
Environmental Activism in China,” China Environment Series 6 (2003): 89-93.
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For the state-controlled civic organizations, the leaders o f these civic 
organizations are elected or nominated by the Chinese government, and the funding of 
these civic organizations come mainly from the Chinese government. Moreover, on 
many occasions, these civic organizations are created or initiated by the government. As 
a consequence, these civic organizations are highly dependent on the government and the 
Chinese government can institute strict control over the activities o f these civic 
organizations.55 On the other hand, the private organizations can choose their own 
leaders, and the funding of these private organizations comes mainly from social 
donations and constituencies’ fees. Moreover, under most circumstances, these private 
organizations are created or initiated by individual Chinese citizens. As a consequence, 
these private organizations are very independent, even though the Chinese government 
can still put some limits on their activities.
The state-controlled civic organizations are designed to give the government a 
means o f controlling the organized interests in society by regulating the activities of their 
members.56 On the other hand, the private organizations genuinely assume the function 
of representing their members’ interests. Unlike the state-controlled civic organizations, 
the private organizations do not necessarily follow the directives from the government 
and they are more responsive to the demands from their members.
Within the state-controlled civic organizations, there exists a hierarchical structure 
that guarantees that directives are effectively transferred from the top down to the local
55 Christopher Earle Nevitt, “Private Business Associations in China: Evidence o f Civil Society or Local 
State Power?” The China Journal 36 (1996): 25-43; Jonathan Unger, “Bridges: Private Business, the 
Chinese Government and the Rise o f New Associations,” The China Quarterly 147 (1996): 795-819; Anita 
Chan, “Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China,” The Australian 
Journal o f  Chinese Affairs 29 (1993): 31-61; Pearson, “The Janus Face o f Business Associations in China;” 
Unger and Chan, “China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model.”
56 Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.
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level.57 The local branch associations must submit to the direction of the top-level 
associations. Moreover, the relations between the state-controlled civic organizations and 
their members are neither horizontal nor voluntary.58 Most state-controlled organizations 
stipulate that membership is obligatory. For example, the Self-Employed Labourers’ 
Association (SELA) and Private Enterprises Association (PEA) clearly state that the self- 
employed businessmen automatically become members when they register for the 
licenses from the government agencies.59
Unlike the state-controlled civic organizations, most private organizations do not 
have local branch offices or affiliations since the government has put limits on their 
memberships and scope of activity.60 And the relations between the private organizations 
and their members are more horizontal and voluntary. Within the private organizations, 
the membership of the constituency is voluntary, and the constituencies can decide 
whether or not to join the organizations freely.61
The comparison between the state-controlled civic organizations and private 
organizations can be best summarized by Table 25.
57 Pearson, “The Janus Face of Business Associations in China.”
58 According to Putnam and his associates, the qualities o f being “horizontal” and “voluntary” are essential 
for an organization to be a genuine civic organization. Please see their book, Making Democracy Work.
59 Nevitt, “Private Business Associations in China;” and Unger, “Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese 
Government and the Rise of New Associations.”
60 Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (2004): 
28-49.
61 Johnson, “The Death and Life of China’s Civil Society.”
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Table 25. The Comparison between the State-Controlled Organizations and Private
Organizations
Private Civic State-controlled Civic
Organizations Organizations
Autonomy Medium or High Partial or None
The Funding and Staff Partially dependent on the Completely dependent on the
Source government or independent government
Organization Leaders Independent or partially Completely decided by the
influence by the government
government
Role o f Civic Interest accumulation and Implementation of
Organizations representation government policies and 
limited function of interest 
representation
The Relations between Equal and voluntary Completely Hierarchical
Organizations and their
Members
C. Empirical Findings and Discussions
The 2004 Beijing Survey contains a standard survey question that is designed to 
assess Chinese citizens’ level of participation in a variety of civic organizations. The 
standard survey question is as follows: “Now I am going to read off a list o f voluntary 
organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are a member or not a 
member of that type of organization? 1) private social welfare groups, 2) state-initiated 
religious or church organizations, 3) private education and cultural groups, 4) state- 
initiated unions, 5) state-initiated political groups, 6) private local community 
organizations, 7) private rights-resistance organizations, 8) private environment groups, 9) 
state-initiated industry associations, 10) private sports and recreation organizations.” 
Among these 10 types of organizations, I define state-initiated unions, political groups, 
religious organizations, and industry associations as the state-controlled civic
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organization, and define private social welfare groups, education and cultural groups, 
local community organizations, rights-resistance organizations, environment groups, as 
well as sports and recreation organizations as the private organizations.
Table 26 shows the participatory pattern of different class groups in the two types 
o f civic organizations. Based on the data presented in this table, we see that the middle 
class people in the private sector are more likely to participate in the private organizations 
than are other social segments. Approximately 30 percent of the people in the private- 
sector middle class indicate that they have participated in at least one private organization. 
The middle class people in the private sector are less likely to participate in the state- 
sponsored civic organizations than the public-sector middle class and the upper class.
Only 13 percent o f the people in the private-sector middle class participated in one or 
more state-controlled civic organizations.




Upper Class 31 11
Public-sector Middle 32 9
Class
Private-sector Middle 13 30
Class
Lower Class 10 5
Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 20.2; df = 3; p = 0.00
2) The middle class people in the public sector are more likely to participate in the 
state-controlled civic organizations than the private-sector middle class and the lower
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class. Approximately 32 percent of the people in the public-sector middle class indicate 
that they have participated in at least one state-controlled civic organization. On the 
other hand, only 9 percent of the people in the public-sector middle class participated in 
one or more private organizations.
3) The lower class people are least likely to participate in both state-controlled 
and private organizations. Such finding can be explained by the following two facts: first, 
the lower class people do not possess resources such as time, money, and civic skills to 
enable them to spontaneously participate in the private organizations; second, the lower 
class people generally do not have close relations with the Party-state thus they are less 
likely to be mobilized by the Party-state to be engaged in the state-controlled civic 
organizations.
4) The upper class is most likely to participate in the state-controlled civic 
organizations. Approximately 35 percent of the upper class participated in one or more 
state-controlled organizations. Such finding simply reflects the fact that the upper class 
people have the strongest ties with the Party-state.
Based on this examination of the survey results, I conclude that the Chinese 
private-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the private civic organizations. 
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the state- 
controlled civic organizations. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical 
discussion and support my hypothesis.
The different participatory behaviors by the two sub-groups of the middle class in 
civic organizations have significant implications for China’s political development. The 
participation in the state-controlled organizations will lead the public-sector middle class
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to identify with the current semi-democratic regime and form affective attachments to
62current political authority. Furthermore, the undemocratic nature o f the state-controlled 
organizations may strengthen the undemocratic belief among the public-sector middle 
class. In addition, the participation in the state-controlled organizations will lead the 
public-sector middle class to be engaged in other forms of conventional political 
activities that support the current system.
On the other hand, the private organizations, like their Western counterparts, are 
voluntarily and horizontally organized; thus they are more democratic than the state- 
controlled civic organizations. As a consequence, involvement in the private 
organizations will instill democratic attitudes in their members and cause their members 
to become critical of the current political authority, which, in turn, may lead to their 
negative evaluation o f the current forms of mass political participation. Finally, this 
negative evaluation may cause the private-sector middle class to adopt a non- 
participatory strategy in regard to other forms of conventional political activity as a 
protest against the current system.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE URBAN SELF-GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
In this section, I will explore the different political behavioral orientations o f the 
two sub-groups o f the middle class by examining how they act in the urban self- 
government system. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to provide an 
overview of the nature of the system first.
62 Johnson, “The Death and Life of China’s Civil Society.”
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A. The Nature o f  the Urban Self-Government System
From the outset of the post-Mao reform, the central government has made 
genuine efforts to adapt the grassroots government system in the urban areas to social 
changes brought about by the reform in the urban neighborhoods, such as the drastic 
decline of the role of work units and the rapid increase in private ownership o f residential
63properties. This system was anchored by its self-governing body, Residents’ 
Committee (RCs, jumin weiyuanhui). Residents’ Committees were first established by 
the government in the 1950s. Before the post-Mao reform, the central government used 
RCs to assist work units at the grassroots level in implementing Party and government 
policies, monitoring and controlling the population, and providing residents with some 
basic social welfare services. Moreover, the central government treated the RCs as its 
administrative extensions, in conjunction with work units, at the local level.
Before reform, urban residents relied more on their work units than on the RCs 
for their basic life needs.64 Therefore, the RCs “were seen to be performing trivial and 
routine tasks.”65 However, since the outset of the Post-Mao reform, the importance of the 
work units in meeting the residents’ basic life needs declined. More importantly, most 
work units no longer provided the social services, such as housing, childcare, medical
63 Allen C. Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II: An Assessment of Urban Residents Committees 
Municipal Community Development,” Asian Foundation Working Paper 1998, no. 10; Benjamin L. Read, 
“Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’,” The China Quarterly 163 (2000): 806-20.
64 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” 
Zhirong Zhang and Haijiao Yang, ed., Jiceng minzhuyu shehui fazhan  (Grass-Roots Democracy and Social 
Development) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2001); Bangzuo Wang, ed., Juw eihuiyu shequzhili 
(Residents’ Committee and Community Governance) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003); 
Robert Benewick, Irene Tong, and Jude Howell, “Self-Governance and Community: A Preliminary 
Comparison between Villagers’ Committees and Urban Community Councils,” China Information: A 
Journal on Contemporary China Studies 18, no. 1 (2004): 11-28; James Derleth and Daniel R. Koldyk, 
“The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban China,” Journal o f  Contemporary China 13, 
no. 41 (2004), 747-77.
65 Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self-Governance and Community,” 14.
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care and other social welfare services, which they did in the pre-reform era.66 And many 
urban residents do not belong to any work unit at all (e.g., those who are laid off from the 
work units and those who are employed in the private or foreign or joint-venture 
enterprises). It is in this larger context that the Chinese government initiated the 
revitalization of RCs.
According to the 1982 Chinese Constitutions, the RCs established among urban 
residents on the basis of their residence are mass organizations of self-management at the 
grassroots level. The Chairman, vice Chairman and members of each RC are elected by 
the residents. In November 1989, the Chinese National People’s Congress promulgated 
the “Organic Law on Organization o f Residents Committees of Cities”, which became 
effective m January 1990. According to the Organic Law, these RCs are supposed to be 
elected and regularly held to account by the residents of urban neighborhoods, and are 
responsible for administering local socioeconomic and political affairs.68 The central 
government’s underlying rationale is that, under this system, the RCs should be more 
effective and efficient in settling these issues, because the RCs, which are supposed to be 
popularly elected, tend to enjoy greater support from residents.
However, the 1990 “Organic Law” did not stipulate clearly how the RC members 
(including chairman and vice-chairman) should be elected. In practice, there are three 
kinds o f elections for RC members: direct election by all residents, election by an 
electorate consisting of representatives from each household, or election by an electorate
66 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self-Governance and 
Community;” Wang, ed., Residents’ Committee and Community Governance.
67 Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II.”
68 Wang, ed., Residents’ Committee and Community Governance', Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban 
‘Nerve Tips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots 
Democracy and Social Development.
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consisting of representatives from each of the Residents’ Small Groups. In reality, the 
“all residents direct election” has been a rare practice, whereas the “indirect election by 
an electorate consisting of RC small groups representatives” has been most widely 
practiced.69 It is much easier for the local Party leaders to control indirect rather than all 
residents’ direct election, since most “representatives” who voted in indirect elections 
were actually chosen by the incumbent RC itself “from among its activists and 
supporters,” or designated by the local Party leaders.
As for the nomination of candidates for RC members, the 1990 “Organic Law” 
did not stipulate clearly how the candidates for RC members (including chairman and 
vice-chairman) should be nominated. In practice, there are five kinds o f nominations for 
RC members: first, the local government/Party leaders selects the candidates; second, the 
RC itself selects the candidates; third, the local government/Party leaders and RC itself 
jointly select the candidates; fourth, the local government/Party leaders and RC itself 
jointly select the candidates with consultation with residents; fifth, residents jointly 
nominate the candidates. In reality, the nomination of candidates for RC members was 
also closely monitored and controlled by the local government and Party leaders, and 
residents almost had no influence in the nomination process.
In 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued its decree, “Views for Advancing the 
Construction o f Urban Residential Communities,” which marked the beginning of the 
central government’s push for more autonomy of grassroots governing bodies in urban 
China. The decree called for the establishment o f new grassroots governing bodies, 
Community Residents’ Committees (CRCs), which are supposed to be different from old
69 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community 
Governance', Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self- 
Governance and Community;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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RCs. The CRCs tend to have more residents and more autonomy than old RCs. In 2004 
when my survey on “Construction of Urban Residential Communities” was conducted, 
most of Beijing’s RCs had already been transformed into the CRCs. According to the 
same decree, the CRCs should operate based on the four democratic principles: 
“democratic election, democratic decision making, democratic management, and
70democratic oversight” . However, this decree does not state clearly the procedure of 
selection of the leadership in the newly-established CRCs. Rather, the selection rules of 
the leadership in the new CRCs are also governed by the 1990 “Organic Law” for RCs, 
and therefore these rules remain the same as those for RCs.71
In recent years, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and its local branches have 
taken measures to promote the direct election of the leadership in the newly-established 
CRCs. For example, in 2004, 182 of 2242 (approximately 8.1 percent) of Beijing’s 
newly-established CRCs had adopted direct elections. In practice, these directly-elected 
CRCs shared the following major characteristics:72 (1) the expansion of the electorate to 
include all residents living in the communities; (2) the residents' right to nominate 
candidates for leaders in the CRCs; (3) the requirement that there be multiple candidates 
for any contested position in the CRCs; and (4) first-time candidates' right to run their 
election campaign in public. However, the majority of the CRCs still followed the old 
procedure for selection o f the leadership.
It may be concluded that this self-government system in the urban areas was only
70 Ministry o f Civil Affairs, “Minzhengbu guanyu zai quanguo tuijin chengshi shequ jianshe de yijian” 
(Views for Advancing the Construction of Urban Residential Communities), (2000). Available [Online]: 
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/content/WJYL_SQJS/200491101216.tml> [11 October 11 2005],
71 Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment.”
72 Xiaoling He, Shequ jianshe m oshiyu ge ’an (Community Construction: Models and Cases) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 2004); Chao Chen, “Democratic Electoral Reform for Communities in 
China,” (2003). Available [Online]: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Apr/62725.htm> [14 
November 2005].
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semi-democratic, if  not non-democratic, since it was in general dominated and controlled 
by the Party-state. As one Chinese scholar has summarized the situation: “to date, 
however, the great majority of elections have been limited to voting by ‘representatives’ 
who are often chosen by the RC itself from among its activists and supporters. Moreover, 
government street officers tend to be heavily involved in the selection o f RC staff; often 
they hire new RC members to work for a trial period of a few months, and then hold an 
election to confirm their choice.”73
B. Participation in the Urban Self-Government System
In order to ascertain the major trends of mass political participation in the self- 
government system, I designed four questions that would measure four types of political 
behavior: (1) voting in the election of RC members, (2) participating in activities 
sponsored by the RC, (3) contacting RC members, and 4) serving in any position 
assigned by the RC. There are two theoretical justifications to choose these four 
categories o f political participation in the urban self-government. First, even though 
these forms o f political participation did not exhaust all types of political behaviors, they 
represent the dominant conventional political acts in the framework of self-government.74 
Thus, they are most likely to represent the fundamental trends of mass political 
participation in the urban self-government system. Second, these forms of political 
behavior are legitimate in the urban self-government. As a result, the survey questions 
about these acts are unlikely to make respondents give interviewers false answers due to
73 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’,” 819.
74 For more on this topic see, Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community Governance; Read, 
“Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and 
Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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the fear of government sanctions against “illegitimate” acts. Thus, the responses to these 
questions are expected to be reliable. Specifically, these four kinds of political 
participation in urban self-government were measured by the following four questions:
1. Have you served in any position assigned by the RC in the past year?
2. Have you ever contacted RC members in the past year?
3. Have you voted in the last election of RC members?
4. Have you participated in any activities sponsored by the RC in the past year?
Respondents were asked to answer each of these four questions on a dummy scale,
where “ 1” indicated respondents’ participation, and “0” referred to their non-participation. 
These four items were then combined to form an additive index to capture a collective 
profile of a respondent’s political participation in the self-government, ranging from “0”, 
indicating non-participation in any kind of activities, to “4” indicating full participation in 
all kinds o f activities listed in the questions. This index is used in the recursive path 
analysis that follows.
A factor analysis is used to test whether these four forms of political acts can be 
formed together to capture the trends of mass political participation in the urban self- 
governance system. Table 27 indicates that the factor analysis strikingly bears out my 
expectation. The pattern that I have discussed in theory is clearly there. The four forms 
o f political acts form a solid base to describe the mass political participation in the urban 
self-governance system. Furthermore, the reliability analysis for these four items shows 
that the inter-item correlations are moderate, ranging from 0.29 to 0.44. This set o f four 
items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of 0.70.
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Table 27. Factor Analysis: Political Participation in the Urban Self-Government
Political Participation in the Urban 
Self-Government
Have you served in any position assigned by the 0.693
RC in the past year?
Have you ever contacted RC members in the 0.668
past year?
Have you voted in the last election of RC 0.794
members?
Have you participated in any activities 0.720
sponsored by the RC in the past year?
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
\  1 component extracted.
2. Initial E igenvalues^.075; % of Variance=51.9
It is my expectation that the middle class people in the private sector are less 
likely than other social segments to participate in the self-government system 
implemented in their neighborhoods. Since the middle-class individuals in the private 
sector are here considered to be likely to have negative attitudes toward the currently- 
implemented self-government, as hypothesized above, they may engage in non- 
participatory action to register their discontent with this system. On the other hand, I 
expect that the middle class people in the public sector are more likely to participate in 
the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods than the private-sector 
middle class. To explore this hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between 
social class and participation in the self-government system against the data from the 
2000 Beijing survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance”.
Table 28 shows the participatory pattern o f different class groups in the self- 
government system implemented in their neighborhoods. Based on the data presented in 
Table 28, we see that the middle class people in the private sector are least likely to
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participate in the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods. 
Approximately 52 percent of the private-sector middle class did not participate in any 
kind of activities, whereas only 17 percent o f the upper class, 22 percent o f the public- 
sector middle class, and 29 percent of the lower class engaged in non-participation.
2) The middle class individuals in the public sector are more likely to participate 
in the self-government system than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 78 
percent o f the middle class people in the public sector indicate that they have participated 
in at least one o f the four types of political acts.
3) The lower class people are more likely to participate in the self-government 
system than all other social groups. Such finding can be explained by the fact that the 
lower class people have the closest ties with the urban self-government system. Since the 
reform, the urban grassroots government (RCs) has been encouraged to develop social 
welfare facilities and other social services which the work units used to provide before
75the reform. In particular, the Party-state expected this grassroots government to become 
the basic social welfare providers to those disadvantaged segments of the urban 
population that are living under the poverty line, retired, unemployed, and handicapped.
In addition, some earlier observations of urban self-government have found that the 
active participants in the urban self-government system are mainly from the segment of
7 f \retired or unemployed people.
75 Kaifeng Yang, “From Danwei Society to New Community Buildings: Opportunities and Challenges for 
Citizen Participation in Chinese Cities,” Chinese Public Administration Review 1, no. 1 (2002): 65-82; 
Agnes Yeung, Kwok Kin Fung, and Kim Ming Lee, “Implementation Problems in the Development of 
Urban Community Services in the People’s Republic o f China: The Case of Beijing,” Journal o f  Sociology 
and Social Welfare 26, no.3 (1999): 151-171; Wang, ed., Residents’ Committee and Community 
Governance', Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
76 Wang, ed., Residents’ Committee and Community Governance; Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban 
‘Nerve Tips’;” Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots 
Democracy and Social Development.
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4) The upper class is more likely to participate in the urban self-government 
system than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 71 percent o f the upper class 
people participated in at least one of the four types of political acts. Such finding simply 
reflects the fact that the upper class individuals have strong ties with the Party-state.
Table 28. Political Participation by Class Identity
Engaging in none o f the four Engaging in at least one of 
activities the four activities
Upper Class 29 71
Public-sector Middle 22 78
Class
Private-sector Middle 52 48
Class
Lower Class______________________  17_________________________ 83___________
Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 23.3; df = 3; p = 0.00
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the private-sector 
middle class is less likely to participate in the self-government system implemented in 
their neighborhoods than other social segments in Chinese society. On the other hand, 
the public-sector middle class has a strong orientation to participate in this self- 
government system. Such findings are consistent with my theoretical discussion and 
support my hypothesis.
C. Attitudinal Orientations toward the Urban Self-Government System
To substantially explore the reason of why the two groups of the middle class 
have different participatory orientations toward the urban self-government, this section
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examines how the two groups of the middle class view the current self-government 
system. It is my expectation that the middle class people in the private sector are more 
likely than other social segments to expect direct election of the self-government system 
because direct election is more competitive and democratic than indirect election 
(controlled by the Party-state), and direct election is more consistent with the general, 
democratic orientations that the private-sector middle class people have. On the other 
hand, I expect that the middle class people in the public sector are less likely to have the 
expectation for direct election of the self-government system that the private-sector 
middle class because the currently implemented indirect election is more consistent with 
the undemocratic belief which the public-sector middle class people have. To explore 
this hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between social class and support for 
direct election of the self-government system against the data from the 2000 Beijing 
Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance”.
In order to assess the urban citizens’ support for direct election of the self- 
government system, I asked my respondents two questions, as follows:
1. Do you agree that the direct election by residents is the best way to select 
members of the Residents’ Committee?
2. Do you agree that the Residents’ Committee should be elected by 
representatives selected by the Party and government?
These two questions asked respondents if  the RC should be directly elected by all 
residents in the neighborhood or by representatives picked by the Party and government.
It should be noted that direct election by the residents without the Party’s intervention 
here is considered a democratic principle. Respondents were asked to answer each of the
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two questions on a 5-point scale. For the first question, “1” and “5” indicated, 
respectively, “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; for the second question, “ 1” and 
“5” stood for, respectively, “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” The values of these 
two questions were added together to form an additive index to capture residents’ support 
for direct election of the self-government system. This index is used in the recursive path 
analysis that follows.
Table 29 shows the bivariate correlation between social class and support for 
direct election of the self-government system. Based on the data presented in Table 29, 
we see that the middle class people in the private sector registered a higher level of 
support for direct election than the lower class, the public-sector middle class, and the 
upper class. Approximately 73 percent of the private-sector middle class people agree 
that the direct election by residents is the best way to select members of the Residents’ 
Committee.
2) The middle class people in the public sector have a lower level of support for 
direct election than the private-sector middle class. Approximately 58 percent of the 
public-sector middle class people agree with the indirect election. In addition, only 27 
percent of the public-sector middle class registered agreement with the statement that the 
direct election by residents is the best way to select members of the Residents’
Committee.
3) The lower class people are less likely to support the direct election of 
leadership in the RCs than the private-sector middle class. But they have a higher level 
of support for direct election than the public-sector middle class and the upper class. 
Approximately 40 percent of respondents from the lower class registered agreement with
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the statement that the direct election by residents is the best way to select members of the 
Residents’ Committee.
4) The upper class people are the least democratic, and they have the lowest level 
of support for direct election. Approximately 62 percent of the upper class individuals 
agree with the indirect election. In addition, only 25 percent o f respondents from the 
upper class registered agreement with the statement that the direct election by residents is 
the best way to select members of the Residents’ Committee.
Table 29. Support for Direct Elections of Residential Committees by Class Identity
Support for the direct 
election1
Support for the indirect 
election2
Upper Class 25 62
Public-sector Middle 27 58
Class
Private-sector Middle 73 21
Class
Lower Class 40 48
Note: All percentages represent positive (“agree” and “strongly agree”) responses.
1. The original question is “Do you agree that the direct election by residents is the best 
way to select members o f the Residents’ Committee?”
2. The original question is “Do you agree that the Residents’ Committee should be elected 
by representatives selected by the Party and government?”
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the Chinese 
private-sector middle class is positively associated with support for the direct 
election of leadership in the self-government system. On the other hand, the 
public-sector middle class shows a strong negative feeling toward support for the 
direct election of leadership in the self-government system.
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As for the evaluation o f the self-government system, I expect that middle-class 
people in the private sector are more likely to negatively evaluate the currently 
implemented self-government system in their neighborhoods than other social segments, 
because the currently-implemented system is still dominated by the CCP, this system 
goes against the private-sector middle class individuals’ democratic expectations 
mentioned above. Thus, the private-sector middle class people are more likely to have 
negative evaluation o f the current system.
As this chapter has discussed, the currently-implemented urban self-government 
system is still dominated by the Party-state rather than being democratically organized by 
all residents. Even though the RCs are officially defined as a body through which all 
residents engage in “self-administration, self-education, and self-service”, their task is 
“not self-administration but rather the fusing of government administration with local
77social networks.” In sum, the major task of the RCs is not to serve the interests of their 
residents but rather to serve the directives from the upper-level government. When any 
demands from residents do arise, the RCs will not be truly responsive to such demands 
but rather use persuasion and pressure to defuse them.
Moreover, the procedure for election of the leadership in the RCs is still un­
democratic. First, the “all residents direct election” has been a rare practice; whereas the 
“indirect election by an electorate consisting of RC small groups representatives” has 
been most widely practiced; second, the nomination of candidates for RC members was 
also closely monitored and controlled by the local government and Party leaders. As a 
result, despite much talk of democratic balloting and scattered experimentation with
77 Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in 
Urban China,” 38.
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reform, elections of the leaderships in the RCs generally remain a thin facade covering
7 0
appointments that are controlled by the local government and Party leaders.
On the other hand, I expect that middle-class individuals in the public sector are 
more likely to positively evaluate the currently implemented self-government system than 
the private-sector middle class, because: first, the public-sector middle class people are 
more likely to identify themselves with the current semi-democratic regime and thus they 
are more likely to possess affective attachments to this semi-democratic self-government 
system; second, this semi-democratic self-government system is more consistent with the 
undemocratic belief which the public-sector middle class people have. To explore this 
hypothesis, I examine the bivariate correlation between social class and evaluation of the 
self-government system against the data from the 2000 Beijing Survey on “Election and 
Urban Local Self-governance”.
In order to detect Chinese urban citizens’ evaluations of the currently 
implemented self-government system in their neighborhoods, I asked my respondents 
two questions, as follows:
1. Do you agree that the current election of the members of Resident’ Committee 
is fair?
2. Do you agree that the current election of the members of Residents’ Committee 
is basically dictated by the Party and government?
These two questions in essence asked respondents whether the currently- 
implemented system was democratic. Respondents were asked to answer each o f the two 
questions on a 5-point scale. For the first question, “1” and “5” indicated, respectively,
78 Read, “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’;” Wang, ed., Residents ’ Committee and Community 
Governance', Choate, “Local Governance in China, Part II;” Benewick, Tong, and Howell, “Self- 
Governance and Community;” Zhang and Yang, ed., Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development.
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“strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”; for the second question, “ 1” and “5” stood for, 
respectively, “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” The scores of these two questions 
were combined to form an additive index to reflect residents’ evaluations of the self- 
government system as implemented in their neighborhoods. This index is used in the 
recursive path analysis that follows.
Table 30 shows the bivariate correlation between social class and evaluation of 
the self-government system. Based on the data presented in Table 30, we see that the 
middle class people in the private sector are more likely to negatively evaluate the 
currently-implemented self-government system than the lower class, the public-sector 
middle class, and the upper class. Approximately 42 percent o f the private-sector middle 
class had a negative evaluation of the currently-implemented self-government system, 
whereas only 8 percent of the upper class and 12 percent of the public-sector middle class 
registered this negative evaluation.
2) The public-sector middle class and the upper class are most likely to positively 
evaluate the currently-implemented self-government system. Approximately 56 percent 
o f the upper class and 46 percent o f the public-sector middle class had a positive 
evaluation of the currently-implemented self-government system, whereas only 23 
percent o f the private-sector middle class people registered this positive evaluation. This 
finding simply reflects the fact that the public-sector middle class and the upper class 
have close ties with the semi-democratic regime and thus are more likely to identify 
themselves with the currently-implemented political system.
3) The lower class people are less likely to negatively evaluate the currently- 
implemented self-government system than the private-sector middle class. But they are
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more critical of the current self-government system than the public-sector middle class 
and the upper class. Approximately 24 percent of the lower class negatively evaluated 
the currently-implemented self-government system, and only 35 percent o f them 
positively evaluated this system.
Table 30. Evaluation of Self-Government by Class Identity
Upper Class Public-sector Private-sector Lower Class
Evaluation of Middle Class Middle Class
Self-Government (%) (%) (%) (%)
Index1
Low 8 12 42 24
Medium 36 42 35 41
High 56 46 23 35
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Pearson Chi-Square = 68.5; d f = 6; p = 0.00
x. The original evaluation index is trichotomized into three categories: high, intermediate, 
and low levels.
Based on this examination of the survey results, I find that the Chinese private- 
sector middle class is more likely to negatively evaluate the currently implemented self- 
government system. On the other hand, the public-sector middle class is more likely to 
have a positive evaluation of this system. Such findings are consistent with my 
theoretical discussion and support my hypothesis.
D. Relationships among Support, Evaluation, and Participation
Based on the above observations and analysis, I have found that the Chinese 
private-sector middle class is less likely to participate in the self-government system
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implemented in their neighborhoods, more likely to support the direct election of 
leadership in the self-government system, and more likely to have a negative evaluation 
of this system; whereas, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the 
urban self-government system, less likely to support the direct election of leaderships in 
the self-government system, and more likely to have a positive evaluation o f this system.
The three Cross-Tab analyses have shown the results of the three separate 
bivariate relationships between the objective indicators of social class and three 
dependent variables. However, these three Cross-Tab analyses did not explain the 
relationships among the three dependent variables (i.e., support for direct election, 
evaluation of self-government, and participation in self-government). An analysis of 
such relationships will explain how the two sub-groups of the middle class internalize 
their attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward the current self-government.
As my hypotheses (H2, H3, H4, and H5) imply, it is my supposition that the 
objective middle class identity is very likely to work through the two attitudinal 
orientations (i.e., support for direct election, and evaluation of self-government) to 
influence participation in the current self-government system. That is, the private-sector 
middle class people’s democratic belief that a political system should be democratically 
formed leads to their negative evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self- 
government system (since under the current system the RC is not directly elected by the 
residents); in turn, this negative evaluation causes the private-sector middle class people 
to engage in non-participatory action to express their discontent with the current system 
that is considered by them as non-democratic; on the other hand, the public-sector middle 
class people’s undemocratic belief may lead to their positive evaluation of the Currently-
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implemented urban self-government system; in turn, this positive evaluation causes the 
public-sector middle class people to engage in participatory action to express their 
support for the current system.
To test this proposition, I ran a recursive path analysis of the structural 
relationship among the three dependent variables (i.e., support for direct election, 
evaluation of self-government, and participation in self-government) within the group of 
the middle class (objectively defined) respondents.79 In order to verify whether this 
proposed relationship can prevail across key demographic divisions, I include in this 
analysis such control variables as sex, education, and income. The results of this analysis 
are illustrated in Figure 3.
Overall, the findings from the recursive path analysis are consistent with my 
proposition regarding the relationships among the attitudinal and behavioral orientations 
toward self-government. Such expected relationships prevailed across major socio­
demographic groupings (i.e., sex, education, and income). Specifically, and first of all, 
among the middle class individuals, the support for direct election significantly and 
negatively affected the evaluation of the current self-government system. Second, among 
the middle class respondents, there was a positive relationship between the evaluation of 
the current system and participation in the system. These findings suggest that the 
middle class individuals who believed in the democratic formation of the grassroots 
governing body (RC) tended to be critical of the current system that was still dominated 
by the Party and thus did not engage in various activities within the current system.
79 To test the structural relationship among the three dependent variables, we employ the analytical moment 
structures (AMOS) model-fitting program. For an introduction to AMOS and Structural Equation 
Modeling, please see Rex B. Kline, Principle and Practice o f  Structural Equation Modeling (New York: 
Guilford Press, 1998); Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With AMOS: Basic Concepts, 
Applications, and Programming (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2001).
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Figure 3. Recursive Path Model of Participation in Self-Government within the Group of the Middle Class
Note: Chi-square= 5.4; df= 10; p= 0.86; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.00; Chi-square/df ratio = 0.54. * p<  0.05; ** p< 0.01.
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Whereas, the middle class individuals who did not believe in the democratic formation of 
the grassroots governing system tended to be supportive of this system and thus engaged 
in participatory action to express their support for the system.
Based on the above discussion, I can draw the following conclusions: (1) because 
the private-sector middle class is more democratic, its democratic belief leads to the 
negative evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self-government system; (2) this 
negative evaluation in turn causes the private-sector middle class people to engage in 
non-participatory action; (3) on the other hand, because the public-sector middle class is 
undemocratic, its undemocratic belief leads to the positive evaluation of the currently- 
implemented urban self-government system; (4) this positive evaluation in turn causes 
the public-sector middle class individuals to engage in participatory action.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has assessed the political behavioral orientations of the Chinese 
middle class people based on their engagement in the civic organizations and the urban 
self-government system. The findings of this chapter indicate that the Chinese private 
sector middle class is less likely to participate in the state-sponsored civic organizations 
and the self-government system implemented in their neighborhoods; whereas, the 
public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the state-sponsored civic 
organizations and the self-government system.
Like their Western counterparts, the Chinese private-sector middle class people 
are also interested in political matters, feel efficacious in regard to participation in 
political and public affairs, and are endowed with the resources (i.e., money and civic
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skills) to do so. As a result, the private-sector middle class is very likely to participate in 
various forms of political activities that are consistent with its democratic belief. The 
democratic behaviors of the private-sector middle class can be measured by the following 
two aspects:
First, the private-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the private 
civic organizations. The private civic organizations, like their Western counterparts, are 
voluntarily and horizontally organized; thus they are more democratic than the state- 
controlled civic organizations, and they are more consistent with the democratic 
principles specified in the previous chapter.
Second, since the private-sector middle class is more democratic, its democratic 
belief leads to the negative evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self- 
government system, which is still dominated by the Party-state; in turn, this negative 
evaluation causes the private-sector middle class people to engage in non-participatory 
action to express their discontent with the current system, which is not consistent with 
their democratic belief.
The democratic demands of the private-sector middle class have posed serious 
threats to the current authoritarian regime. Those politically competent and 
knowledgeable middle class people in the private sector have taken non-conventional 
actions such as forming home-owners’ associations and organizing protest to defend their 
property interests and rights.80 For example, not a few empirical studies and reports have 
documented the role o f newly emerging home-owners’ associations in helping the
80 Cai, “China’s Moderate Middle Class;” Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing 
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China;” Tomba, “Residential Space and Collective Interest 
Formation in Beijing’s Housing Disputes.”
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private-sector middle class individuals protect their interests.81 It should be noted here 
that the home-owners’ associations are more democratic, and are, on many occasions, 
initiated and self-managed by the residents. However, in many urban areas, the local
governments have not legally recognized the existence of the home-owners’ associations
• • 82and have restricted their activities. Furthermore, when their demands cannot be met,
those competent private-sector middle class individuals may even go forward to organize 
protests and demonstrations.83
On the other hand, the public-sector middle class people are less interested in 
political matters, have a lower level o f political efficacy, and are endowed with fewer 
resources to participate in political affairs than the private-sector middle class. In 
addition, the public-sector middle class has negative attitudes toward democracy and 
close ties with the Party-state, all of which will lead the public-sector middle class to act 
in an undemocratic way. The undemocratic behaviors of the public-sector middle class 
can be measured by the following two aspects:
First, the public-sector middle class is more likely to participate in the state- 
controlled civic organizations. The participation in the state-controlled organizations will
81 Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level;” Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights;” Read, “Democratizing 
the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
82 It is until July 2005 that the Chinese National People’s Congress issued the “Law o f Property Rights in 
the People’s Republic o f China” . According to the “Law o f Property Rights”, homeowners may establish 
the Home-Owners’ Associations in their neighborhoods and it does endow ordinary homeowners with the 
right to organize the Home-Owners’ Associations. However, in practice, local governments put many 
limits on the organization o f the Home-Owners’ Associations by ordinary homeowners. As a result, the 
Home-Owners’ Associations almost did not exist in many neighborhoods, and for those existed Home- 
Owners’ Associations, their autonomy is severely impacted by the local government. For more on this 
point, please see “Yezhu beida pingliang chanchu, yezhu weiyuanhui gan’ga qiusheng” (More 
Homeowners Were Beaten and the Home-owners’ Association was in a dilemma), Zhongguo jing ji shibao 
(China Economic Times), 19 June 2002; Read, “Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing 
and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China.”
83 Dolven, “A Home Revolt at Ground Level;” Fan, “The Fight for Property Rights.”
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cause the public-sector middle class to identify with the current semi-democratic regime 
and form affective attachments to current political authority.
Second, since the public-sector middle class people are undemocratic, their 
undemocratic belief and their close ties with the Party-state contribute to their positive 
evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self-government system; in turn, this 
positive evaluation causes the public-sector middle class people to engage in 
participatory action to express their support for the current system.
Based on these observations, I can address the questions put forward in the 
beginning of this chapter: the private-sector middle class, who have democratic values, 
act in democratic ways that will promote democracy in China; whereas, the public-sector 
middle class, who hold negative attitudes toward democracy, act in undemocratic ways 
that will impede the transition to democracy.




Using data from the two Beijing surveys 2000, 2004, and the World Values 
Survey 2001 ,1 have sought to answer three fundamental questions in this study: (1) Who 
are the people who constitute the middle class in today’s China? (2) Does the Chinese 
middle class support democracy as the best form of government? And (3) what impacts 
does attitudinal support of democracy have on the middle class people’s political 
behaviors? On the one hand, since the findings from the World Values Survey are based 
on a national sample, I believe that these findings may be directly applied to the general 
population of urban China. On the other hand, since the findings from the two Beijing 
surveys are based only on the Beijing urban areas, I do not intend to generalize these 
findings to the areas of urban China outside of Beijing. Nonetheless, I believe that the 
findings from the two Beijing surveys and the implications of these findings can 
contribute to a better understanding of these important questions concerning the middle 
class people’s attitudinal and behavioral orientations toward democracy. In this chapter, I 
will summarize the empirical findings from the previous chapters concerning these three 
questions and then elucidate the key political and theoretical implications o f these 
findings.
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In order to determine the identity of the people who constitute the current Chinese 
middle class, I have examined the validity of three types of measurement (i.e., the
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subjective measurement, the income- and education-based quantitative measurement, and 
the occupation-based qualitative measurement) of the middle class that are commonly 
used in the Western literature for the purpose of assessing their applicability to Chinese 
society. The results o f this examination indicate that the occupation-based qualitative 
measurement is the type that is applicable to the study of the middle class in today’s 
China.
First, in regard to the subjective measurement, I have found that the Chinese 
people’s subjective perception of class identification is still far from coming into being, 
even though objective bases of class difference have formed since the post-Mao reform. 
The findings from the World Values Survey 2001 indicate that approximately 7 % of the 
Chinese respondents could not recognize their social class position. Moreover, over 50% 
of the Chinese respondents subjectively identified themselves with the middle class, 
while only 13% of them were objectively qualified for the middle class. This finding 
may imply that most people in a developing, transitional society such as China are 
longing to become members of the middle class and therefore may subjectively (or 
wishfully) identify themselves with the middle class.1
Second, in regard to the income- and education-based quantitative measurement, I 
have found that neither the level of income nor the level of education is a good indicator 
for the purpose o f identifying the middle class in Chinese society. Regarding the income- 
based quantitative measurement, it is very hard to achieve a consensus on the criterion of 
income when defining the middle class, since, an accurate account of personal income is
1 Several earlier empirical studies of social classes in China indicated that over 60% of respondents 
subjectively identified themselves with the middle class. These findings are consistent with my findings in 
this study. See, for example, Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Li, “The Composition and 
Size of China’s Contemporary Middle Class.”
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hard to obtain; moreover, income varies dramatically across the different regions of 
China. More importantly, as Jie Chen pointed out, income does not necessarily indicate a 
person’s true socioeconomic status in the Chinese society. On the other hand, the 
education-based quantitative measurement fails to correctly identify certain people— such 
as self-employed individuals who have not necessarily received a post-secondary 
education— as being middle class.
Third, in regard to the occupation-based measurement, I have found that this 
measurement is promising in overcoming all the drawbacks that the above-mentioned 
two types of measurement have suffered. Therefore, such an occupation-based 
measurement is a more reliable and practical indicator of the middle class in the Chinese 
society. Based on this occupation-based measurement, I operationalize the middle class 
in China by combining four occupational groups typically used in the Western societies: 
self-employed laborers (i.e., private entrepreneur of small or medium-sized business in 
the Chinese context), managerial personnel, professionals, and civil servants (i.e., white- 
collar office workers in the Chinese context). The findings from the 2000 Beijing Survey 
indicate that currently the middle class (defined by this occupation-based measurement) 
in China constitutes no more than 15% of the country’s urban population.
To gain a thorough understanding of the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of 
the middle class, I have examined the unique socio-political background of the 
emergence of the Chinese middle class. The rise of the Chinese middle class is a 
relatively new phenomenon and a direct consequence of the rapid state-led economic 
development of the past two decades. Therefore, the current middle class represents a 
first-generation middle class in the Chinese society. This finding may imply that a 
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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unified and distinctive middle class identity has not formed in Chinese society, since it 
often takes two or more generations for a clear pattern of middle class identity to emerge.
Moreover, the activities of the party-state have been the primary source of the 
formation o f the middle class in China, and almost half o f the Chinese middle class is 
employed in the public sector, which is controlled by the state. The middle class in the 
public sector is primarily composed of the managers in the state-owned enterprises, 
professionals in the public organizations, and staff members in the government and party 
agencies and public organizations. On the other hand, a group of the middle class which 
is employed in the private sector is emerging in the Chinese society. This group of the 
middle class in the private sector is independent from the state power and it mainly 
includes the managers in the private and foreign-related enterprises, professionals in the 
private sector, private entrepreneurs of small and medium businesses as well as the white- 
collar office workers in the private entities.
In order to ascertain the extent of the middle class’ support for a democratic 
government, I have examined the middle class people’s attitudinal orientations in regard 
to three selected democratic values: (1) support for competitive election, (2) support for 
equal protection and rights for all people, as well as (3) support for the sovereignty of the 
people’s will. The two Beijing surveys clearly indicate a higher level of support for (1) 
competitive election, (2) equal protection and rights for all people, as well as (3) 
sovereignty of people’s will among the private-sector middle class than the public-sector 
middle class and other segments of the Chinese population. Overall, these findings 
suggest that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic social group in the
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Chinese society; on the other hand, the public-sector middle class has a fairly negative 
attitude toward democracy.
In order to assess the impact of attitudinal support for democracy on the middle 
class’ political behavior, I have investigated the middle class people’s participation in 
two of the most common kinds of political act in urban China: (1) participation in the 
civic organizations, and (2) participation in the urban self-government system. The 
findings from the two Beijing surveys indicate that the people in the private-sector 
middle class are more likely to participate in the private civic organizations, which are 
democratically organized, and are less likely to participate in the state-controlled civic 
organizations than those in the public-sector middle class. The findings from the two 
Beijing surveys also indicate that the people in the private-sector middle class are more 
likely to be critical of the currently-implemented urban self-government system (since it 
was not organized as democratically as they expected), and therefore less likely to 
participate in the system; on the other hand, the people in the public-sector middle class 
have a positive evaluation of the currently-implemented self-government system, and 
therefore are more likely to participate in the system to express their support for the 
current authoritarian regime. Overall, these findings may imply that the private-sector 
middle class, which holds democratic values, acts in ways that will promote democracy 
in China; while, the public-sector middle class, which holds negative attitudes toward 
democracy, acts in an undemocratic fashion.
In sum, the findings from this study have provided us with a multifaceted picture 
of the Chinese middle class. What does this multifaceted picture imply for CCP rule as
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well as China’s political development in general? I will now address this important 
question.
THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN CHINA’S DEMOCRATIZATION
The empirical findings detailed in this study have important implications for CCP 
rule as well as the future o f democracy in China. Both modernization theorists and 
Western policymakers have expressed the hope that the emergence of a prosperous and 
strong middle class in Chinese society will lead to political change and ultimately 
democratization in that country. However, the findings from this study provide a mixed 
picture about the role of the Chinese middle class in promoting democracy in China. On 
the one hand, the current Party-state can still draw substantial political legitimacy from 
the public-sector middle class; on the other hand, the Party-state has to face the rising 
democratic demands and challenges from the private-sector middle class.
Implication 1: The Public-Sector Middle Class and China’s Democracy
The empirical findings from this study imply that the current Party-state can still 
draw political support from the public-sector middle class to sustain its authoritarian rule. 
First, it is clear that the Chinese public-sector middle class has a negative attitude toward 
democracy. The public-sector middle class, in general, appears to be more concerned 
about issues of material well-being than democratic change, because this class has a 
vested interest in the continuation of the current regime. As An Chen points out, the 
public-sector middle class may “expect a system of checks and balances that could
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effectively.. .hold a tight rein over corruption,” but this class is skeptical of democratic 
change and it hardly accepts the complete overthrow of the current regime.3
Second, the findings of the relationship between the attitudinal support of 
democracy and political behavior imply that undemocratic belief could translate into 
overt or behavioral support for (as opposed to overt alienation from) CCP rule. As 
demonstrated in Chapter V, the public-sector middle class people who have strong 
negative attitudes toward democracy are more likely to participate in the state-controlled 
civic organizations and the currently-implemented urban self-government system. 
Participation in the state-controlled civic organizations and the urban self-government 
system can best be understood as an expression of support for CCP rule, since the state- 
controlled civic organizations and the urban self-government system— in which people 
are no longer coerced to participate— are dominated by the CCP politically and 
ideologically.
Finally, the CCP still enjoys political legitimacy in the minds of the public-sector 
middle class. As documented in Chapter V, an overwhelming majority o f the public- 
sector middle class people, who have strong negative attitudes toward democracy, tend to 
have a positive evaluation of the currently-implemented urban self-government system. 
Since the urban self-government system can be characterized as a proxy for the whole 
political system, support of the urban self-government system can be interpreted as 
support for the current regime. Therefore, this finding suggests that the majority of the 
public-sector middle class people still support the current political regime.
3 Chen, “Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China,” 416.
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Implication 2: The Private-Sector Middle Class and China’s Democracy
The empirical findings from this study also indicate that the private-sector middle 
class poses a serious challenge to the current regime. First, the findings have indicated 
that the private-sector middle class is the most democratic group in Chinese society. The 
private-sector middle class people have shown a strong demand for such democratic 
principles as (1) competitive election, (2) equal protection and rights for all people, and 
(3) sovereignty of people’s will. This rising demand for democracy will, of course, 
constitute a major challenge to the current political regime, since the current regime can 
at best be characterized as semi-democratic, which is not consistent with the expectations 
of those who strongly believe in democratic principles.
Second, the findings of the relationship between an attitudinal support of 
democracy and political behavior imply that democratic belief could translate into 
behavioral alienation from CCP rule. As demonstrated in Chapter V, the private-sector 
middle class people, who are strongly supportive o f democracy, are less likely to 
participate in the state-controlled civic organizations and the urban self-government 
system. This non-participation is a strategy to express discontent with the current 
political system.
Finally, the CCP can not derive political legitimacy from the private-sector 
middle class. As documented in Chapter V, an overwhelming majority of the private- 
sector middle class people, who are strongly supportive of democracy, tend to have a 
negative evaluation of the urban self-government system. Moreover, the private-sector 
middle class individuals’ dissatisfaction with the urban self-government system is 
directed at CCP rule. In my 2004 Beijing interview, quite a few private-sector middle
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class people alleged that the semi-democratic nature of the urban self-government system 
is attributable to the rule of CCP. Mr. M, a middle-level manager of a large private 
enterprise said:
“The CCP set the tone for the currently-implemented urban self-government 
system. As long as the CCP holds power, the urban self-government can not 
become really democratic.”
If the above findings about the private-sector middle-class individuals’ attitudinal 
and behavioral orientations can be repeated in future studies based on national or 
multiple-locality samples, then it can be more assertively argued that the private-sector 
middle class is the harbinger of democratization in China. According to the findings of 
this study, approximately one half of the Chinese middle class is currently employed in 
the private sector, which means that the private-sector middle class constitutes 
approximately 7% of the country’s population. As modernization continues to deepen 
and extend to more socioeconomic sectors as well as geographic areas in China, however, 
the size of the private-sector middle class will grow accordingly. When the private-sector 
middle class gains size, it will play a more important role in promoting democracy at both 
the local and national levels.
When initiating socioeconomic reform in 1978, the Communist Party leadership 
expected to regain political legitimacy through the reform. However, this economic 
reform has brought about unexpected consequences. Market reform has created a sizable 
middle class that is employed in the private sector. This private-sector middle class has 
called for further political reform, including a democratic political system, and this class 
tends to be very critical of the current authoritarian regime. As Jie Chen and Peng Deng 
have observed, economic reform, by which the Party intends to maintain their political
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legitimacy, has changed the public attitude toward politics in Chinese society, and this, in 
turn, will become a catalyst for political transformation 4
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
This study might seem to be overly ambitious, given my initial statement of the 
main goal of this dissertation: to determine whether the Chinese middle class thinks and 
acts democratically and hence serves as the harbinger of democratic change in China. In 
this final section, I will discuss several implications of the findings.
Implication 1: Supplementing the Modernization and Contextual Approaches
The modernization approach seems to be helpful in identifying the pro-democratic 
influence of the middle class on democratization, although it fails to consider the 
different social and historical contexts of the middle classes in the transitional societies. 
This approach is well-suited to tracing the structural linkage between the rise o f the 
middle class and democratization in a society over a long period. Via this linkage, 
modernization theorists using this approach have been able to identify the pro-democratic 
influence of the middle class on democratization in the developing world.
The contextual approach seems more correct by recognizing the different social 
and historical contexts of the middle classes in the transitional societies, although it 
incorrectly treats the role of the middle class as an “arbitrary” or “dependent” variable 
that can be predicted by the overall social context. This approach sensibly takes into 
account the unique social, political, historical and cultural context of the middle class.
4 Jie Chen and Peng Deng, China since Culture Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism  
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995).
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Moreover, both the modernization and contextual approaches tend to be 
structural-oriented. This study offers a new analytical approach to study the role of the 
middle class in democratization by engaging in an individual-level analysis of the 
attitudinal and behavioral orientations of the middle class. Thus, on one hand, I avoid an 
overly simple expectation of the pro-democratic role of the middle class in the 
transitional societies. On the other hand, I am well prepared to answer the question of 
why a large sector o f the middle classes in the transitional societies are illiberal or anti­
democratic— a question that has always frustrated modernization believers who assume 
that the middle class is a consistent agent for democracy.
Implication 2: Inheriting and Modifying the Western Individual-Level Theoretical 
Framework
The predominant view, within the individual-level studies of the middle class in 
the West, suggests that middle-class individuals do think and act democratically: that is, 
they have attitudes in support of democratic principles, and engage in actions (or “non­
actions”) for the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system and against a non- 
democratic system.5
This study inherits and applies this Western individual-level theoretical 
framework: it uses objective factors— owning small properties (specifically referring to 
the apartment properties), supervising others, possessing professional expertise— as the
5 Eulau, “Identification with Class and Political Perspective;” and idem, “Identification with Class and 
Political Role Behavior;” Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy;” and idem, Political Man\ 
Milbrath, Political Participation; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, “Social Structure and Political Participation, 
Part I,” and “Part II;” Glassman, The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-Historical Perspective; and 
idem, The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective; Walsh, Jennings, and Stoke, “The 
Effects o f  Social Class Identification on Participatory Orientations towards Government.”
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initial and dynamic factors in influencing the middle class people’s political attitudes and 
behaviors. In addition, this study has added a new objective factor—the socioeconomic 
ties with the state—to modify the application of this Western individual-level theory to 
transitional societies such as China.
All members of the Chinese middle class own a relatively substantial amount of 
property: all small entrepreneurs own their businesses, while most managerial personnel, 
professionals, and white-collar office workers possess at least their apartments.
According to the Western individual-level theory, one would expect that the Chinese 
middle class would perceive democracy to be the best form of government to protect its 
property. However, the middle class people who have close ties with the Party-state do 
not think this way. As the previous chapters document, the public-sector middle class 
people who are employed either in the state bureaucracy, in state-owned enterprises, or in 
public organizations have close ties with the CCP and very often use these ties with the 
CCP to assure the protection of their property. Moreover, some of the property owned by 
the public-sector middle class came from the Party-state. For example, the public-sector 
middle class people purchased their apartments through their work units at a very low 
subsidized price. Therefore, the public-sector middle class has a vested interest in 
maintaining the rule of the current authoritarian regime and will not support democratic 
change.
On the other hand, the private-sector middle class people who are employed in 
either the private enterprises or organizations often do not have close ties the Party-state; 
thus they are independent from the CCP. Moreover, the material benefits enjoyed by the 
private-sector middle class were mainly acquired through the market. For example, the
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private-sector middle class people purchased their apartments through the market with no 
government subsidy. Since the private-sector middle class people lack powerful political 
patrons to protect their property, they have to rely on legal weapons and have a fairly 
strong demand for an institutionalized democracy. Overall, the private-sector middle 
class is very critical of the current authoritarian regime and demands democratic change 
in China.
In short, the implication of this study in regard to the application of the Western 
individual-level theory is that objective factors, such as owning small properties, 
supervising others, and possessing professional expertise, are the important factors in 
assessing the political orientations of the middle class. In regard to the modification of 
this Western individual-level framework, however, this study adds a new objective 
factor— the socioeconomic ties with the state— in assessing the political orientations of 
the middle class in China. The findings of this study imply that the political orientations 
of the Chinese middle class are not unified, but divided. The middle class people who are 
employed in the private sector have close ties with the Party-state, and thus are less likely 
to support democracy, while the middle class people who are employed in the private 
sector often have no ties with the Party-state and thus are supportive of democratic values.
Implication 3: Explaining and Predicting the Role o f  the Middle Class in the Non- 
Democratic, Transitional Societies
Since the explanatory capability of this new analytical approach has been strongly 
supported by the empirical observations on the Chinese middle class detailed in the 
previous chapters, one might further ask: Can this analytical approach explain and predict
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
the role of the middle class in other non-democratic, transitional societies? The answer to 
this question will be explored in the following tentative discussions of two salient issues.
The first issue concerns the role of the state in the formation and development of 
the middle class in the non-democratic, transitional societies. For example, quite a few 
empirical observations of Pacific Asian societies suggest that the rise of the middle class 
in these countries is a direct consequence of rapid state-led economic development in the 
past several decades.6 A large sector of the newly-emerged middle class in Pacific Asian 
societies is “dependent upon the state for their employment, either as public servants, or 
as employees of state-supported companies.”7
The direct result of this active state intervention in the formation of the middle 
class in Pacific Asian societies is that this class is highly dependent upon state 
patronage.8 This unique relationship between the state and the newly-emerged middle 
class in Pacific Asian societies makes this class quite different from its counterparts in the 
Western democratic societies. Therefore, when analyzing the political attitudes and 
behaviors o f the middle class in the developing world, researchers have to bear this fact 
in mind.
The second issue concerns the variations within the group o f the middle class, 
especially along the line of the relationship with the state. Many empirical studies have 
found that since the state often played a very active role in creating and shaping the
6 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal 
Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia;” Koo, “The Middle Class in the East Asian Newly Industrialized 
Societies.”
7 David Brown and David Martin Jones, “Democratization and the Myth of the Liberalizing Middle 
Classes,” in Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Macmillan, 1995), 92.
8 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Brown and Jones, “Democratization and the Myth of 
the Liberalizing Middle Classes;” Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class 
Culture in Pacific Asia;” Takashi Torii, “The Mechanism for State-Led Creation of M alaysia’s Middle 
Classes,” The Developing Economies 41, no. 2 (2003): 221-42.
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formation of the middle class in the developing world, the emergence of a unified and
distinctive middle class identity was nearly impossible. As a result, these studies suggest
that the political orientations of the middle classes in the developing world are not unified
but divided along the lines of the relationship with the state. As U lf Sundhaussen
concluded, inquiry in the political orientations of the middle classes in the developing
world “would have to begin with distinguishing between the different kinds of Middle
Classes.”9 Furthermore, he observed that:
“the salaried professionals, often in state employ, are usually too dependent on 
their employer, especially if the state has been organized along patrimonial 
lines....Only, the intellectuals, academics, lawyers and journalists, can reasonably 
be expected in Third World countries to champion the cause of democracy.”10
For example, some empirical observations of Pacific Asian societies have found
that the political orientations of the middle classes in the Pacific Asia are not unified but
divided.11 In Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea, a large sector
of the upper middle classes, which are employed either in the state bureaucracy or in
businesses with links to the ruling political party, have generally supported the
consolidation of authoritarian rule,12 since these upper middle classes were the main
beneficiaries of the state activities in the past decades; thus they have a vested interest in
the continuity and stability of authoritarian rule.13 On the other hand, in these countries, a
majority o f the new middle classes, which consist of professional and technical workers,
9 Sundhaussen, “Democracy and the Middle Classes,” 112.
10 Ibid., 113.
11 Tamio Hattori and Tsuruyo Funatsu, “The Emergence of the Asian Middle Classes and Their 
Characteristics,” The Developing Economies 41, no. 2 (2003): 140-60; Koo, “The Middle Class in the East 
Asian Newly Industrialized Societies.”
12 For example, please see Bell, “After the Tsunami;” Brown and Jones, “Democratization and the Myth of 
the Liberalizing Middle Classes;” Neil A. Englehart, “Democracy and the Thai Middle class,” Asian Survey 
43, no. 2 (2003): 253-79; Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in 
Pacific Asia;” Shin, “Social Change, Political Elections, and the Middle Class in Korea.”
13 Bell, “After the Tsunami.”
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as well as managers, tends to be more progressive and is more likely to demand 
democracy than the upper middle classes which have close ties with the state. Therefore 
it would be difficult to summarize the general orientation of the middle classes due to 
such intra-class variation in these countries.
These examples tend to confirm my analytical model: rather than treating the 
newly emerged middle class as a monolithic class, researchers have to divide this class 
into different subgroups, especially along the line of the relationship with the state, 
because these different subgroups of the middle class may have different political 
orientations toward democracy.
FINAL WORDS
The issue of the role of the middle class in promoting democracy in the non- 
democratic, transitional societies has always been complicated. Many scholars, however, 
have persisted in their inquiries into this issue, because it is too important to be neglected. 
Understanding the role of the middle class in democratization can help us to more 
properly and accurately explain and predict the path of democratization in the non- 
democratic, transitional societies. This study has been devoted to finding a better 
analytical approach to this issue. Although this study does not exhaust this issue, it has 
provided an alternative direction for further inquiry into the role o f the middle class in 
democratization in the developing world.
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APPENDIX A
Beijing Survey on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance” in 2000
This data on “Election and Urban Local Self-governance” comes from a public 
opinion survey conducted in Beijing in fall 2000 in cooperation with Renmin University 
of China (also known as People’s University o f China).1 The survey was based on a 
probability sample of Beijing residents, aged 18 years and older. This probability sample 
was derived from a multistage sampling strategy. Four urban districts (qu) were 
randomly chosen at the first sampling stage. At the second sampling stage, 9 streets 
(jiedao) were randomly selected from the four districts with a probability proportionate to 
size (pps), with one large-size district having four streets, two medium-size districts 
having two streets each, and one small-size district having one street. At the third stage 
o f sampling, four neighborhoods were randomly chosen from each of the nine streets 
(since all streets are similar in size). This process yielded 36 residents’ neighborhoods. 
Then 986 households were randomly chosen from 36 residents’ neighborhoods by using 
pps, with large-size neighborhoods having over 30 households, and small-size 
neighborhoods having only about 10 households. At the final stage, one individual was 
chosen randomly from each of the 986 households as the interviewee. The adjusted 
response rate of this survey was 96 percent (946), which is very high by Western 
standards, though quite similar to the response rates from other surveys conducted in 
Beijing.2
1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the survey, its name must remain 
confidential.
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
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College students of sociology were employed as field interviewers, and they were 
trained by project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey was 
carried out. Respondents were assured o f the confidential nature of their responses and 
encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. Circumstantial 
evidence and evidence from other Beijing surveys3 suggest that Beijing residents feel free 
to express their views in public opinion surveys such as ours.
3 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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APPENDIX B
Beijing Survey on “Construction of Urban Residential Communities” in 2004
This data on “Construction of Urban Residential Communities” comes from a 
public opinion survey conducted in Beijing in July 2004. The design of the questionnaire 
and sample, as well as the implementation of the actual survey, was done in cooperation 
with Renmin University of China (also known as People’s University of China).1 The 
survey was based on a probability sample of the Beijing urban residents, aged 18 years 
and older. This probability sample was derived from a multistage sampling strategy.
Four urban districts (qu) were randomly chosen at the first sampling stage. At the second 
sampling stage, 6 streets (jiedao) were randomly selected from the four districts with a 
probability proportionate to size (pps), with two large-size districts having two streets and 
two small-size districts having one street each. At the third stage of sampling, four 
residents’ communities were randomly chosen from each of the six streets (since all 
streets are similar in size). This process yielded 24 residents’ communities. Then 623 
households were randomly chosen from the 24 residents’ communities by using pps, with 
large-size communities having over 30 households and small-size communities having 
only about 10 households. At the final stage, one individual was chosen randomly from 
each of the 623 households as the interviewee. The adjusted response rate o f this survey 
was 95 percent (592), which was very high by Western standards, though quite similar to 
the response rates from other surveys conducted in Beijing.2
1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the survey, its name must remain 
confidential.
2 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China; Shi, Political Participation in Beijing.
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College students of sociology were employed as field interviewers, and they were 
trained by project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey was 
carried out. Respondents were assured o f the confidential nature o f their responses and 
encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. Circumstantial 
evidence and evidence from other Beijing surveys3 suggest that Beijing residents feel free 
to express their views in public opinion surveys such as ours.
3 Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China.
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APPENDIX C
The National Survey of Public Opinion in China, the World Values Survey (WVS)
2001
This data on “The National Survey of Public Opinion in China” comes from the 
WVS 2001 China Survey.1 The WVS 2001 China Survey was implemented by the 
Research Center for Contemporary China at Beijing University on June 2001. The 
sample consists of 1,000 respondents distributed proportionately throughout China so as 
to be representative of the adult population of China (18 years old and over). The WVS 
2001 China Survey replicates the core questionnaire of the international WVS project and 
provides the feasibility of a cross-national comparison.
1 The data used in this dissertation is from Ronald Inglehart. World Values Surveys and European Values 
Surveys, 1999-2001 [Computer file], 1CPSR Version (Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [distributor], 2004).
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APPPENDIX D
Beijing Interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” in 2004
The interview on “Middle Class and its Political Attitudes and Behavior” was 
conducted in Beijing in cooperation with Renmin University o f China (also known as 
People’s University of China).1 The interview sample was designed to reflect the 
variations within the group of the middle class. Thus, our sample included middle class 
individuals from different occupational backgrounds, age groups, and levels of 
educational attainment. In fall 2004, we contacted 40 interviewees, and successfully 
completed 25 interviews. Detailed background information on the interviewees is 
included in the Table below. For reasons o f confidentiality, we do not use their real name, 
but instead use one of 25 letters to indicate their identities.
1 According to my agreement with the department overseeing the interview, its name must remain 
confidential.
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Table 31. The Detailed Background Information of Middle Class Interviewees
Name Sex Age Education Occupational Background Sector
A Female 48 Graduate level Doctor in a public hospital Public sector
B Male 41 College level Middle-level manager in a 
state-owned enterprise
Public sector
C Female 32 College level Accountant Public sector
D Male 28 Graduate level Owner of small company Private Sector
E Male 27 College level Computer Technologist Private sector
F Male 35 College level Middle-level manager in a 
foreign-owned enterprise
Private sector
G Female 25 College level Actress Private sector
H Female 34 Graduate level Lawyer Private sector
I Male 37 High school Owner of small business Private sector
J Female 28 Graduate level Teacher Public sector
K Female 37 College level Middle-level manager o f a 
big private enterprise
Private sector
L Male 32 College level Journal editor Public sector
M Male 34 Graduate level Middle-level manager of a 
big private enterprise
Private sector
N Female 34 College level Journalist Public sector
0 Female 44 College level Middle-level manager of a 
big foreign enterprise
Private sector
P Female 41 Graduate level University Professor Public sector
Q Female 23 College level Staff member in public 
organization
Public sector
R Male 24 College level Staff member in government Public sector
S Male 44 Graduate level Researcher in public 
organization
Public sector
T Female 27 College level Low-level manager in a 
foreign-related enterprise
Private sector
U Male 37 College level Artist Private sector
V Male 47 High school Owner of small business Private sector
w Male 32 Graduate level Independent scholar Private sector
X Female 42 High school Owner o f small company Private sector
Y Female 32 Graduate level Accountant Public sector
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